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Introduction and Plan of Research 
Recent discussions on the appropriate levels of decentralisation in many 
countries, including the UK, coupled with the growing importance of supra-national 
authorities such as the European Union has re-ignited the debate regarding fiscal 
policy conduct over a number of tiers of government. Throughout both the developed 
and developing worlds, there is now a substantial academic and public policy 
literature that discusses the merits and de-merits of alternative levels of expenditure 
responsibility and financial autonomy available to each governmental tier. While this 
literature has been largely normative in nature, in more recent years there has been a 
movement toward a more 'positive' approach. 
However, within the fiscal decentralisation/federalism literature there has been 
surprisingly little cross-country empirical work examining the impact or implications 
of national fiscal policy being determined over a number of tiers of government. The 
vast majority of empirical studies have been limited to individual country studies. 
Even here, the literature is dominated by studies of the USA. While these single-
country case studies have generated a good deal of useful information and plausible 
hypothesis, the applicability of such studies to other less decentralised countries is 
likely to be limited and cross-country studies have much to offer the literature. 
The cross-country empirical studies that do exist tend to be of two types. 
Firstly, there are those which examine the impact of decentralisation on the size of 
national government and secondly, those which examme the impact of 
decentralisation on the national growth rate. Both empirical studies are based on two 
key propositions from advocates of decentralisation: increased decentralisation can a) 
limit the size of government and b) increase the growth rate of a country. It is fair to 
say that the results from both literatures are inconclusive. The relationship between 
government size and decentralisation appears to be unclearl. For example, early 
studies such as Oates (1985) find no significant relationship between the two, while 
more recent studies offer conflicting results; Stein (1999) finds evidence of a 
significant positive relationship between decentralisation and government size in 
Latin America though in contrast, Rodden (2003) finds evidence of a significant 
negative relationship. Similar mixed results are obtained in examinations of the 
relationship between decentralisation and growth2. For example, Davoodi and Zou 
(1998) find a negative but insignificant relationship for developing countries and no 
significant relationship for developed countries. In contrast, ThieBen (2003) finds 
evidence of an apparent non-linear effect within developed countries, with those with 
'medium' levels of fiscal decentralisation associated with the highest growth rates. 
The goal of this thesis is to offer a contribution to this cross-country empirical 
literature. In contrast to those studies outlined above however, we choose to focus on 
a more narrow aspect of national fiscal management; fiscal consolidation attempts. A 
fiscal consolidation attempt is defined as a large and discretionary attempt by a 
country/government to improve the fiscal position. Our aim is to examine the role of 
sub-central tiers of government and their relationship with the centre during such 
1 For an excellent survey see Oates (1999). 
2 For an excellent survey of both the empirical literature and the avenues through which 
decentralisation can impact on growth see ThieJ3en (2003). 
2 
periods of budget adjustment, together with the more general implications of fiscal 
decentralisation on the consolidation process. 
Governments' attempts to improve the sustainability of their fiscal balances 
have been at the forefront of fiscal policy discussion for more than a decade. In some 
countries such as Ireland, the consolidation effort has resulted in stabilised Debt to 
GDP ratios for the first time in a generation. Elsewhere, some previous bastions of 
fiscal prudence such as Germany and France are now struggling to maintain or regain 
sound fiscal positions. Lower interest rates have reduced debt servicing costs for the 
majority, but adherence to fiscal rules and the fiscal implications of ageing 
populations will ensure that the need to strengthen fiscal positions will remain a key 
issue in the years to come. 
A substantial empirical literature has developed exammmg fiscal 
consolidations and some key policy conclusions have emerged. For example, 
following the work of Alesina and Perotti (1995) and McDermott and Wescott (1996), 
it is widely accepted that consolidation attempts based upon expenditure cuts are more 
likely to generate long-term improvements in a country's fiscal position than those 
based upon revenue increases. 
However, throughout this literature, (see for example, Alesina and Perotti 
(1995) Alesina et al. (1998), McDermott and Wescott (1996) and Von Hagen et al. 
(2001)) the focus has been on general government data. General government is the 
3 
aggregate of central and sub-central tiers3. This has one clear advantage in that large 
and consistent data sets are readily available, but in our view, this advantage is 
outweighed by a key weakness. The approach implicitly assumes that governments 
behave as if a single authority exercises complete control over the size and 
composition of fiscal balances. In view of the substantial role played by sub-central 
governments in the conduct of fiscal policy, we believe that it is worth extending this 
literature to look at the distinct contributions made by sub-central and central 
government and examine how these tiers of government interact during consolidation 
attempts. 
The SIze and responsibilities of sub-central tiers of government differ 
markedly across countries. In many countries with a federal structure e.g. the USA, 
Austria, Germany and Canada, sub-central legislatures have considerable political 
power and sizeable spending and financing responsibilities relative to the 
central/federal tier. In Canada, for example, data from IMF Government Financial 
Statistics indicate that over 50% of total government expenditure is conducted by sub-
central tiers. 
In unitary countries it is often assumed that fewer responsibilities are devolved 
to lower tiers of government, although it does not necessary follow that their role in 
fiscal policy is insignificant. Many unitary countries have in fact devolved 
considerable fiscal responsibilities. For example, IMF figures indicate that in 1998, 
sub-central government expenditure was 44% of the general government total in 
Denmark. Even in the UK, still a relatively centralised country, this figure was 22%. 
3 General government is defined by the OEeD as "all departments, offices, organisations and other 
4 
Financing responsibilities also vary, with at least some countries avoiding passing on 
major revenue raising responsibilities. It is relevant to ask whether the central tier 
retaining control over financing obligations makes fiscal consolidation attempts more 
or less likely to succeed. 
Thus the aim of the thesis is to offer a contribution both to the decentralisation 
literature and the fiscal consolidation literature. An outline of the thesis is provided 
below. 
Outline of the Thesis 
In Chapter 1 we begin with a discussion and survey of the extent and format of 
decentralisation in our sample countries. The primary motivation for this Chapter is to 
provide an overview of the key issues of decentralisation and to discuss current 
developments in the literature. In addition to discussing the arguments for and against 
fiscal decentralisation, our cross-country comparative study allows the reader to gain 
an insight into countries' different approaches to decentralisation. We are able to 
demonstrate that while most countries have substantial elements of fiscal 
decentralisation, important differences are evident not just in the level of sub-central 
involvement in fiscal policy conduct, but also in the type of expenditures and taxation 
that these units control. 
bodies which are agencies or instruments of the central, state or local public authorities", OEeD 
(2002). 
5 
Chapter 1 highlights a key issue that recurs throughout the remainder of this 
thesis: the form of sub-central finance. In practice, sub-central expenditures can either 
be financed from revenues raised by the sub-central units themselves or by inter-
governmental transfers. It is apparent that considerations of inter-regional equality and 
central government control result in significant levels of central transfers. By far the 
biggest central transfer is the grant system though in countries such as Austria and 
Germany, tax-sharing arrangements also play an important role. The issues of 
intergovernmental transfers and the contrasts between grants and tax -sharing 
arrangements are important points of discussion which we return to on numerous 
occaSIOns. 
In the mam, the remainder of the thesis focuses primarily upon fiscal 
consolidation attempts and Chapter 2 is devoted to a discussion of the methodology 
used to identify such episodes. In an ideal world, it would be possible to focus on 
episodes when we know for certain that a government/nation had embarked on a 
deliberate discretionary attempt to improve their fiscal position. However in practice, 
such information is unavailable and it is necessary to rely upon movements in data to 
determine ex post, when consolidation has taken place. 
In common with the existing literature we define a fiscal consolidation as a 
discretionary attempt to improve government fiscal balances. In what follows we 
analyse both general government and sub-central government attempts at fiscal 
consolidation. In order to focus on discretionary policy actions it is necessary to 
abstract from the effects of automatic stabilisers and interest payments. This leads us 
to focus on changes in the structural primary balance as a proportion of GDP. While 
6 
both adjustments are deemed appropriate how one adjusts for the economic cycle is 
controversial4. 
As yet, there is no universally accepted technique for decomposing the ratio of 
the primary balance to GDP into its cyclical and discretionary components. Much of 
this Chapter is therefore, devoted to this issue and the attainment of an appropriate 
method to isolate discretionary fiscal policy upon which the subsequent analysis is 
based. We have chosen to adopt the Blanchard Fiscal Impulse (BFI) measure as it is 
transparent, robust and appears to generate results that accord with the consensus of 
stylised facts. In addition, much of the previous consolidation literature has employed 
the BFI, so by following this lead, the comparability of this work and the value added 
of this thesis can be readily observed. 
In addition, we discuss the methods we employ to identify and measure the 
success of consolidation attempts. Again, we outline a number of possible approaches 
in addition to our preferred options. Our approach, which mirrors that of the current 
literature, measures success by observing the post-consolidation performance of the 
debt to GDP ratio. Again, we have chosen this approach in order that the value added 
from our results over the existing literature can be clearly observed. For both our 
techniques of identification and classification of consolidation we demonstrate the 
robustness of our analysis to alternative methodological approaches. 
Having outlined our measure of discretionary fiscal policy, Chapter 3 begins 
4 Interest repayments reflect earlier borrowing and are affected by chagnes in monetary policy and have 
little to do with current fiscal policy. 
7 
our formal empirical analysis of fiscal consolidation attempts. In line with Alesina and 
Perotti (1995 and 1997), Alesina et al. (1998) and McDermott and Wescott (1996), 
we adopt a descriptive approach and examine the size and composition of general 
government consolidations by measuring the average change in the adjusted deficit 
and components of expenditure and revenue during such adjustments. In doing so, we 
are able to discriminate between successful and unsuccessful consolidations and 
compare and contrast the changes that appear conducive to success. However unlike 
the existing studies, this chapter's primary point of interest involves examining the 
distinct contributions of both the centre and the sub-centre to consolidation. 
Our methodology is based upon calculated averages and t-stats and it is this 
simplicity which is the major advantage of our analysis. We also construct a novel, 
more refined measure of success and in doing so, we are able to observe interesting 
features of successful and unsuccessful consolidation attempts that have been 
previously overlooked. By focussing on descriptive contemporaneous changes III 
fiscal policy, we are able to clearly identify the alternative characteristics of 
successful and unsuccessful fiscal adjustments. In addition, our approach offers a 
previously unexplored insight into the distinct contribution of the sub-central tier and 
of their interaction with the centre during consolidations. We believe that this 
extension of the literature to account for the separate contributions of central and sub-
central tiers separately, offers an important step forward. 
To summarIse our key results, we find that during national consolidation 
attempts, sub-central governments do in fact playa key role, especially in successful 
attempts. We also verify a result from the existing literature that successful 
8 
consolidations tend to be based upon expenditure cuts as opposed to increases in 
revenue and demonstrate that this result holds at both central and sub-central tiers. 
Indeed the majority of consolidations involve shared effort across both tiers of 
government. This is especially important with regard to the wage bill. Previous 
studies have stressed the importance of tackling the government wage bill during 
consolidation and we are able to demonstrate that the involvement of sub-central tiers 
of government is crucial to achieving such cuts. However, our results also 
demonstrate that a consolidation attempt is less likely to be successful if the relative 
brunt of the consolidation effort is skewed toward the sub-central tier. 
On numerous occasions we observe that central governments exert a strong 
influence on the expenditure of sub-central tiers through their grant allocations. 
Changes in these allocations essentially 'force the hand' of the sub-central tiers to 
adjust expenditures and have a considerable impact upon the outcome of 
consolidation attempts. 
An apparent downside is however revealed in the analysis of the composition 
of expenditure in that there is a bias toward cuts in local/regional public investment 
programs. This result is especially evident when focus is directed from general to sub-
central government consolidation attempts. For example, when sub-central 
governments consolidate, without any similar adjustment at the centre, the vast 
majority of the adjustment to sub-central expenditures is borne by capital investment. 
This bias toward cuts in capital expenditure represents a genuine cause for concern, 
given the long-term implications for local service provision. 
9 
While Chapter 3 is able to offer an important insight into the role of sub-
central tiers during consolidation attempts, the primary limitation with the 
methodology adopted here and in the fiscal consolidation literature in general, is the 
restriction of the analysis to the period of actual adjustment. Little is known about 
fiscal policy behaviour both before and after consolidation. For example, we are 
unaware whether consolidation attempts appear to follow periods of expansion or 
more limited contraction and/or whether any reforms made in the period of 
consolidation are sustained. In Chapter 4 therefore, we extend our descriptive analysis 
so that we can observe changes in fiscal policy both in the period of consolidation and 
in surrounding periods. 
To undertake this analysis we conduct an event study. This methodology is 
popular in the Finance literature but is less widely observed in macroeconomics. In 
our context however, we argue that event analysis methods are highly applicable and 
can offer some important insights. The methodology we adopt enables us to conduct a 
natural experiment to capture the difference between fiscal behaviour during both the 
period of consolidation and surrounding years with 'normal' (i.e. non-consolidation) 
years. While the methodology has been adopted elsewhere in Tomell and 
Westermann (2002), its application to fiscal consolidations is novel. 
In addition to exammmg episodes of consolidation, in Chapter 4 we also 
extend our analysis to examine the response of sub-central governments to periods 
when their grant allocations are cut. This enables us to examine the extent to which 
sub-central governments adjust expenditures and use their own fiscal powers (where 
these are significant) to offset the cuts in grants. The literature on central government 
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grant allocations and the associated 'flypaper' effect has largely been limited to 
studies that use USA data, while any non-USA studies have been limited to individual 
country case studies - see for example Gramlich (1977), Hines and Thaler (1995) and 
Moisio (2003). Our analysis in this section of Chapter 4 is therefore, an important 
step-forward as we are able to conduct what we believe to be the first study of grant 
cuts on a cross-national basis. 
In summary, while verifying the key conclusions of the previous chapter a 
number of additional results are obtained in Chapter 4. For example, we verify that 
successful fiscal consolidations bring with them similar and sustained cuts in 
expenditure at the sub-central level with grants playing an important role in 'forcing 
the hand' of the sub-centre. In contrast, unsuccessful consolidations tend to be driven 
by short-term revenue increases - i.e. higher revenues in the period of consolidation 
followed by cuts in the immediate aftermath. 
In our event study of grant cuts, our results shed some light on how sub-central 
governments react to cuts in grants and thus, at least indirectly, on the 'flypaper' 
effect, by showing that it operates in reverse. Not only do sub-central governments 
react to a cut in grants by cutting expenditures, but remarkably those countries with 
structures which are more decentralised and apparently involve greater fiscal 
autonomy tend to cut expenditures by more, and seem reluctant to raise sub-central 
taxes. This reverse 'flypaper' effect might highlight either a low degree of effective 
fiscal autonomy, or a high effective degree of tax competition at the sub-central level 
which prevents any offsetting increase in local taxation. 
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Furthermore, by grouping countries using country characteristics in our event 
analysis regressions, we can examine whether particular patterns of reaction to fiscal 
consolidations or cuts in central government grants are particularly applicable to 
certain individual or groups of countries. We find for example, that coalition 
governments appear less willing to cut sub-central grant allocations in periods of 
fiscal consolidation. This is consistent with the political economy belief that the type 
of government can be an important determinant of fiscal policy conduct within a 
particular country. 
In Chapter 5 we change tack slightly and discuss the implications of 
alternative sub-central financing regimes on the ability of the centre to influence sub-
central and hence national fiscal policy. One weakness with standard public finance 
databases such as the OECD's Revenue Statistics and the IMF's Government Finance 
Statistics is that they are likely to overestimate the extent of sub-central financial 
autonomy by attributing all taxation revenue received by the sub-centre as 'own-
source'. In many countries, significant tax sharing arrangements exist and while the 
sub-centre 'receives' these tax revenues they have little or no control over how they 
are raised. As evident from OECD (1999), under most tax sharing regimes the central 
and sub-central share of the total pool of revenues raised from shared taxes is fixed 
either by the constitution or by some previously mutually agreed means-tested 
formula. However, even though the tax 'shares' each tier receives are fixed, the centre 
retains full control over the base and the rate of this commonly shared revenue source. 
Therefore, it has been argued in the recent literature, see Rodden (2002), Pola (1999) 
and Ebel and Yilmaz (2002), that such revenues are in effect a central transfer and 
should be classified in an identical way to grants. 
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However, in Chapter 5 we outline, VIa a stylised budgetary accounting 
framework, that there are important differences between grants and the most common 
form of tax sharing arrangement. These differences lead to a clear distinction in the 
extent of 'effective' central control over sub-central fiscal policy. In essence, under a 
system of grant finance, the centre is able to manipulate sub-central fiscal policy in a 
manner that is akin to full centralisation. By altering annual grant allocations, the 
centre is able to 'force the hand' of the sub-centre to consolidate. In contrast, under a 
system of tax sharing, provided that the tax shares received by each tier are fixed or 
require the consent of both tiers before alteration, the level of central control is in fact 
more akin to that under full decentralisation. In this scenario, the centre is unable to 
'force the hand' of the sub-centre and the degree of 'effective' control is significantly 
more limited. 
We believe that this result has important implications at both the policy and 
academic levels. While both tax sharing and grants represent a reduction in sub-
central financial autonomy relative to full tax autonomy, the degree of effective 
central control is higher under a system of grants than under tax sharing. Therefore, 
switching from grant finance to tax sharing, contrary to established thinking, 
represents a substantial loss in central effective control. On the academic front, this 
result implies that despite the recent trend in the literature, it is inappropriate to 
classify grants and tax sharing arrangements as equivalent sources of 
intergovernmental transfer. Although both involve a transfer of resources, the relative 
ability of the centre to control these transfers differs substantially. 
13 
Finally, while Chapters 3 and 4 examine the role of sub-central governments 
during national consolidation attempts, in Chapter 6 we explicitly test whether the 
degree of decentralisation impacts on the nature and ability of a country to undertake 
a successful consolidation. In doing so, we aim to shed light on an important concern 
of the decentralisation literature by testing whether higher levels of decentralisation 
lead to a loss in macroeconomic control. While the political economy literature has 
assessed the relative impact of different types of government and budgetary 
institutions on the ability of a country to implement a successful consolidation, the 
role of decentralisation has so far been ignored. This is surprising as the literature has 
stressed the importance of political fragmentation during budget negotiations on fiscal 
outcomes and it would seem plausible that at a first glance, similar fragmentation can 
exist when national fiscal policy decisions are conducted across tiers of government. 
At the outset, pnor to any empirical analysis, we discuss in detail the 
construction of our measures of decentralisation which we use to capture differences 
in the relative power of sub-central authorities. We construct two measures, one based 
on the level of fiscal decentralisation and the other on the level of sub-central political 
autonomy. Both measures we believe are as accurate as possible using current data 
and provide good approximations of the level of decentralisation within our sample 
countries. From this, we are able to test directly whether the degree of decentralisation 
impacts on consolidation attempts. Our approach again focuses on both the 
composition and the success rates of consolidation attempts and assesses the impact of 
decentralisation on both of these outcomes. 
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In conducting our analysis of the composition (i.e. the extent of the adjustment 
to expenditure andlor revenue) of our identified consolidation attempts, we initially 
adopt standard OLS/SUR analysis although such an approach can be influenced by 
cross country differences in the size of government. A method which circumvents this 
problem and has a number of other additional advantages is to employ limited 
dependent variable (LDV) analysis. In this chapter we use both binary and ordered 
dependent models. While binary models have been used in the existing literature, we 
believe that the use of an ordered model is unique. A similar approach is adopted in 
our analysis of success. In both the analysis of composition and success, we include a 
number of economic and political 'control' variables to obtain a full understanding of 
the factors contributing to both the reliance upon expenditure or revenue adjustment 
and its ultimate long term outcome. For example, in addition to measures of the 
output gap and the monetary stance, we also account for the 'type of government' at 
the centre during consolidation and examine the extent to which single party, 
coalition, minority, right and left wing governments consolidate differently from each 
other. 
The results from this chapter suggest that while decentralisation does appear to 
have a limited impact on the composition of a consolidation attempt, it is unclear if 
this is sufficient to generate a significantly lower probability of success. In our 
analysis, we find that countries with higher levels of decentralisation typically base 
their consolidation attempts on revenue increases as opposed to expenditure cuts. We 
interpret this result as consistent with the hypothesis that political fragmentation in the 
budgetary setting process can skew the consolidation attempt toward the less 
politically 'sensitive' elements of fiscal policy. However, we find that in a direct test 
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of whether or not increased decentralisation lowers the probability of a successful 
consolidation, having accounted for various political and economic controls, our 
measures of decentralisation tend to be insignificant. This result suggests that at a first 
pass, decentralisation does not lead to a significant loss of general government fiscal 
control. 
One issue, which we discuss in detail in Chapter 6, is the attainment of an 
appropriate measure of decentralisation for each country in our sample. While we 
believe that the methods we have applied are a significant improvement on previous 
studies, further advancements are possible. However, attaining these will require 
additional data and information which as yet, is unavailable. In the final section of 
Chapter 6 we outline some important measurement issues and potential avenues for 
future research. This is an aspect I wish to advance in post-doctoral studies. 
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Chapter 1 
"Fiscal Decentralisation: A Discussion of the Literature and Cross-Country 
Experiences I" 
1.1. Introduction 
The issue of fiscal decentralisation has become of paramount importance for 
many countries in recent years. Throughout both the developed and developing 
worlds, there is now a substantial academic and public policy literature that discusses 
the merits and de-merits of alternative levels of expenditure responsibility and 
financial autonomy available to sub-central governments. In some countries, such 
debate has led directly to fiscal reforms. The recent first wave of devolution in the UK 
for example, represents one of the most fundamental changes to the UK Constitution 
in over a century. The UK has not been alone in undertaking or contemplating 
increased sub-central fiscal responsibility and similar issues are being discussed in 
France, Spain and Italy. 
In many instances, discussions regarding the appropriate level and form of 
decentralisation are motivated by political concerns. In Spain for example, increasing 
the fiscal powers of the Autonomous Communities (ACs) was seen as an essential 
part of the democratisation process. In others, including the UK, decentralisation has 
I We would like to thank participants at the Scottish Affairs Seminar on Scottish Devolution and to J 
M0nnesland for extensive comments on an earlier version of this Chapter. 
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been a response to pressures from regional/national groups for more participation in 
and control of the political process. At the extreme, sub-central devolution can 
represent an attempt to keep a country united in the face of such pressures either by 
granting greater autonomy to all regions, or, as in Spain, Italy and the UK, by forging 
asymmetric devolved powers. 
Political decentralisation refers to the transfer of formal political power from 
'higher' levels of government to 'lower' level government. In contrast, fiscal 
decentralisation concerns the transfer of financial resources and responsibility for the 
provision of certain goods and services from 'higher' to 'lower' levels of government. 
Clearly there is considerable overlap between political and fiscal decentralisation and 
it is virtually impossible to completely separate political and economic factors. 
However, the focus of this thesis is primarily upon the economic aspects of fiscal 
decentralisation and discussion will therefore be primarily restricted to this area. 
Nevertheless and where appropriate, acknowledgement and analysis of relevant issues 
from the political science literature will be made. 
In order to analyse the role and implications of fiscal decentralisation for 
national fiscal consolidation attempts it is, at the outset, necessary to provide a 
summary of the key issues previously highlighted in the fiscal decentralisation 
literature. This chapter aims to discuss such issues by adopting a two-strand approach. 
Firstly, we summarise the levels and forms of fiscal decentralisation in our OECD 
sample countries and compare and contrast the fiscal arrangements adopted. We 
demonstrate that while most countries have substantial elements of fiscal 
decentralisation, important differences are evident not just in the level of sub-central 
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involvement in fiscal policy conduct, but in the type of expenditures and taxation that 
these units control. In addition, we show that the degree of borrowing autonomy and 
central government control/influence over the sub-centre also differs quite 
considerably across countries. Secondly, in examining cross-country experiences we 
also draw on the established literature to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of 
alternative decentralisation structures. 
At the heart of much of our discussion lies the fact that, while there are many 
persuasive arguments for decentralising substantial elements of government 
expenditure to sub-central tiers, the financing of these arrangements is less clear. 
Concerns over equality, administrative complexity, economies of scale, transparency, 
macroeconomic stability and reliable revenue flows tend to favour centralised revenue 
collection and consequently, various forms of central control over sub-central 
finances. As our analysis shows, most major taxes are typically assigned to central 
governments. Thus, there is an inherent imbalance between on the one-hand 
expenditure assignment and on the other revenue assignment. This observation is of 
key importance in future chapters. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In Section 1.2 we introduce the 
dataset that is used throughout the thesis. Section 1.3 reviews the theoretical 
arguments for and against the decentralisation of spending responsibilities. In 
addition, we provide a cross country comparison of the extent to which spending 
powers have been devolved in the countries in our sample, putting each country's 
position into a wider context. In Section 1.4 we shift focus toward the revenue side. In 
doing so, we review some insights from the theory of fiscal federalism on fiscal 
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autonomy and assess the actual extent of sub-central revenue autonomy for the 
countries in our sample2. Revenue decentralisation tends to be more complex than 
expenditure decentralisation with greater scope for variation between nations. 
Consequently much of this chapter is devoted to this issue. Section 1.5 concludes. 
1.2. Data 
Throughout this thesis the primary source of data is the International Monetary 
Fund's Government Finance Statistics (GFS), 2002 Edition. In addition, we 
supplement this with data from the OECD Statistical Compendium, 2002 Edition. 
GFS provides the best internationally comparable data on fiscal variables across 
OECD countries disaggregated by tier of government. International comparability is 
the great strength of the GFS database. Unlike general government fiscal data, 
separate fiscal data on central and sub-central expenditures and revenues is difficult to 
find. While it is possible to obtain fiscal data on an individual country basis, in most 
cases, given differences in measurement and accounting, such data is not comparable. 
The GFS presents fiscal data for central, state and local authorities for a number of 
countries which is directly comparable. For the most part, in federal countries we 
combine state and local authority fiscal data to obtain an aggregate measure of sub-
central fiscal policy. The data is annual. 
2 In the UK, the academic and policy debates have typically termed discussions regarding revenue 
autonomy as fiscal autonomy. In other circles, fiscal autonomy is used to refer to both expenditure and 
revenue autonomy. In this thesis we adopt the UK definition so that discussions regarding 
decentralisation of revenue responsibility are referred to as fiscal autonomy. 
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GFS allows one to examine individual components of fiscal policy in addition 
to aggregate measures. Thus, we are not only able to examine total expenditures, total 
revenues and aggregate deficits, but in addition we can differentiate expenditures 
according to economic type (e.g. social transfers, wages etc) and function (e.g. 
defence, health care etc), while revenues can be disaggregated according to taxation 
(direct and indirect), fees and user charges and inter-governmental grants. Therefore, 
the GFS database provides an invaluable source of central and sub-central government 
data upon which cross-country analysis can be carried out. While alternative sources 
such as the OEeD's Revenue Statistics contain similar data on total revenues and 
expenditures across tiers of government, they do not provide as precise a 
decomposition of such aggregates. The use of the GFS database is therefore highly 
advantageous in our analysis of how tiers of government consolidate. 
Given data constraints, we restrict our focus to fifteen countries which 
includes both unitary and federal countries. Within these fifteen countries the sample 
periods differ within the range 1970 - 1999. The countries examined, together with 
their respective sample periods are listed in the following table. 
Table 1.1: Samule Periods 
Country Start data End date Country Start data End date 
Australia 1980 1998 Ireland 1970 1997 
Austria 1970 1994 Netherlands 1975 1997 
Belgium 1978 1998 Norway 1980 1998 
Canada 1979 1999 Spain 1980 1997 
Denmark 1977 1999 Sweden 1978 1999 
Finland 1972 1993 UK 1970 1998 
France 1978 1997 USA 1980 1999 
Germany 1974 1998 
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A description of the data is provided in an Appendix. 
Although we believe this dataset is ideally suited to our research, it does have 
some weaknesses which must be recognised. An obvious one is that little or no 
distinction is made between revenues from taxes, where the sub-central tier control 
both the tax rates and/or the tax base and revenues from tax-sharing arrangements. 
The GFS classifies all taxation revenue received by sub-central tiers as being 'own-
source'. Many countries, including Norway, Germany and Austria make extensive use 
of tax-sharing arrangements. Tax-sharing arrangements exist when both the centre and 
the sub-centre receive revenues from the same source. The level of sub-central 
influence over such shared tax revenues varies both by country and type of tax. In 
many instances, sub-central authorities have very little autonomy to alter the revenues 
they receive from such taxes and hence it is arguably more appropriate to interpret 
such revenues as transfers rather than 'own-source'. 
Information on such shared revenues has been difficult to find, although a 
recent study OECD (1999) has made progress in this area. The OECD (1999) study 
was the first to explicitly differentiate sub-central taxation revenues into those where 
sub-central tiers have full autonomy and those that are shared with the centre. The 
study also measures the ability of sub-central tiers to alter the rate and base of the 
shared taxes. In the analysis that follows, we have been able to take into account this 
additional information. 
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Another potential weakness is the extent to which central government can 
exert influence on sub-central spending patterns through directives (see Pola (1999) 
and Ebel and Yilmaz (2002», GFS will overstate the true nature of sub-central 
expenditure autonomy. 
To the extent that central governments continue to be seen, or see themselves, 
as accountable to their electorate, they may fear the consequences of any deterioration 
in standards of provision following decentralisation, prompting the response of 
explicit directives. Areas such as health and education are common examples in which 
central government direction goes beyond simple guidance. In such circumstances 
sub-national governments should be seen not as independent providers of public 
services, but as local agencies implementing central government policies, see Tanzi 
(2001). Unfortunately, where directives are used, the GFS data will overestimate the 
true extent of fiscal decentralisation. 
Obtaining an accurate cross-country comparison of the extent and significance 
of directives and central government influence is likely to be problematic. Ebel and 
Yilmaz (2002) have conducted some very preliminary analysis for a small selection of 
Eastern European countries in one particular year, but such studies are very much in 
their infancy. Nevertheless, despite these caveats the GFS remains without question 
the best available internationally comparable dataset for our purposes and we have 
chosen this as the primary source of data in the analysis that follows. 
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1.3. Expenditure Decentralisation: Motivation and Cross-Country Experiences 
Every country in the developed world assIgns some elements of national 
government expenditure to sub-central tiers of government. Expenditure 
decentralisation occurs when units of authority, other than the central government, are 
responsible for the provision of certain government services. While the type of 
expenditure assigned to sub-central tiers tends to be similar across countries, the 
actual level and degree of responsibility for particular types of national government 
expenditure differs considerably. We begin with a discussion of the benefits and costs 
of alternative levels of expenditure decentralisation before examining the cross-
country evidence. 
1.3.1. Theory 
The economic theory of decentralisation draws on contributions by Tiebout 
(1956), Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972). An excellent overview is provided in 
Oates (1999)3. There is broad agreement that central government should have 
responsibility for macroeconomic stabilisation, overall redistribution, and for 
functions providing clear collective benefits or spillovers (such as national defence, 
international relations and research and development). However, a key presumption 
made by proponents of decentralisation is that centralised provision in other areas can 
be too uniform and relatively inflexible in the face of potentially diverse regional 
preferences and needs. Decentralisation can aim at increasing the role of those with 
3 Many of the arguments here relate to both expenditure and revenue decentralisation and will be 
repeated in Section 1.3. 
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greater knowledge of local preferences so that fiscal decisions made at the sub-
national level better reflect regional diversity. 
Given regional diversity, Tiebout's (1956) model of revealed preference 
predicts that consumers will choose to locate in jurisdictions that provide the mix of 
public services that maximise their welfare. The intention is that citizens who are 
dissatisfied with the pattern of provision in their area can, if they wish, move to areas 
where the pattern suits them best Therefore under certain assumptions, diversity of 
provision combined with consumer mobility can lead to pareto optimal provision. 
This idea is driven by the 'benefit principle' which states that a given service 
should be provided by the level of government that most closely represents the region 
that benefits. From a traditional textbook perspective the gains are obvious. 
Underlying the optimal provision of a public good is the condition that the sum of the 
marginal rates of substitution for a public good, vis-a.-vis a basket of private goods, 
should equal the marginal costs of producing an extra unit of the public good. To the 
extent that marginal rates of substitution (and to a lesser extent marginal costs) differ 
between regions, this efficiency condition requires different levels of public good 
provision between regions in order to marry the heterogeneous preferences of each 
region with marginal cost. 
In many respects the concept of 'subsidiarity', as proposed in the Maastricht 
Treaty and reasserted in the Amsterdam Treaty through the notion of bringing 
decisions as close as possible to the citizen, relates closely to this concept of 
efficiency in public service provision. Recently, this has received further impetus, 
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both within individual ED states and from the ED's Committee of the Regions. An 
additional benefit of bringing decisions closer to citizens is that this may promote 
their involvement in the democratic process, see for example, Tanzi (2001). 
The greater sensitivity of sub-central governments to local preferences, may 
enhance the ability of the provider to identify both recipients and citizens' willingness 
to pay4. It is argued that individuals will be more willing to pay for services that they 
find to be responsive to their priorities, especially if i) they have been involved in the 
decision making process, and ii) costs are clearly perceptible in that process. In short, 
decentralisation may result in a closer approximation to the efficient solution of 
provision to the point at which the marginal costs and benefits of provision are 
equated. 
Theory also has something to say about the optimal SIze of sub-central 
governments. Oates' (1972) classic work on fiscal federalism suggests that 
jurisdictions should be designed, and the assignment of public expenditures should be 
carried out, in such a way that provision is the responsibility of the jurisdiction 
representing the smallest possible area over which the benefits are distributed. The 
notion is to combine the most efficient allocation of public goods whilst avoiding taste 
differences (Atkinson and Stigilitz 1980). Complete compliance with this principle 
would suggest that different services would be associated with jurisdictions of 
different optimal sizes. Obviously other inefficiencies would result from a multiplicity 
4 The demand revelation problem is a well-recognised issue in public economics. While the market 
determines the exact quantity of private goods in equating supply and demand, no parallel mechanism 
exists for public goods. Instead, policymakers are required to assess desired levels of supply of each 
good, given costs of supply and perceived public preferences. 
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of tiers of government, but the key principle is that the size of the sub-central tiers 
should be chosen to be suit the broad range of services provided. 
Finally, it has been suggested that decentralisation can foster innovation, in 
that diversity may result in greater experimentation and innovation in provision, and 
additionally provide valuable information about potential improvements in policy 
design, e.g. through piloting new approaches. In conjunction, a necessary feature must 
then include some mechanism/forum for cross regional sharing of ideas/findings. 
While the above 'normative' arguments suggest possible benefits from 
decentralisation there are also a number of potential 'positive' benefits. Perhaps the 
most famous relates to the possibility that decentralisation itself may impact on the 
actual size of government. A large literature has evolved on the ability of sub-central 
governments to act as a constraint upon central government 'Leviathans'. Brennan 
and Buchannan (1980) have argued that politicians at the centre have a motivation to 
maximise the size of government beyond the level that is most efficient and in doing 
so, they create a 'Leviathan'S. By devolving fiscal responsibility away from the 
centre, it is possible that this incentive effect can be curbed as under decentralisation, 
government's quest for rents and revenue is undermined by the need for jurisdictions 
to compete for mobile sources of revenue. Empirical evidence regarding the 
Leviathan is mixed. Initial studies such as Oates (1985) found no evidence and in fact, 
he was forced to conclude that the Leviathan appeared to be a 'mythical beast'. More 
recent work by Rodden (2003) provides evidence of a negative relationship between 
government size and decentralisation, provided that in addition to measuring 
5 This cynical belief on the behaviour of politicians is central to the Public Choice or Virginia school of 
public economics. 
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expenditure decentralisation, account IS also made of the degree of revenue and 
borrowing autonomy6. 
Another branch of this 'positive' approach has been to examme the 
relationship between decentralisation and economIC growth. As pointed out by 
ThieBen (2003), the theoretical arguments of the impact of decentralisation on 
economic growth are ambiguous. For example, proponents of decentralisation argue 
that benefits from diversification of public goods in line with the Tiebout (1956) 
hypothesis, constraints on government size, improvements in productivity from more 
responsive and innovative sub-central governments, and better general governance 
can lead to improvements in economic growth. In contrast, opponents argue that the 
potential for increased macroeconomic instability, the likelihood of weak and corrupt 
local politicians and bureaucracy, the scarcity of 'good' local taxes and harmful inter-
state tax competition may all serve to reduce growth. Given this, it is unsurprising that 
the empirical evidence is mixed. For China, Zhang and Zou (1998) find evidence of a 
negative relationship between decentralisation and growth though in a similar study 
for the USA, Xie et al. (1999) found no relationship. Similar results are obtained in 
cross country studies with Davoodi and Zou (1998) finding a negative though 
insignificant relationship while ThieBen (2003) finds that for a group of high income 
countries, those with a 'medium' level of decentralisation are associated with the 
highest growth rates. 
Of course, there are arguments that suggest limits should be imposed on the 
6 In fact, this result is entirely consistent with the original claim by Brennen and Buchannan (1980) 
which was that the overall size of the public sector "should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the greater the 
extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralised". 
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extent of decentralisation of spending decisions. Some public goods are by nature 
inappropriate for sub-central tiers. These include 'national' public goods such as 
defence, foreign affairs etc. For such goods and services which are non-rival m 
consumption within an entire country and where there are significant economies of 
scale, it is efficient for provision to be restricted to the central levee. Furthermore, 
concerns about national economic stability and the ability of the central government, 
the ultimate guarantor of macroeconomic policy, to respond to unforeseen events, 
requires that they retain the ability to control sufficiently large levels of fiscal policy. 
A downside of expenditure decentralisation is that there is no guarantee that sub-
central fiscal policies will be entirely consistent with those of the central government. 
For example, sub-central governments may wish to pursue a more expansionary 
policy strategy than the centre. Even if both agree on the 'stance' of fiscal policy, 
changes in the composition of sub-central expenditures can affect aggregate demand 
in ways which may run counter to the objectives of the centre. The issue of central 
control during macroeconomic adjustment is a key concern and one that we will 
return to on a number of occasions, especially in Chapters 5 and 6. 
Decentralisation may also come into conflict with distributional/equality 
objectives. Central governments are likely to be concerned about issues of equality of 
access to public services and uniformity, or at least an acceptable minimum in 
standards of provision. To the extent that substandard levels of provision of certain 
public goods affect adversely the stock of human capital of the country, there can be 
significant efficiency costs from the decentralisation of these types of expenditures. 
7 In Finland, the local government system encourages shared programs between individual 
municipalities to gain from economies of scale. The obvious downside to this is a potential loss in 
transparency and accountability. 
31 
Such concerns are particularly strong in areas such as health and education, not least 
because electorates tend to perceive the accountability to lie with central government. 
Furthermore, the ability of sub-central governments to provide public goods and 
services to their residents may vary widely leading to undesirable social and political 
tensions. 
To the extent that the economic arguments outlined above motivate shared 
responsibilities of central and sub-central tiers of government, there may be increased 
administrative complexity, lack oftransparency and potential clashes in competencies. 
These disadvantages could easily offset potential benefits. Oates' work on optimal 
size of government suggests that centralised provision is appropriate in areas where 
economies of scale are pervasive. Areas where there are interregional spillovers also 
need to be considered carefully; whilst decentralised provision may still be feasible, 
this is likely to require compensating transfers. 
There are a number of additional practical concerns with high levels of 
expenditure decentralisation that relate to institutional constraints. A commonly cited 
concern relates to the administrative capacity of sub-central governments and the 
competence levels of local politicians. A key question here is, are local politicians 
more or less competent than their national counterparts? If they are more competent, 
positive benefits from expenditure decentralisation can be realised while the opposite 
will hold if they are less competent. It is widely thought that the more able 
politicians/bureaucrats can be found at the central level. Ter-Minassian (1997) 
postulates that "overstaffing, poor technical skills and training of employees, and the 
inability to formulate and implement effective spending programs" characterises 
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many sub-central authorities worldwide. A related but more specific point, relates to 
the level of corruption at the sub-central level. Tanzi (2001) argues that this is likely 
to be especially important for developing countries, given the likelihood of less 
effective scrutiny from the media, international organisations etc and where regional 
dynasties are relatively more powerful. While this issue is likely to be less relevant in 
developed countries, a general concern throughout the OEeD relates to the correlation 
between decentralisation and pork-barrel projects, that is local politicians granting 
specific local 'rewards' in return for political support. 
In summary, with regard to the three traditional Musgravian functions of 
government, the pitfalls of expenditure decentralisation are related more closely to 
macroeconomic stability and redistribution, while the benefits involve gains in 
allocative efficiency. 
1.3.2 Comparative Evidence: Expenditure Decentralisation 
1.3.2a) Current levels of Expenditure Decentralisation 
Typically, the macroeconomic literature tends to ignore the role of sub-central 
governments in national fiscal policy conduct. Tables 1.2 and 1.3 provide 
internationally comparable information from IMF Government Financial Statistics 
(GFS) on public expenditure by level of government across a number of distinct 
functions and over time. An obvious conclusion that can be drawn from these tables is 
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the substantial amount of government expenditure that is assigned to sub-central tiers 
of government. Even in the least decentralised countries such as France and the 
Netherlands, around 20% of total general government expenditure is undertaken at 
sub-central tiers, rising to around 50-60% in the large federations such as Australia 
and Canada. 
Table 1.2: Sub-Central Government Ex.uenditure by Function 
(as a percentage of General Government totals for each category) 
Education Health Social Housing Public Recr'nal General 
Security and Local Order and Public 
and Amenities and Cultural Services 
Welfare Safety Services 
Federal Countries 
Germany 1996 96 28 21 93 92 95 62 
USA 1999 95 43 31 33 79 74 32 
Australia 1998 72 48 10 77 87 79 64 
Canada 2000 95 96 31 74 67 69 40 
Austria 1994 72 23 9 25 3 60 31 
Spain 1997 71 31 6 93 41 39 64 
Unitan: Countries 
Denmark 2000 46 95 55 33 13 45 29 
Norway 1998 63 77 19 87 17 35 66 
France 1993 37 2 9 82 28 17 26 
N'lds 1997 33 5 14 79 25 17 39 
UK 1998 67 0 20 41 52 35 22 
Ireland 1997 22 48 6 70 100 N.A. 8 
Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics, 2002 edition. 
Notes: 
1. Figures are given for the most recent year available, as noted in brackets after the country 
name. 
2. For the federal states, the single sub-central government figure combines the totals at 
federal and local level. This provides a clearer comparison with unitary countries where 
only a single figure is available (even for countries that have a multi-tier system of 
regions, and local level government). 
3. Spain is included with the federal countries above, although it is not strictly a federation. 
It is often referred to as 'Quasi-Federal' or 'Regionalised State' since the constitution 
does not include a federal distribution of powers and the Spanish Parliament can transfer 
legislative and executive functions without any statutory reform. See Russell-Barter 
(2000) for a more detailed typology of international forms of regional government. 
4. Disaggregated data are not available for all European countries in GFS so Finland, 
Belgium and Sweden had to be excluded from this table. 
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Table 1.3: The Evolution of Sub-Central Government SI!ending since 1970 
(Figures are given as percentages of General Government totals) 
Federal 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Latest 
Countries 
Germany 45 44 44 41 41 41 38 (1998) 
USA 47 46 43 41 44 47 50 (1999) 
Canada 61 58 58 56 56 57 59 (2000) 
Australia 49 42 41 40 43 42 41 (1999) 
Austria 30 32 31 30 30 31 31 (1998) 
Spain - - 11 21 30 30 32 (1997) 
Unitary 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Latest 
Countries 
Denmark l 44 47 48 43 44 44 46 (2000) 
Sweden 45 44 40 37 37 31 34 (1998) 
Norway 38 40 33 33 32 32 33 (1997) 
Finland 38 38 39 40 41 34 36 (1998) 
France 17 17 16 16 18 18 17 (1997) 
Belgium2 - - 14 12 11 11 11 (1997) 
Netherlands - 27 25 26 23 24 22 (1997) 
United 30 30 26 24 25 22 22 (1998) 
Kingdom 
Ireland 27 28 27 25 23 24 25 (1997) 
Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics, 2002 edition. 
Notes: 
1. For Denmark a figure for 1972 has had to be substituted for 1970. 
2. Belgium has effectively moved from a unitary structure to a federal structure. However, 
whilst the OEeD provides some information for all three levels of sub-central 
government in Belgium (local government, communities and regional government), to 
date the GFS has kept its disaggregation to central and local government where it appears 
that the federal layer has been included with the centre. To this extent, the above figures 
understate the true extent of devolved spending in Belgium. 
The distinction between unitary and federal countries is perhaps more apparent 
than real. While some federations have assigned major welfare (health, education and 
social welfare) functions to sub-central jurisdictions, others have not or they retain 
central control over some key functions (e.g. health in Germany and France and social 
security in all cases except Denmark). 
As one would expect, the large federations, the USA, Canada and Australia 
have large levels of expenditure conducted at the sub-central level. In addition, 
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however, some unitary countries, for example the Scandinavian countries, have 
extremely devolved systems. In Sweden for example, municipalities and counties 
undertake 35% of public sector spending, with medical care assigned mainly to 
county councils and education (up to secondary schooling) mainly municipalities -
see European Communities (2001). 
The figures show that Denmark has the most devolved system among the 
unitary countries, dating back to progressive reforms that began in 1970 and 
proceeded through that decade. The devolved responsibilities extend to the provision 
of a broad range of services, from primary education to care of the elderly and to the 
distribution of benefit payments. Daugaard (2002) argues that the pursuit of 
administrative efficiency, the ability to target services at recipients and political 
arguments such as the strengthening of local democracy, have been important factors 
motivating this strategy. However, while Denmark is unusual in channelling social 
transfers through local governments (see Table 1.2), the central tier remains the main 
payer as refunds are paid from central to sub-central governments. In reality the 
situation is the same as if the state handled benefits through their own local agencies. 
The incentives for efficiency gains e.g. through better targeting of benefits to 
recipients are therefore unclear. 
Interestingly, there exists substantial cross-country differences with regard to 
expenditure decentralisation by economic function. Though omitted from Table 1.2, 
all countries have assigned around 100% of all defence expenditure to the central 
government. Social security is also primarily the responsibility of the centre, the 
exception being Denmark as discussed above. In other areas of expenditure, such as 
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health care, education etc, there is greater evidence of shared competency. However, 
the tier of government which has the greater responsibility over expenditure delivery 
in such 'shared' expenditures, differs considerably across countries. For example in 
Germany, while sub-central authorities have, relative to other countries, high levels of 
expenditure responsibility for education provision, this contrasts to health care in 
which they are one of the least decentralised countries. This is the exact reverse of 
Denmark. 
Continuing our cross-country comparisons, Figure 1.1 examines the degree of 
expenditure decentralisation according to economic type. 
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Figure 1.1: The Composition of Sub-Central Government Expenditure8 
(as a percentage of General Government totals in each category) 
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Once more it is possible to observe the important role that sub-central 
governments play in national fiscal expenditure. For example, on average, 61 % of the 
national public sector wage-bill is assigned to sub-central tiers. A similar important 
role can be observed in non-wage and capital expenditures. In line with the theory 
discussed above, which postulates that the centre should be dominant in areas of 
redistribution and stabilisation, sub-central involvement in the provision of social 
transfers is generally limited. 
g Note that GFS does not split sub-central current spending into wage and non-wage components for 
Australia. 
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Again, substantial cross-country heterogeneity is evident among our sample 
countries. In most areas, Canada tends to have the highest level of expenditure 
decentralisation along with the other 'large' federations such as the USA and 
Germany. Interestingly however, the relative position taken by countries vis-a.-vis 
others can differ considerably. For example, while Sweden has the highest percentage 
of national public wages assigned to the sub-centre and around average non-wage and 
social transfer expenditures, it has one of the lowest ratios of sub-central to central 
capital investment among our sample countries. 
1.3.2b) Changes over time 
Table 1.3 shows that across most countries, expenditure decentralisation has 
been stable over time. Discussions regarding alterations to the degree of 
decentralisation (typically movements toward increased decentralisation) have 
typically only taken place within the last few years. One country where substantial 
reforms have taken place is the UK. However, the devolution reforms for Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland that took place in 1999, lie outside our sample9. 
The one exception to this observation is Spain where as noted earlier, 
decentralisation became an important component of the transition to democracy 
embodied in the 1978 constitution and has been progressive. Regional governments' 
share in general government expenditure rose from 11 per cent in 1980 to 32 per cent 
(close to the OECD average) in 1997, see Table 1.3 (and Figure 1.4). The progressive 
9 The most recent data in GFS (2002) relates to 1998. 
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transfer of primary and secondary education to Autonomous Communities (ACs) was 
completed in 2001 and a similar process is set to see the transition of health spending 
and non-university education to all ACs by 2004. However, many competencies again 
remain shared between the four tiers of government (central, the ACs, provinces and 
municipalities). There is additional complexity in that asymmetries remain between 
the functions assimilated by the "fast track decentralisation" ACs (the Basque 
country, Navarra, Andalucia, the Canaries and Valencia) and those available to the 10 
"slow track" ACs which have been given the option to assimilate fewer devolved 
powers over a more protracted periodlO . However, it is fair to say that progress is 
being made on a framework to extend and standardise powers. 
The issue of asymmetry is an important one that has attracted considerable 
attention in recent years. A number of countries have adopted an asymmetric 
approach to decentralisation, granting greater fiscal powers to some regions. The 
experience of the AC's in Spain as discussed above is a case in point as is the UK 
approach. In general, the UK has imposed considerable consistency to the shape of its 
local government by explicitly allocating functions to different tiers and generally 
avoiding clashes of competencies. More recently, the creation of devolved 
administrations for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in 1999 has changed the 
nature of sub-central government and has had a major impact on the degree to which 
expenditure is assigned to sub-national jurisdictions. The remit of the UK's devolved 
administrations is clearly defined, though for historical reasons, the devolved 
territories have been granted different political and economic powers. For example, 
Scotland has much more exclusive control of functions such as education and health 
10 See loumard and Varoudakis (2000). 
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even when compared to many more devolved unitary states and the Scottish 
Parliament has (limited) revenue raising powers, unlike the Welsh Assembly. Whilst 
the blueprint for English regional government is not yet entirely clear, it is already 
apparent that the ultimate pattern of devolution in the UK will not be symmetric. 
Whether asymmetry is positive is open to debate. Russell-Barter (2000) exalts 
asymmetry as a virtue, in so far as regions are not forced to take on responsibilities 
they are not yet ready or willing to bear. However, political scientists, such as Le 
Gales and John (1997), argue that incrementalism carries considerable costs in terms 
of lost momentum for reform and the fuelling of inter-regional tensions. 
1.4. Fiscal Autonomy 
Having looked at how expenditure responsibilities are allocated, it is natural to 
consider how these should be financed. At the simplest level one can postulate that 
sub-central expenditures can be financed from two sources, either from revenues 
raised by the regional/state/local authorities or alternatively, they can be financed by 
the central governmentll . In line with the general policy discussion in the UK, we 
term the ability of sub-central authorities to raise revenue as fiscal autonomy. To be 
consistent with Loughlin and Martin (2003), we classify 'own-source' revenues as 
funding that sub-central units not only raise themselves, but we also require that they 
have some discretion in terms of how they are raised and for what purpose. 
11 The detennination of the vertical tax structure is typically referred to as the 'tax-assignment' 
problem. 
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Central government finance of sub-central expenditures typically originates in 
two forms 12. Firstly, there are central to sub-central government grants. Grants are a 
direct transfer of money from the centre to the sub-centre. They can come in a variety 
of forms such as block grants (the transfer of a 'lump-sum'), matching grants (the 
transfer of funds to complement money already raised at the sub-centre) and specific 
grants (the conditional transfer of funds to finance expenditures targeted by the 
centre). Block grants are typically aimed at addressing vertical (i.e. between tiers of 
government) and horizontal (i.e. between individual sub-central governments) 
imbalances. Matching and specific grants tend to be used by central governments to 
target specific policy areas which while not under their direct control, are deemed to 
be of social, economic or political importance to them. Under a system of block 
grants, the sub-central tier typically has relatively high discretion to allocate the 
money transferred as it sees fit. In contrast, with matching and especially specific 
grants, the local authority has far less autonomy and in many cases simply acts as the 
Agent in a Principal/Agent relationship with the body allocating the funding. 
Secondly, there are tax-sharing arrangements 13. Tax-sharing arrangements 
exist when two or more tiers of government receive revenue from the total tax yield 
from a particular tax. An example of a shared tax could be a national income tax 
whereby the centre receives 75% of all income tax receipts and the sub-centre 25%. 
The 25% share to sub-central governments could then be allocated to each sub-central 
unit either on the basis of a 'needs' based formula (e.g. population, unemployment 
etc) or through a bargaining process between individual units. Tax-sharing 
12 For a comparison of the two different types of transfer see Chapter 5. 
13 In the literature, shared taxes are sometimes referred to as non-exclusive taxes while own-source 
taxes are called exclusive taxes. 
42 
arrangements can differ for a whole variety of reasons. Two of the most important are 
i) the tax actually being 'shared' and ii) the extent to which each tier has autonomy to 
control the revenues received from the 'shared' tax. Some shared taxes give sub-
central governments a degree of discretion over their base and rate. In other cases, the 
share received by each sub-central unit is determined by a formula detailed in the 
constitution or by a higher authority. For example, in Germany and Austria the 
revenue allocations which the Federal and Lander governments receive from the 
shared taxes are fixed and cannot be altered without the consent of both tiers. In 
contrast, in other countries such as Norway, the centre retains the right to unilaterally 
alter the revenue distribution. In some countries, the tax-sharing arrangement is such 
that the sub-centre is permitted within some boundary to alter the tax rate but not the 
tax base. Such arrangements are termed 'overlapping' or 'piggy-back' taxes. Again in 
Norway, local taxation rates must be below an upper limit fixed by the central 
government14. Therefore, the particular form of tax sharing arrangement is a key 
determinant of the level of central government influence/control over sub-central 
authorities and is an issue which we will return to in Chapter 5. 
14 Typically, all local governments in Norway have set their tax rates at the maximum level possible. 
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1.4.1 Theory 
The theory of fiscal federalism provides a number of arguments for sub-central 
fiscal autonomy (see, for example, Gramlich, 1984) as opposed to central government 
finance 15 . 
First, it is argued that heavy reliance on grants and other centrally distributed 
revenues places too little pressure on local administrators and politicians to manage 
spending efficiently. Devolving fiscal authority is seen as important to ensure that 
financing and expenditure responsibilities are linked at the margin, so that local 
politicians can bear the costs of their decisions. 
Various commentators have suggested that the cnSIS III democratic 
participation in local government elections in several countries, including France and 
the UK, is in part attributable to the lack of fiscal powers available to sub-central 
governments. For example, The Economist (2002) argues that the problem of 
democratic participation in local and devolved government will not be solved if the 
proposed English regional assemblies are granted few economic powers. It has been 
suggested that voter interest will dwindle in devolved government in Scotland and 
Wales in the absence of further devolution of fiscal powers. 
Second, it is important that the costs of servIces are perceptible to the 
electorate in order to make meaningful decisions on alternatives. Expenditure 
increases on a particular area necessarily imply either higher taxation (or other 
15 The belief that sub-central governments should have the ability to raise revenues is an explicit 
component of the European Charter of Local Self-Government: Article 9. 
44 
sources of revenue such as user charges etc), cutbacks in other areas of expenditure, 
or increased fiscal deficits. In a system whereby sub-central units are largely 
responsible for expenditure but not revenue decisions, it is difficult for the electorate 
to 'see the bigger picture' and be aware of the true costs and benefits of increased 
targeted expenditure. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, failure to grant revenue autonomy in 
line with decentralisation of expenditure can create negative incentives. 
Responsibility for expenditure without revenue responsibility can lead to a standard 
'Principal-Agent Problem' between the centre (the principal and the funding source) 
and the sub-centre (the agents undertaking the expenditure). A commonly cited 
concern in such a situation is the creation of a 'Common Pool problem'. Each 
individual sub-central government unit has the incentive to spend as much as possible, 
fully internalising the benefits of the expenditures spent in their particular area but 
only internalising a fraction of the cost, which is instead shared across the entire 
population. A related concern is the possible generation of 'soft-budget' constraints, 
whereby sub-central governments overspend, safe in the knowledge that rather than 
see them 'bankrupt' and unable to provide even the most basic service, the 'lender of 
last resort', i.e. the centre, will 'bail them out' and fund their excess spending. For a 
discussion see Wildasin (1999)16. 
However, the literature on fiscal federalism also provides clear guidance on 
the limits that should be imposed on fiscal autonomy. Four arguments are highlighted 
here. First, the usual argument against complete fiscal autonomy is one of equity. 
16 This issue has been a major source of concern in Italy - see Bordignon (2000). 
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Jurisdictions with different levels of income and wealth will have very different tax 
resources at their disposal, and the need to ensure that citizens have access to a 
roughly equal level of public services will imply some degree of redistribution 
between sub-central governments. For this reason no industrialised countries, not even 
federal states, have opted for complete fiscal autonomy. A number of approaches to 
redistribution are feasible, through the use of vertical transfers funded from general 
taxation, 'pooling' arrangements between sub-central governments, or tax-sharing 
arrangements designed to benefit poorer jurisdictions. It is certainly important that 
sub-central governments have access to sufficient funds to adequately meet their 
spending responsibilities. Clearly there is a trade-off between equity and 
accountability: if resources are shared equally between sub-central governments, the 
incentive effects from fiscal autonomy disappear17. This has become one of the key 
issues that countries have to face in deciding the appropriate level of fiscal autonomy 
for sub-central tiers of government. 
A second argument is that one has to avoid tax externalities, in the interests of 
economic efficiency. 'Tax exportation', McLure (1967), is one such problem. If 
taxation decisions by sub-central governments impinge on non-residents, then local 
residents and politicians will fail to fully internalise the 'true costs' of public services 
and there is likely to be a degree of over-provision. Of course, insofar as non-residents 
benefit from service provision, then there could be under-provision, a problem that 
often arises with large metropolitan areas and satellite towns. A way to deal with this 
problem is to ensure that different types of taxes are assigned to different levels of 
government thus avoiding tax exportation between sub-national jurisdictions. 
17 Of course, it is possible that fiscal equalisation may be undesirable if it holds back the development 
of poorer areas by impeding the necessary inter-regional flow of resources. 
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A third limit on fiscal autonomy is a consequence of the potential migration of 
factors of production. Tax competition is a fact of life in most systems, and the 
mobility of capital and labour imposes natural limits on fiscal autonomy. This is why 
most decentralised taxation systems still assign the majority of ability-to-pay or 
redistributive taxes to central government, especially corporate taxes, which fall on 
the most mobile factor, capital18 . Most countries that have opted for a substantial 
degree of fiscal autonomy have tended to rely on i) benefit taxes or user charges 
(based on the benefit consumers derive from local services), ii) taxes on immobile 
factors such as property, or iii) small changes in ability-to-pay taxes (such as local 
income tax), where limits may be applied to prevent tax-induced migration flows 
across regions - see Section 1.4.2. The 'race to the bottom' is often cited as an 
argument against sub-central taxation autonomy, with the fear that individual sub-
central units will become involved in a downward spiral, consistently trying to 
'undercut' the tax rates of their neighbours19. While inter-regional competition is 
desirable within limits (i.e. encouraging politicians to adopt efficient levels of public 
goods and not set excess tax rates) too much competition can be harmful. However, 
whether this happens in practice is debatable. Hines (2004) argues that harmful tax 
competition is unrealistic once one takes into account the other side of the coin - i.e. 
expenditure decentralisation. He argues that some regions will be tempted to set low 
tax rates but others will be satisfied to have higher tax rates coupled with greater and 
more efficient public service provision, financed by higher taxes. However, one 
concern is that armed with a number of tax instruments, for example one on a mobile 
18 As Tanzi (2001) points out, there is a danger that high levels of decentralisation can segment the 
single national economic market. 
19 See for example Enrich (1996). 
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tax base (such as capital) and the other on an immobile base (such as property), inter-
state tax competition can lead to the burden of finance being unfairly placed on the 
immobile factor. Empirical evidence on inter-regional tax competition is relatively 
limited. There is some evidence to suggest that such behaviour exists, see for example 
Case et al. (1993), but whether this leads to negative outcomes is unclear. 
Finally, a fourth argument against fiscal autonomy is that it can generate 
administrative complexity. In essence, it is argued that managing a national tax 
system is feasible at lower cost (i.e. economies of scale) and this implies that 
financing systems based on grants or tax -sharing arrangements are optimal. In fact, in 
the case of any modem developed economy, this is likely to be a spurious argument. 
There is no reason why one needs to decentralise the tax collection system, as 
evidenced by a number of OECD countries which manage the collection of taxes 
shared by different jurisdictions through a single national tax collection system. 
However, if national tax collection systems have to cope with a plethora of shared 
taxes between jurisdictions, clearly this can increase administrative costs. 
A more subtle version of this argument relates to the visibility, transparency 
and complexity in decentralised tax systems. A complex tax system, where various 
jurisdictions share the same tax base, and where sub-central governments have 
important fiscal powers, may lead to less transparency in the fiscal system. Much 
attention is therefore required in the construction and presentation of the chosen 
system. It is important that voters understand the operations of the different levels of 
government if accountability is to be achieved (Tanzi, 2001). 
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To summarise, economic theory suggests that some degree of fiscal autonomy 
can render policy-makers more accountable, and may improve economic efficiency. 
Against this, there are concerns regarding tax competition, externalities, equity and 
transparency. It is unlikely, that one particular formula for revenue decentralisation 
will be appropriate for all countries. The 'optimal' level will depend largely on 
individual country economic and political characteristics2o. In the following section 
we discuss how the countries in our study have tackled the issue of fiscal autonomy. 
1.4.2 Comparative Evidence: Fiscal Autonomy 
1.4.2a) Levels of Revenue Decentralisation 
Figure 1.2 provides internationally comparable information from IMF 
Government Financial Statistics (GFS) on the degree of revenue decentralisation, and 
for comparison expenditure decentralisation, across our sample countries. In addition, 
Figure 1.3 highlights the sources of sub-central revenues accordingly - grants, taxes 
and 'other' sources, predominantly user charges and fees. 
20 One of which will, of course, be the level of expenditure decentralisation. 
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Figure 1.2: Fiscal Decentralisation 
(Sub-Central Expenditure and Revenue as percentages of General Government totals) 
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Figure 1.3: Composition of Sub-Central Government Revenues 
(as a percentage of their Total Revenues) 
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From Figure 1.2 we can clearly observe that substantial amounts of national 
government revenue are assigned to most countries in our sample. Note however, that 
the degree of revenue decentralisation is considerably less across all countries, than 
the degree of expenditure decentralisation. This is reflected in the fact that all our 
country data points lie below the 45° line. The vertical distance between each point 
and the 45° line shows how dependent the country's sub-central tier of government is 
on grants from the central tier. On average across the 15 countries, over a third of total 
fiscal expenditure (35.1%) and a quarter of revenues (25.6%) are assigned to (i.e. 
under the control of) sub-central governments. 
The Spanish experience is again of special interest as it is the one country in 
our sample where there has been the greatest reform in the level of fiscal 
decentralisation. Devolution of revenue raising powers lagged the rapid 
decentralisation of spending competencies. The process has been characterised by 
growing imbalances between tax assignments and expenditure functions. Figure 1.4 
demonstrates this. Figure 1.4 is identical to Figure 1.2 however, it shows the time path 
of the level of sub-central expenditures and revenues in Spain from the later 1970s to 
the present day. As before, the vertical distance between each point and the 45° line 
shows the extent to which sub-central jurisdictions in Spain were dependent on central 
government grants. In the early years of the new Spanish Constitution, sub-central 
governments raised and spent relatively small amounts. As the level of expenditure 
decentralisation has increased through the 1980s so have sub-central revenues. 
However, the increase in expenditure decentralisation has far outweighed the level of 
revenue decentralisation resulting by 1999, in a substantial vertical imbalance. 
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Figure 1.4: Fiscal Imbalances: Tax and Non-Tax Revenues and Expenditure of Sub-
Central Governments in Spain 
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Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics, 2002 
Notes: 
1. Revenues include taxes, fees and other sources of non-tax revenues but exclude grants. 
2. The figures are expressed as percentages of general government totals. 
Figure 1.3 shows that there is a great deal of heterogeneity regarding the 
sources of sub-central finance in our sample countries. Certain countries, such as the 
UK, Ireland and the Netherlands rely heavily upon central grants to finance their 
expenditures. In others, such as the USA and Canada, taxation appears to represent a 
far greater source of revenue for sub-central authorities. In what follows, we take each 
element of sub-central finance in turn, and discuss the issues pertinent to this 
particular revenue source and the importance of this form of finance in particular 
countries. Firstly however, we examine the issue of vertical imbalances more closely. 
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1.4.2b) Vertical Fiscal Imbalances - Country Experiences 
We have noted a number of cases where decentralisation of spending greatly 
exceeds the level of fiscal autonomy. As discussed above, there are good reasons for 
this. However, decentralisation of expenditure without similar revenue 
decentralisation can create a number of problems, not least in the incentive constraints 
faced by sub-central politicians. In this section, given its importance, we examine this 
issue explicitly and discuss a number of instances where this has been of direct 
concern to individual countries. 
The expenence of Italy though not included in our sample due to data 
limitations, offers a clear example of the kind of problems that this mismatch can give 
rise to, and illustrates how these problems can be exacerbated when central 
government also imposes standards on local provision. Specifically during the 1970s, 
reforms had been aimed at simplification of the tax system and regaining central 
government control at a time of macroeconomic crisis. These reforms actually 
reduced the extent of sub-central fiscal autonomy, but at the same time spending 
responsibilities were progressively devolved. Particular areas of tension emerged in 
the provision of health and transport services where the regions were given key 
responsibilities for service delivery. The system of grant finance was based on 
historical spending shares with insufficient reference to performance or needs and 
failed to promote efficiency together with weak incentives to contain spending. 
Conditional grants often took on the character of entitlements, through central 
government imposition of "essential" standards. As Bordignon (2000) and Bosi and 
Tabellini (1995) note, this led to a clear problem of 'moral hazard', with regions 
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blissfully runnmg spending overruns in key areas, knowing that the central 
government would bail them out21 . This situation, in which the system of vertical 
transfers rewarded profligate and inefficient regional governments, obviously worked 
against regional fiscal responsibility. The Italian case is an extreme example due to 
the particular administrative framework that allowed budget overruns and a political 
environment that encouraged 'bail-outs'. However, in relation to specific areas of 
expenditure similar problems can be identified elsewhere. 
In Denmark, high growth in expenditure on childcare and care of the elderly 
since the 1990s, reflects central government policy. Fiscal balance has not been a 
major concern of the local providers since additional spending has typically been 
funded by higher revenues and higher provision in subsequent years. Local 
governments have repeatedly blamed overruns on agreed spending on the centrally 
imposed objectives and regulations, and have resorted to unplarmed tax hikes, while 
parliamentarians have criticised local authorities for not meeting centrally initiated 
objectives and not complying with negotiated budgetary limits, Dauguaard (2002). 
However, it is clear that the central government has effectively separated the 
discretion to decide policy from the responsibility of finance spending. The existence 
of targets that lack credibility and are regularly not met raises moral hazard problems. 
Reforms proposed by the OEeD and others include imposing financial penalties on 
tax increases, and extending local discretion to other forms of taxation, tax allowances 
and user fees, Bibee and Goglio (2002). 
21 In fact, the constitutional court has sided with the regions and ordered central government to provide 
additional grants to cover the costs of providing nationally mandated "essential" services. 
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These examples serve to illustrate that if central government is intent on 
maintaining the level of key public services, sub-central governments can exert real 
pressures for increased vertical transfers, unless these are explicitly prohibited by law. 
Clearly, if budget constraints are to be binding, lower level governments should suffer 
the consequences of their own mismanagement and should not be able to rely on 
transfers from above to 'bail them out' of financial difficulties. If this is not the case 
then sub-central governments may have the incentive to overspend. This institutional 
behaviour is one of the most serious potential negative consequences of fiscal 
decentralisation. 
1.4.2c) Grants 
As noted above, the potential benefits of decentralisation may cease to exist if 
local governments suffer from a poor capacity to implement spending. Redistribution 
via transfers of nationally collected tax across local jurisdictions is generally used to 
ensure that an adequate level of provision can be achieved no matter how strong or 
weak the taxing capacity of the sub-central jurisdiction. 
In addition, if regions are subject to different cyclical developments the 
pooling of risks can raise welfare. Pooling may be achieved more easily through 
vertical transfers from the centre to the regions rather than through horizontal 
transfers between independent localities, see Oates (1972) and Musgrave and 
Musgrave (1976). In general, transfers can take two forms i) a grant from a higher tier 
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of government or ii) an allocation of a share in nationally collected or pooled taxes. 
We discuss grants in this section and taxation in 1.4.2d). 
It is immediately clear from Figure 1.3 that certain European countries such as 
the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands have traditionally financed most of the spending 
of its sub-national jurisdictions through grants. This heavy reliance on grant funding 
presents a striking contrast with most other federal or Scandinavian countries22 . 
Most countries operate some kind of agreed and transparent formulae-based 
allocation of transfers, in part to eliminate costs of frequent negotiations. Equalisation 
schemes have the advantage of discouraging competition between authorities to 
attract higher-than-average earners with low needs, though at the same time overly 
generous equalisation formulae can weaken the incentives to attract residents by 
improving the quality of services or being more efficient. Furthermore, if tax 
collection is the responsibility of regions prior to central pooling and redistribution, 
then it is also possible that richer regions will put in less effort to the task. These 
concerns have led some countries to cap the extent of revenue equalisation. Certain 
countries have attempted to introduce positive incentive schemes to counteract such 
incentive concerns. For example in Spain, the AC's are permitted to retain a 
proportion of any positive deviation from the budgeted increase in receipts (tied to the 
growth of a basket of taxes including personal and corporate income taxes and V AT), 
Joumard and Varoudakis (2000). 
22 Note that in line with the earlier discussion, the relatively high dependence on grants in Denmark in 
part reflects 100% transfer refunding. 
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Throughout our sample countries, a great variety of alternative formulas and 
structures have been put in place for allocating grant revenues among regions. In 
many instances, while attempting to be transparent, the allocation of grant finance can 
sometimes be anything but. This in tum can lead to controversy and tension between 
different regions, especially if a sub-central unit feels as though it has been 'hard done 
by' in recent negotiationslbudget calculations etc. Even within individual countries 
grant allocation mechanisms can vary greatly both across time and type of grant being 
allocated. 
For example, in Spain a variety of grant formulae have been put in place, the 
most important of which is redistributed pooled tax revenues based on expenditure 
need as measured by population size, personal income and tax capacity. Additional 
criteria at the provincial and municipal levels include surface area and school age 
population. The slow delegation of revenue raising powers in Spain has in part 
reflected the need to collect relevant information on costs of provision as well as 
differing needs and preferences, most of which was unavailable before. Spain's sub-
central fiscal autonomy and the formulae employed are therefore, continuing to 
evolve. 
In France, where autonomy is more limited (see Figures 1.2 and 1.3), the main 
grant, the Dotation Globale de Fonctionnement uses objective factors based on need 
(population, school population, tourist numbers, and fiscal capacity). Separate 
allocations are made for capital grants, Dotation Globale d'Equipement, which tend to 
support local initiatives by matching investments by Communes and Departments. 
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Post-war Germany has operated a system of horizontal equalisation aimed at 
equalising revenues between poorer and richer Linder. This system, the 
Finanzausgleich, has been very successful in maintaining a high degree of uniformity 
in public services throughout Germany. In 1997, following the incorporation of the 
East German Lander into the system, 6.1 bn was transferred from the richer to the 
poorer Lander, compared to only 1.5 bn in 1994. In addition to these horizontal 
transfers, a number of federal grants were made to fiscally weaker Lander ( 7.2 bn in 
1997), see OECD (1998). Overall, 20% of Lander revenues came from grants, 
including transfer payments from the equalisation system. In 2001, a new agreement 
was reached for the period 2005-19 which maintains a federal contribution of about 
10 bn per year, OECD (2002). Some observers have argued that this extent of 
equalisation has led to a lack of accountability, see Spahn and Franz, (2000). Whilst 
the reforms have attempted to address a perceived need to incentivise the Landers' 
performance and efficiency, equity remains a guiding principle of the new system. 
In contrast, as highlighted by Oates (1999), grants designed to counteract 
horizontal imbalances between US States are relatively limited. Instead, 
intergovernmental grants in the US typically address specific functions or programs, 
but usually do not explicitly target the issue of inter-state equity. However, at the 
State level, equalising grants to local jurisdictions are more frequently observed, 
notably to school districts. 
In many cases equalisation schemes are self-financing. In Sweden one such 
scheme has covered all the municipalities and counties since 1996; it aims to offset 
95% of the differences in taxable income per capita between local governments and 
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allows for major differences in service delivery costs. In Denmark a grant is payable 
to local authorities with a tax base per capita below 90% of the national average. 
Again, the size of the grant paid is based on expenditure need and is evaluated using a 
range of demographic and social indicators, see OECD (1997). 
In some countries, grant distribution is inextricably linked to 'historical' shares 
III addition to, or instead of, a formal equalisation scheme. A common set of 
difficulties can arise when allocations are closely linked to historical shares as they 
are likely to place too little emphasis on efficiency and the containment of spending. 
For this reason, with very few exceptions, European countries have moved away from 
allocation formulae based on historic shares, such as the UK's Barnett formula, 
towards formulae that use objective parameters measuring fiscal need and tax-raising 
capacity - see above. 
Whilst the UK has always had a system of grant allocation based on fiscal 
need for local government, it has resisted any reform of the Barnett formula for the 
allocation of block grants to its main devolved regions (see Twigger (1998) for an 
explanation of the formulae). In so doing, the UK remains, with Italy, one of the few 
countries that has resisted the trend towards needs-based formulae and has remained 
with historical and political expediency. However, there is growing recognition that 
any further move towards financial autonomy for the UK's main devolved units, will 
bring with it a need to address the issue of horizontal equalisation and will require 
some reform of the grant system, see for example, Muscatelli (2001) and Cuthbert 
(2001). Further progress on the devolution agenda, such as the creation of regional 
assemblies in England, will also bring the issue of needs assessments to the fore. 
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There is some evidence to suggest that electoral concerns, in addition to equity 
considerations, can strongly influence central governments' funding of sub-central 
tiers. In a study of English local governments, Ward and John (1999), found that local 
councils controlled by the party in power at the central level and marginal 
constituencies were more likely to receive relatively generous grant allocations than 
those controlled by other parties. 
We have already discussed the use of central government directives to 
influence spending decisions, but constraints attached to funding may also be used to 
exercise control on local provision. This is demonstrated by the use of a whole host of 
alternative types of 'specific' grants. Specific grants can come in a variety of guises, 
such as earmarked, conditional or matching grants. The use of such grants is typically 
justified if there is evidence of strong inter-regional spill-over effects from the 
provision of particular services. It is arguable however, that if such issues are 
pervasive, provision and funding of such services might be more appropriately 
retained by central government. This was certainly a key factor motivating the recent 
shift of the responsibility for hospitals back to central government in Norway?3. 
The form of the restrictions imposed obviously affects the nature ofthe budget 
constraints facing the sub-central tiers of government. This can give rise to the so 
called 'flypaper effect' - that is that grants "stick where they hit", resulting in a 
different allocation than would arise from the same marginal change in own tax 
revenues, see for example, Courant et al. (1981). 
23 This transfer was accompanied by a reduction in the block grant and the upper limit on local tax 
rates, matching the reduced county expenditure level. The transfer of capital equipment was 
compensated via ear-marked grants. 
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Given the distortions involved, the heavy use of specific grants has been 
criticised on efficiency grounds. 
The following table is taken from the Council of Europe (2000) and shows the 
percentage of total grants classed as either block or specific grants. This is the first 
study of its kind and relates only to European countries. 
Table 1.4: General and SI!ecific Grants as a Percentage of Total Grants 
Country Block Grants Specific Grants 
Austria 100 0 
Belgium 83 17 
Denmark 100 0 
Finland 97 3 
France 100 0 
Ireland 19 81 
Netherlands 93 7 
Norway 55 45 
Spain 24 76 
Sweden 58 42 
UK 54 46 
Australial 56 44 
USA l 15 85 
1. Information on Australia and the USA from 'Local Government Grant Distribution: An 
International Comparative Study'. No information is available for Canada. 
Again we observe a great deal of heterogeneity with regard to the use of block 
and specific grants across European countries. Some countries such as Ireland and 
Spain appear to make substantial usage of specific grants, whereas in others, Belgium 
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and Austria for example, block grants are the sole source of central to sub-central 
grant finance. 
In recent years there has been a general trend away from earmarked or specific 
grants toward more general block grants. For example, in 1986 the Norwegian central 
government introduced the 'General Purpose Grant Scheme' which replaced a system 
of about 50 earmarked grants - see Joumard and Suyker (2002)24. In Sweden, some 
90% of grants were earmarked until 1992, with extensive regulations on provision 
imposed. However here too, reforms aimed at improving the efficient use of local 
resources and encouraging innovation have now reduced that figure to around 25%, 
see Roseveare (2002). 
It is thought that the use of earmarked grants can erode local accountability 
and the remaining benefits from sub-central provision are then less clear. Only block 
or untied grants appear to be fully consistent with autonomy of local decisions. A 
further problem with specific grants is that costs of provision are less likely to be 
perceptible to citizens. If sub-central governments have access to their own taxes, this 
particular problem may be solved. 
24 This figure will reflect shifts in finances following the transfer of hospital finances but may be 
distorted by the presence of ad hoc ear marked grants compensating for the transfer of capital 
equipment. Unfortunately intertemporal and cross country comparisons are not feasible since, to the 
best of our knowledge, there is no comprehensive source of internationally comparable data on 
proportion of intergovernmental transfers that are earmarked or conditional as opposed to general 
purpose. 
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1.4.2d) Taxes 
As discussed in Section 1.2, GFS provides a single figure for sub-central tax 
revenues and does not distinguish between revenues collected through shared taxes, 
piggybacked taxes, or taxes that are completely locally determined. As noted above, 
shared taxes can be an attractive source of revenues, given the potential benefits of 
pooling risk and the relatively low administrative costs involved. 
In discussing fiscal autonomy it is relevant to consider the extent to which sub-
central governments control their own tax base or tax rates. Using the classifications 
provided in OECD (1999) and information supplied by Jonathan Rodden combined 
with the GFS data we are able to generate a weighted 'Index of Fiscal Control' that 
dd h·· 25 a resses t IS pomt . 
Specifically, the OECD use a classification of sub-central tax revenues ranging 
from (a) where the sub-central government can set both the tax rate and tax base, to 
(e), where central government sets both the base and the rate of taxation. Tax sharing 
schemes (d) are divided into four categories from (d.1) where the sub-central 
government can determine the revenue split, to the other extreme (d.4) where the 
national government can unilaterally decide the revenue split. 
There are, however, two caveats with this information. The first is that it 
results in the loss of observations for two countries (France and Australia). The 
25 We use this information throughout this thesis. 
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second is that the reference date for these measures of tax autonomy is fixed at 1995 
levels. 
In Figure 1.5 we summarise this evidence. The vertical axis shows the tax 
revenues received by sub-central governments as a percentage of total tax revenues, 
so providing a measure of the importance of sub-central financing of public services. 
The horizontal axis plots a constructed 'Index of Fiscal Control', reflecting the extent 
to which tax revenues can be considered to be controlled at sub-central level. It 
follows that the countries closest to the north-east corner of the graph are those in 
which the sub-central governments have the greatest degree of fiscal autonomy: that is 
they have a large share of total taxation and have greater control of taxation receipts. 
Details on the construction of the 'Index of Fiscal Control' are given in an appendix. 
Figure 1.5: The Importance of Sub-Central Levels of Government and the Extent of 
Fiscal Control 
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26 Note the data for the USA and Canada is provided by Jonathan Rodden of MIT. However, the 
number is limited to the percentage of sub-central revenues in the USA and Canada where the sub-
centre has control over the tax rate and the tax base. Thus, the ' Index of Fiscal Control' for these two 
countries is likely to be an underestimate. 
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Some comment on individual countries' location in Figure 1.5 is necessary. It 
is apparent that, although the UK's local government layer has a reasonable degree of 
autonomy, the sub-central levels of government in the UK control a very small 
proportion of total taxation27. The 'gearing effect' which necessarily follows, has been 
at the centre of policy discussions regarding possible reform to the council tax system. 
In contrast, whilst sub-national jurisdictions, for example in Scandinavia and 
Belgium, have slightly lower degrees of fiscal control, the total importance of sub-
central government is much greater. Contrasts between federal states are also 
apparent: Canada and the USA grant their sub-central governments the greatest 
control over taxation in our sample, whilst the German and Austrian Lander have far 
less independent control. 
There is broad consensus in the literature that the central government should 
be assigned taxes that have certain tax base characteristics - see Norregaard (1997): 
1) Tax bases that are mobile. 
2) Tax bases that are sensitive to income. 
3) Tax bases that are distributed unevenly across regions. 
Historically, the primary form of sub-central taxation has been the property 
tax. In a study undertaken by the Council of Europe (2000), property taxation was a 
source of direct income for sub-central governments in 23 out of 25 countries 
27 Note that since the UK figures relate to 1998 they pre-date the introduction of the Scottish tax 
varying powers (the 'tartan tax'). However since the Scottish right to vary the rate of income tax has 
not yet been exercised, and in any case would have a very small impact on total Scottish tax revenues, 
it is fair to say that devolution has thus far had little change on the position of fiscal autonomy. 
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analysed. It is often seen as a 'good' local tax, as administration costs are typically 
low, it is clear which unit of government is entitled to the revenue it yields and it is a 
relatively reliable source of income. The actual tax base adopted does however, vary 
considerably across countries. It can be a tax on land, buildings or some combination 
of the two. There is also a wide variation in the property tax as a proportion of local 
tax revenue ranging from 100% in the UK, Ireland, USA, Canada and Australia to 
very small proportions in others such as Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain. 
While property taxes have the advantage of immobility of the tax base, to the 
extent that some beneficiaries of services are not homeowners, the costs of provision 
are less perceptible; also the tax base for property taxes generally grows relatively 
little over time. Further, property taxes universally realise lower returns than required. 
There are many reasons for this, including the fact that it is a very visible tax and thus 
politically unpopular. 
Business taxation and to a lesser extent income taxation, are the two principle 
additional taxes commonly available to sub-central tiers. A local income tax is found 
in all Scandinavian countries and is becoming increasingly viewed by many in the UK 
as a potentially more advantageous form of local taxation than the council tax28. For a 
breakdown of the sources of taxation revenues in the Scandinavian countries see 
Table 1.5. 
28 See for example 'The Centre for Council Tax Reform', www.counciitaxreform.org.and·Isit Fair?", 
www.isitfair.co.uk. 
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Table 1.5: Sub-Central Revenue Sources for Scandinavian Countries 
Finland Sweden Denmark Norway 
Tax Income 
Income Tax 42 60 52 40 
Business & 12 N.A. 8 1 
Property Tax 
State Transfers 
Block Grants 17 16 10 23 
Earmarked 2 5 8 17 
User Fees and 25 18 21 14 
Charges 
Other Income 3 1 1 5 
Source: Table 3 M0nnesland (2002). 
The right of local authorities in Scandinavia to set local income tax rates is 
seen as the cornerstone of their local government autonomy, but in reality the systems 
are fairly restrictive. In Norway, local governments can set a local income tax within a 
range set by the central government. However, in practice, all the regions apply the 
maximum rate29 . The Danish central government has in principle abstained from 
direct intervention to set constraints on local taxes. However, the system of formalised 
budget co-operation between central government and local government associations, 
links the size of central transfers to local tax setting decisions and in reality appears to 
have a similarly restrictive effect on the autonomous setting of tax rates, M0nnesland 
(2002)30. In Sweden the central governments' commitment to fiscal consolidation in 
the 1990s gave rise to various ad hoc regulations that have at least temporarily limited 
29 Similarly, municipalities are able to levy a tax on net wealth, within a centrally determined band, but 
again all set the same maximum permitted rate. 
30 A downside of the Danish system appears to be the nature of the negotiation process between the 
centre and sub-central units which it is argued has hampered transparency and the formulation of multi-
year planning, see Daugaard (2002). 
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local autonomy, these include the imposition of a cap on tax rates between 1991-93 
and the central government taking a 50% share of any increase in tax revenue from 
1997. 
From 1994, the Spanish ACs have been allowed to obtain a share of the 
personal income tax raised in their own territory and in recent years they have 
gradually been granted greater autonomy over such revenues. In addition, the share of 
income tax as a percentage of total tax raised by ACs has continued to rise. 
Among the discussed advantages of local income taxation is that they are 
capable of generating sufficient revenues to fund local services. In comparison to 
business taxation they have the advantage of being less likely to lead to harmful tax-
competition between regions in an effort to attract new industry. However, there are a 
number of significant disadvantages which may explain the relative reluctance among 
countries to implement a local income tax. One clear disadvantage relates to 
horizontal equality. If regions have different income levels, then the potential revenue 
levels that can be raised in rich regions will be substantially higher than in the poorer 
regions. Further, receipts can fluctuate as the economy moves through the economic 
cycle to a far greater extent than revenues from property taxation. 
Local business taxation is relatively more common than income tax however, 
it tends not to constitute a substantial share of regional or local revenues. The main 
form is a company tax and this is found in Belgium, France, Germany and Spain3!. 
One explanation for the relatively low reliance upon business taxation is the 
31 Following the devolution reforms in the UK, the ability to set non-domestic rates in Scotland is now 
the responsibility of the Scottish Parliament. 
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unpredictability of such revenues. Corporate tax revenues are relatively more volatile, 
given their dependence on cyclical activity, rather than property, income, wealth or 
sales taxes. Reliance on corporate taxes could therefore, lead to substantial 
fluctuations in sub-central income. 
Sales taxes can come in a variety of guises, such as single stage taxes, 
including excise and retail taxes or multi-stage taxes such as turnover taxes and VAT. 
The main disadvantage of local sales taxes are the distortions that can be generated as 
consumers are driven to making purchases away from high tax areas. Consequently, 
while we observe regional sales taxes in the US and Canada, they are less feasible 
within European countries where devolved regions are significantly smaller than US 
states, and in any case there are EU wide limits on sales taxes. 
Natural resource taxation has been the least popular instrument of sub-central 
finance raising. The exception to this is in Canada, where such taxes represent a 
significant proportion of total provincial taxation - see 'Local Government Grant 
Distribution: An International Comparative Study'. The major limitation with reliance 
upon natural resource taxation is one of equitl2. Clearly, valuable resources are not 
distributed evenly between regions and hence certain regions will have far more 
valuable tax bases upon which to draw upon. For example, during the decade until 
1985, the richest province in Canada, Alberta, consistently had a per-capita revenue 
raising capacity that was double the capacity of the poorest provinces, Newfoundland 
and Prince Edward Island. The use of natural resource taxation in Canada is a special 
case and to address issues of equity the Canadian system involves a complex 
32 In addition, revenues from natural resource taxation can be volatile owing to price fluctuations. 
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horizontal equalisation scheme, which is mandated by the Constitution. In addition, 
there is the danger with natural resource taxation that resource-rich regions and 
central governments would both seek to compete for the taxation revenues, leading to 
excessive taxation on natural resource. 
In summary, most countries that have granted a greater degree of fiscal 
autonomy to their regions have done so through a greater delegation of taxes on 
immobile factors and to a lesser extent, on personal income and business. Where taxes 
are devolved to lower tiers, the choice of tax and any limits set should pay heed to tax 
externalities. Many countries leave the responsibility for tax collection with central 
government, which can ensure equal effort is put into collection across the country. 
This is easier to administer even if there is a system of local tax surcharges. 
1.4.2e) User Charges and Fees 
It is also possible to compare the extent to which individual consumers or 
companies contribute directly to the provision of services by the public sector, via 
user charges and fees including collective and co-payment arrangements - see Figure 
1.3. Within this category a distinction can be made between 'real charges' and 'quasi-
charges'. With real charges, what individuals pay is closely related to their usage of 
the charged service (e.g. water charges based on meter readings etc). Quasi-charges 
are when the amount of money an individual pays is based on formulae rather than 
their actual usage ofthe services (e.g. charges for water based on property values etc). 
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User charges can be a useful source of revenues and can be helpful in relaxing 
supply constraints and strengthening the influence of demand. By charging at the 
point of delivery they are also highly perceptible and relieve pressure on general tax 
revenues. In addition, concern over the distortionary effects of tax financing, fairness 
and a wish to make costs more perceptible to consumers, are all factors that 
potentially support increases in the scope of user charges. However, the scope for user 
charges tends to be limited, because of i) relatively high collection costs in 
comparison to the sums that can be levied, ii) concern over access by low income 
groups33, or iii) the kind of services best suited to charging have already been 
privatised. Further, by the very nature of public goods it is not surprising that this 
category makes up the smallest component of total sub-central government revenues. 
The OEeD has been critical of low reliance of user charges in varIOUS 
countries, e.g. in the areas of child-care, care of the elderly and pharmaceuticals. 
Trends in these areas suggest that take-up of free services is booming and supply-side 
rationing is considerable, Atkinson and van den Noord. (2001). The provision of 
services free of charge, or without making costs perceptible, obviously risks 
prompting excessive demand and hitting supply constraints, since the social costs of 
supply are largely irrelevant for the individual. User charges offer the potential to gain 
more information about price sensitivity of demand for services and can potentially 
influence demand pressure directly rather than being expressed indirectly and 
imperfectly through the electoral system. Demand pressures may also be influential 
on supply side efficiency. User charging will however, be viable only if the costs of 
collection and of compensation through the benefit system are low relative to the 
33 This concern can be reduced to a certain extent by the reimbursement of charges via the benefit 
system. 
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sums that can be levied and the efficiency gains that can result. Countries that have 
tried to increase reliance on fees and charges have generally aimed to strike a balance 
between co-payment and maximum contributions, to avoid imposing unduly high 
expenses on some households. 
Among developed countries, the USA and Australia have the strongest culture 
of user charging, particularly for facility and utility services. In most other countries, 
the proportion of non-tax revenues to total sub-central revenues is typically small. The 
scope to extend user charges has been limited in recent years by the extent that the 
delivery of key services has been privatised. In addition, cross-country evidence 
shows that even in the area of user charges, central governments retain a degree of 
influence. For example in Norway, while sub-central governments are permitted to 
impose user fees, they are required by the centre to be set below costs. 
1.4.2 f) Borrowing Autonomy 
The ability of any level of government to borrow can be helpful in facilitating 
short-term smoothing and to finance investment projects. However as discussed 
above, threats to fiscal sustainability can derive from insufficiently hard budget 
constraints, and a lack of expenditure restraint. These considerations lead many 
central governments to place restrictions on the ability of sub-central authorities to 
borrow, see for example Pisauro (2001) and Rodden (2002) for more detailed 
discussions of these issues. Figure 1.6 shows an index of borrowing autonomy from 
Rodden (op cit.). 
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Figure 1.6: Index of Borrowing Autonomy 
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Note: The index is bounded between 1 and 5 where 1 = no borrowing autonomy and 5=high 
borrowing autonomy and the period assessed is 1986-1996 where feasible. The light bar relates to the 
state/regional government while the darker bars relate to local government. 
It is interesting to note that there is sometimes little relationship between the 
degree of decentralisation in spending and borrowing autonomy. For instance, in 
France regional and local authorities have considerable latitude in deciding how much 
to borrow for capital expenditure, although borrowing is not allowed to cover current 
expenditure or to refmance existing loans. 
In Germany, the Lander and local authorities can only borrow for investment 
purposes, in proportion to their financial capacity, and subject to agreement by the 
Land's interior ministry. Spain also sets limits to total debt service spending and only 
allows short-term borrowing to cover cash-flow requirements and long-term 
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borrowing to finance public investment projects. However, Joumard and Varoudakis 
(2000) argue that in the absence of penalties, these rules are not enforced effectively. 
They suggest that non-authorisation of access to credit markets has had the result that 
sub-central authorities make greater use of bank loans which are less effectively 
regulated, but more expensive. Deficit restraint at sub-central level in recent years has 
been attributed to the annual programmes of deficit reduction that are bilaterally 
negotiated between the Federal government and each region, rather than controls on 
borrowing. 
Elsewhere too, the Maastricht criteria, and subsequently the Stability and 
Growth Pact, have forced the imposition of greater controls over borrowing by sub-
central governments. For instance, Austria introduced an 'Internal Stability Pact' in 
January 1999 to help ensure that the overall deficit position for all levels of 
government does not exceed 3%. This is done by allowing very little margin for 
borrowing by sub-central tiers of government, who are only permitted to run an 
aggregate deficit of 0.3% of GDp34. One possible justification of the low margin is 
that temporary deterioration that is best covered by temporary borrowing is likely to 
be caused by the operation of automatic stabilisers, which are largely the concern of 
central government. A limitation with such ad hoc solutions is that they might place 
too much of a constraint on public investment. This is a well-known criticism of the 
EU Stability and Growth Pact in contrast to the 'Golden Rule' for borrowing adopted 
in the UK. 
34 A similar 'internal pact' has been imposed in Italy. 
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1.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have summarised the arguments for and against alternative 
levels and forms of fiscal decentralisation. In addition, we have shown how various 
countries have interpreted such arguments and constructed their central and sub-
central fiscal arrangements accordingly. The crux of the decentralisation/federalism 
policy debate centres on the attempt to obtain the most appropriate mix between 
responsible and efficient policy setting at both central and sub-central tiers of 
government. 
We have outlined the key arguments for and against alternative levels and 
forms of decentralisation. At an intuitive level, decentralisation is often advocated on 
the grounds of possible efficiency gains from smaller operations, accountability of 
policy decisions and the potential gains for consumer choice and variety. However, 
one has to balance this with concerns regarding equity between regions, economies of 
scale, transparency, tax competition and political incentive structures (e.g. 'common 
pool' problems etc). 
Our cross-country comparisons demonstrate that throughout the OEeD, sub-
central governments playa significant role in the conduct of national fiscal policy. 
Substantial amounts of expenditure and revenue are assigned to sub-central tiers and 
their responsible (or irresponsible) use will clearly have an important impact on the 
well being of the nation as a whole. It seems pertinent therefore, for any study of 
national fiscal policy to account for the role played by sub-central tiers and to analyse 
the distinct contributions of the two tiers and the interactions between them. 
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As highlighted in the main body of the chapter, using recent data, expenditure 
decentralisation ranges from under 25% in many unitary countries to over 50% in 
some federations. Of additional interest are the types of expenditure assigned to sub-
central tiers. Typically and in line with what the theory would suggest, 'national' 
public goods such as defence and to a lesser extent, social security, remain largely 
controlled by central governments. Sub-central expenditure responsibilities tend to be 
skewed toward the provision of health care, education, housing and recreational 
services. However, our analysis shows that some countries have devolved relatively 
high levels of responsibility in certain types of expenditure and relatively lower levels 
in others. For example, in comparison to other countries, the German education 
system is one of the most de centralised however, their health care system remains one 
of the most centralised. 
Finally, an observation which is of clear importance is the existence of 
substantial 'vertical imbalances' across all our sample countries (though to a greater 
extent in some than others). Such imbalances are the result of sub-central 
governments having responsibility for expenditure provision that exceeds the 
revenues that they can raise themselves. This gap in finance is filled by central 
government transfers. It is clear from the above discussion that while there are 
recognised benefits from expenditure decentralisation, how such expenditures should 
be financed is a more complex issue. The scope for sub-central governments to raise 
revenues themselves is relatively limited given concerns over equity, efficiency oftax 
collection, harmful inter-state competition etc. Thus, vertical imbalances are 
themselves desirable. However in practice, vertical imbalances can create difficulties, 
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none more so than the possible damaging incentives placed upon sub-central 
politicians. Reliance upon central transfers can erode the accountability of those 
responsible for policy and decision making at the sub-central tier, encourage fiscal 
profligacy and over-extraction from the 'Common (National) Pool' of resources and 
generate 'soft-budget' constraints. The reliance upon central transfers is an important 
issue, and as will be discussed in future chapters, inter-governmental transfers appear 
to be a key component in successful national fiscal consolidation attempts. 
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1. 7 Appendix 
1.7.1- Description of Data 
In this appendix we discuss the fiscal and economIC data that is used 
throughout this thesis. All variables unless otherwise stated are from the IMF 
Government Finance Statistics 2002 database. GFS subject codes are presented in 
parentheses for reference. Data from the GFS refers to either the Central, Local or 
State government. 
Total Expenditure and Revenue: 
Our measure of Total Expenditure is given by the GFS's Total Expenditure 
variable (82) plus Lending minus repayment (83). Total Revenue is given by Total 
Revenue plus Grants (81). Grants (81Z) originate from two main sources - from 
National Government (81ZG) and Super-National Authorities, e.g. the EU (81ZA). 
Total Deficit (80) is given by Total Revenue (81) less Total Expenditure (82 + 
83). 
Composition of Expenditure 
We decompose Total Expenditure into the following groups: 
a) Current Expenditure (82R): 
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i) Wages and Salaries (82NA) and Employer Contributions (82NX), 
ii) Other Purchases of Goods and Services (82NP), 
iii) Subsidies (82PK) and Transfers to Non-profit Organisations and 
Households (82PT) 
iv) Interest Payments (82PA), 
v) Transfers to other levels of government (82PM). 
b) Capital expenditure (82V) less Capital Transfers (82U): 
We can also classify expenditure according to economic function. We split up 
expenditure into the following categories: 
1) Defence (82B) 
2) Education (82C) 
3) Health (82D) 
4) Social Security and Welfare (82E) 
5) Housing and Local Amenities (82F) 
6) Public Order and Safety (82AC) 
7) Recreational and Cultural Services (82G) 
8) General Public Services (82B) 
9) All other expenditure: Natural Resource (8IB) and Other Expenditure 
(82K). 
Composition of Revenue 
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Likewise, we can split up Total Revenue in a similar fashion: 
1) Direct taxation: Income Tax (81A) plus Taxes on Payroll or Woriforce 
(81C) plus Taxes on Property (81D), 
2) Social Security Contributions (81B), 
3) Indirect taxation: Domestic Taxes on Goods and Services (81E) plus Taxes 
on International Trade and Transactions (81F) 
4) Non-Tax Revenues (81YB), 
5) Capital Revenue (81 YC), 
6) Intergovernmental Grants (81Z). 
In addition to the GFS database, we make use of the OECD Statistical 
Compendium 2002 Edition for additional data on -
: Debt to GDP ratio: Gross National Debt as a percentage of GDP. 
: GDP = Gross Domestic Product (Expenditure approach) at current prices. 
: Unemployment = Number unemployed as a percentage of total labour force. 
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Appendix 1.7.2 - Construction of the 'Index of Fiscal Control' (as used in Figure 
The 'Index of Fiscal Control' comprises a weighted average index measuring 
the tax raising autonomy of state and local governments, multiplied by the magnitude 
ofthese respective taxation revenues. The weighted average index is based on OECD 
Tax Policy Study Number 1 (OECD 1999). The weights are as follows -
Table 1.6: Weights for 'Index of Fiscal Control' 
Weight Taxation Autonomy 
1 State/Local government free to set both tax rate and tax base. 
0.8 State/Local government free to set tax rate only. 
0.6 State/Local government free to set tax base only. 
0.5 State/Local government able to determine revenue-split in tax 
sharing arrangement with higher levels of government. 
0.4 Revenue split in tax sharing arrangement with higher level of 
government requires consent of State/Local government. 
0.3 Revenue split in tax sharing arrangement is fixed, but can be 
unilaterally altered by higher level of government. 
0.2 Revenue split in tax sharing arrangement is determined by higher 
level of government in their annual budget. 
0 Higher level of government sets both tax rate and base. 
For example, for a country with a central and local government structure, e.g. 
Poland with 45% of taxation in category (b), 1 % category (c) and 54% category (d.3), 
the index is obtained as follows: 
Index of Fiscal Control = 0.45*0.8 + 0.01 *0.6 + 0.54*0.3 = 0.528 
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Alternatively, for a country with a central, state and local government 
structure, e.g. Switzerland the index takes account of the ratio of state vis-a.-vis local 
taxation revenues: 
Communities: 0.97*0.8 + 0.03*0.3 = 0.785 
Cantons: 0.89* 1 + 0.06*0.4 + 0.05*0.3 = 0.929 
Overall Index of Fiscal Control = (16/38)*0.785 + (22/38)*0.929 = 0.868 
Appendix 1.7.3 - Construction of the Borrowing Autonomy Index (as used in 
Figure 1.7): Source Rodden (2003) 
Criteria: Index is bounded between 1 and 5. Higher values = greater freedom 
to borrow. 
Borrowing arrangements -
1 ) Ability to borrow - can the sub-central government borrow? 
No = 2 points 
Yes = 0 points 
2) Authorisation - Does borrowing by the sub-central government require central 
government approval? 
Yes = 1 point 
No = 0 points 
If authorisation required only on certain kinds of 
debt a value between 0 and 1 is assigned according 
to the detail of the constraint. 
3) Borrowing constraints - Are there numerical constraints on borrowing? 
Up to 0.5 points depending upon coverage of 
constraints. 
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4) Limits on the use of debt - Can debt only be used for 'golden rule' 
expenditures etc? 
If debt may not be used for current expenditures 0.5 
points. 
The final value of these four items is equal to 2 minus the sum of the points 
from criteria 1 through 4. For example, if sub-central governments in a country cannot 
borrow, the total for this part will be 2-2 = o. 
Additional criteria -
1) Sub-central government banks - Do sub-central governments own banks? 
Yes = 1 point. 
No = 0 points 
Further, depending upon the importance of these 
banks, up to 0.5 points added. 
If sub-central governments have a special 
relationship with a bank(s) but do not actually own 
them = 0.5 points. 
2) Public enterprises - Do sub-central governments own public enterprises who 
in turn have liberal borrowing practices? 
Yes = 0.5 points. 
No = 0 points. 
These scores are then added to the value obtained above. One is added so that the final 
index varies between 1 and 5. 
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Chapter 2 
"Methodology: Identifying and Classifying Fiscal Consolidation Attempts" 
2.1. Introduction 
As outlined in the Introductory chapter, a primary task of this thesis is to 
examine the distinct roles of both central and sub-central governments during national 
fiscal consolidation attempts and to discuss those factors which make certain 
consolidation attempts more likely to be successful than others. In the final chapter we 
assess the implications of alternative levels and forms of decentralisation on the 
consolidation process and empirically test whether decentralisation itself ultimately 
impacts on the probability of success. To undertake these objectives it is necessary at 
the outset to outline the methodologies we adopt both to identify consolidation 
attempts and to measure their success. In this chapter we take time to outline and 
discuss the techniques applied. In doing so, we also outline some possible alternative 
approaches and discuss the robustness of our analysis. 
We refer to a fiscal consolidation as a large and discretionary attempt by a 
country/government to improve their fiscal position l . Both elements (large and 
discretionary) are necessary requirements of a fiscal consolidation. We are therefore, 
1 In the literature, fiscal consolidations are also referred to as positive fiscal adjustments or fiscal 
reforms. 
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interested in examining episodes where there were significant reductions in the fiscal 
deficit or increases in the fiscal surplus as a direct result of intentional policy shifts. 
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2 we discuss the 
construction of an accurate measure of discretionary fiscal policy, paying particular 
attention to the approach we have applied, the Blanchard Fiscal Impulse. In Section 
2.3, using these measures of discretionary fiscal policy we discuss the identification of 
fiscal consolidation episodes. In Section 2.4 we shift focus to measuring the relative 
success of these identified consolidations, while Section 2.5 discuss our methodology 
to identify sub-central fiscal consolidation attempts. Section 2.6 provides our results 
and Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2. Measuring Discretionary Fiscal Policy 
One of the primary roles of fiscal policy is to act as an automatic stabiliser in 
response to economic fluctuations. During downturns (i.e. periods of deteriorating 
economic growth performance), fiscal policy loosens as taxation revenues fall and 
social transfers (such as unemployment benefits) increase. This in tum has an 
expansionary effect on the economy, assisting the economy's return to trend output. 
In contrast, during above trend expansions (i.e. periods of economic growth above 
'normal'), fiscal policy tightens as taxation revenues increase and social transfers 
decrease. This has a stabilising contractionary effect on the economy. The effects of 
these automatic stabilisers are significant. For the Euro area, it is estimated that a 1 % 
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fall in GDP relative to trend will increase the deficit by around 0.5 percentage points 
ofGDp2. 
Given the endemic fluctuations in the macroeconomy, it is unlikely that fiscal 
balances will remain constant even without any discretional intervention by fiscal 
policy makers. However, to examine consolidation attempts we wish to focus solely 
upon large discretionary changes in government policy. Consequently, a key goal for 
any study of consolidation attempts is to distinguish between on the one hand, fiscal 
policy changes originating from macroeconomic fluctuations and intentional policy 
shifts by governments. When identifying consolidation attempts we wish to be sure 
that the observed large changes in the fiscal position are the result of distinct policy 
shifts and are not the result of macroeconomic factors. 
Unfortunately however, there is no universally accepted technique for 
decomposing changes in fiscal policy into its discretionary and non-discretionary 
components. In fact, the appropriate method to adopt and indeed if there is an 
appropriate method, has and continues to be, one of the most controversial debates in 
modem macroeconomics. Throughout the literature, a number of alternative 
techniques have been proposed each with their respective merits and de-merits. 
Ultimately, the final decision regarding which approach to adopt will come down to 
personal preference and the research question being studied. Key concerns include 
accuracy, transparency and robustness. 
2 Source European Commission (2000), p. 51. 
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In what follows, we firstly discuss two alternative approaches to obtain a 
measure of changes in discretionary fiscal policy before outlining in detail our chosen 
approach, the Blanchard Fiscal Impulse. 
2.2.1 Alternative Approaches 
It is standard practice in the literature to deduct debt interest payments from 
the fiscal balance prior to making any calculations of discretionary fiscal policy - i.e. 
focus upon changes in the primary balance (total fiscal balance - debt interest 
payments). There are two main reasons for doing this. Firstly, current interest 
repayments largely reflect the behaviour of past governments. For example, countries 
that have had fiscally profligate governments in the past will tend to face relatively 
high debt interest payments. Thus contemporaneous interest payments are an element 
of current expenditure which has little to do with present day policymakers. Secondly, 
interest repayments are highly responsive to changes in the macro economy and 
monetary policy. Thus, interest payments may fluctuate widely outside the direct 
control of the government. For both reasons, it is widely accepted that one should 
eliminate such effects when attempting to focus upon intentional shifts to consolidate 
the budgetary position. 
To obtain a decomposition into discretionary and cyclical, or structural fiscal 
policy there are two main methods one can adopt. Firstly, one can adopt a top-down 
approach. This methodology typically consists of estimating the so-called structural 
(or cyclically adjusted) budget balance as the residual having purged the actual 
primary balance of the estimated budgetary consequences of the business cycle. 
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Having done this, year on year changes in this measurement or changes relative to 
some base year, can be calculated to obtain a measure of discretionary stance. While 
the Blanchard Fiscal Impulse estimates the discretionary fiscal stance directly, it also 
falls into this category of top-down estimation. Secondly, one may adopt a bottom-up 
approach. Here, one accounts for the budgetary effects of individual policy initiatives 
on the one hand, and each cyclical influence on the other, thereby, explaining the 
different causes of the change in the budget balance. While favourable in theory, the 
primary practical limitations of this approach are the information and data required. 
Internationally comparable data on a sufficiently large and accurate disaggregated 
basis simply does not exist. Consequently, all estimation techniques to be discussed in 
this chapter can be classified as top-down. 
2.2.2 The Hodrick-Prescott Filter and Production Function Approaches3 
In both of these estimation techniques, the measurement of the discretionary 
(or structural) fiscal impulse proceeds in three steps. Firstly, a reference path for real 
GDP is calculated. In the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) approach this reference path is trend 
output4. In essence, this trend represents the 'average' growth rate of GDP across the 
sample. In contrast, under the Production Function (PF) approach the reference path is 
a direct measure of potential GDP. Potential GDP is the level of GDP which the 
economy could produce if it were operating at full capacity. Given this estimate of 
3 For a discussion of these two approaches see Chalk (2002). 
4 A related approach to the HP filter which also calculates trend output is the Split-Time Trend (STT) 
approach. For a survey of this approach see Giomi et al. (1995). While once popular with the OECD, 
the STT approach is no longer used in current research. 
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either trend or potential output the output gap can be calculated - i.e. the difference 
between actual GDP and the chosen reference path. 
Secondly, using these output gaps, together with the relevant fiscal elasticities, 
it is possible to estimate the level of government revenues and expenditures that 
would prevail if output were at the reference path instead of the actual level. 
Typically, government tax revenues and unemployment-related items of expenditure 
such are social transfers, are thought to be the most sensitive to changes in GDP, and 
will respond closely to cyclical fluctuations. Hence, such elements are adjusted in this 
manner. The resulting estimates of adjusted revenues and expenditures can be used to 
determine the structural (or cyclically adjusted) budget balance corresponding to the 
underlying reference path for output. This technique is applied to both central and 
sub-central government data. 
Thirdly, to estimate the discretionary (structural) fiscal impulse, one only need 
calculate the first difference of this adjusted budget balance. An alternative to 
examining annual changes or the construction of a structural fiscal balance is to 
compare the current fiscal position with some pre-determined base year. Typically, 
this is a year in which actual and potential GDP were very close. One such approach 
is the IMF approach, see Alesina and Perotti (1995). In this method, the fiscal stance 
is measured by comparing the current fiscal policy with the base year where by 
definition the fiscal stance is neutral. 
94 
The primary limitation with this three stage approach is the attainment of an 
accurate measure of the output gap in stage 1. We will discuss this issue in more 
depth below. 
A less serious problem relates to the estimation of average GDP elasticities for 
government revenues and expenditures in stage 2. In principle, the measurement of 
the responsiveness of particular budget items to fluctuations in GDP is quite 
straightforward. The possible instability of the elasticities over time or over the cycle 
may, however, hamper the reliability of average elasticities. For example, 
consolidation programmes and tax reforms can change the cyclical sensitivity of 
budgetary categories in a distinctive manner. Therefore in subsequent post 
consolidation periods, changes in GDP may not generate the same response in 
elements of fiscal policy, as had previously been the case. 
2.2.2a) The HP Filter 
The use of the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to estimate potential output has 
become commonplace in the macroeconomic literature and needs little introductions. 
The basic idea of the HP filter is to fit the 'best' trend through observations of actual 
GDP by means of weighted moving averages6. This trend yields the estimate of 
5 See Hodrick and Prescott (1980) and EC (1995). 
6 For a discussion of the use of the HP method to calculate structural budget balances see Roger and 
Ongena (2002). 
95 
'potential' outpue. To do this, the H-P filter approach decomposes output (Y) III 
period t into a trend (Yt*) and non-trend or cyclical (ytC) component, i.e. -
(2.1) 
Hodrick and Prescott argued that by minimising a linear combination of the 
sum of the deviation of Y from its trend (Y*) and the variability of the trend itself, a 
measure of the trend value ofY (Y*) could be obtained8, i.e.-
(2.2) 
The parameter A is known as the 'smoothing parameter'. It determines the 
relative weights attributed to the deviation of Y from trend and the variability of the 
trend itself. The choice of A involves a trade-off for the trend between smoothness and 
fit to actual output. The 'smoother' is trend output, the poorer the fit to actual output 
and vice versa. Higher values of A imply a 'smoother' trend: for A = a the trend is 
linear. That is, a low of value of A produces trend output estimates that closely follow 
actual output and are therefore relatively volatile. A high value of A produces 
smoother trend estimates that follow actual output less closely. 
7 Strictly speaking this 'potential' output is in fact trend output and has nothing to with the level of 
output an economy can actually produce. 
8 It has been shown by King and Rebelo (1992) that applying the HP filter, results effectively in a 
moving average filter. Each estimate of trend output is calculated by the application of a weighted 
average, which extends over several years, to the actual output data. The weighting coefficients of the 
moving averages are fixed so that higher weights are assigned to the years closest to the reference year, 
i.e. the year for which trend output is calculated. The filter weights are symmetric, i.e. observations in a 
similar position on each side of the central observation are given equal weights. 
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The appropriate choice of A is ultimately at the discretion of the researcher. 
Some argue that the most appropriate method is to follow Hodrick and Prescott's lead 
(see Hodrick and Prescott (1980)) and choose a constant ratio of the variances of trend 
output and actual output. Applied on a cross-country basis, this generates different A 
values for each individual country. An alternative is to impose a uniform degree of 
both smoothness and variance in trend output for each country. Alternatively, one can 
choose a value of A that generates a pattern of cycles that are broadly consistent with 
prior views about past country specific cycles. Such criteria while inherently 
judgmental are able to incorporate (limited) information about the past. On the 
downside however, this approach is less transparent than the other two mentioned 
above. 
The primary advantage of the HP filter method is its simplicity, since it only 
requires data on actual GDP. Given the wide availability of comparable cross-country 
GDP data, it can generate consistent estimates across countries. It is also highly 
transparent. In addition when applied correctly, it is widely accepted to give accurate 
estimates of trend output. 
However, the approach does suffer from a number ofweaknesses9. A common 
criticism is that applying the filter to non-stationary series can lead to the creation of 
spurious cycles - i.e. the creation of an economic cycle which does not actually exist. 
The criticism of spurious cycles is less likely to be a significant concern with sample 
9 For a discussion of the criticisms of the HP filter see Maravall (1995) and St Amant and van Norden 
(1996). 
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sizes in excess of 30 observations - see Bouthevillain et al. (2001). Moreover, small 
samples can also suffer from an end-point problem. As the HP filter is a moving-
average based method, the trend follows actual GDP more closely at the beginning 
and end of the estimation period than in the middle. It becomes asymmetrical at the 
extremes of the series, due to the lack of observations, increasing the weights over the 
years for which observations are available. Thus the estimates at both the start and 
end-points of the sample may be biasedlO. 
The most commonly cited criticism against the HP filter approach, is the 
arbitrary choice of the smoothness parameter A. In the literature there is little 
consensus as to the appropriate value of A. Baxter and King (1999) show that for 
annual data, most contemporary studies use a value of A = 400 or 100, while for 
quarterly data the corresponding figure is usually around 1600. Recent studies have 
argued that for annual data, a value of 400 or 100 is too high. In fact, according to 
Ravn and Uhlig (2001), a value of 1600 for quarterly data corresponds to a value of 6 
to 8 for annual data. Bouthevillain et al. (2001) argue that the most effective 
'smoothing parameter' is a value of 30, though the European Commission favour a 
value of 100 (see EC 1995). The failure to reach a consensus on the most appropriate 
value of smoothing parameter is a major limitation of the HP filter approach. 
Further, by moderating the contemporaneous effects of structural breaks and 
instead, spreading out the effects over several years, any significant breaks in output 
are typically smoothed over during application ofthe HP filter. As a consequence, it is 
10 This can be circumvented where possible by adding additional observations (or forecasts) of output 
outwith the sample to increase the number of observations at the start and end of the series or 
alternatively truncating the sample having applied the filter. 
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difficult to single out large and sudden changes in the level of output if the HP filter is 
applied. Moreover, the construction oftrend output generates an inherent symmetry in 
the series, guaranteeing that output gaps and hence by implication the cyclical 
components of the budget if constructing a measure of structural balance, sum to zero 
over time. This may not be entirely appropriate and could lead to a serious 
misrepresentation of rapid structural changes. 
A final criticism often levied against the HP filter method is that it is purely 
mechanistic and as such it carries no information about the constraints and limitations 
on output posed by the availability of factors of production or other endogenous 
influences - i.e. it calculates trend rather than potential output. Thus, the trend output 
growth projected by the HP filter may be inconsistent with actual changes in capital 
stock, labour supply or total factor productivity, or it may be unsustainable because of 
inflationary pressures. 
An alternative approach, which calculates an output gap based on deviations in 
actual GDP from potential GDP, is the Production Function approach. 
2.2.2b) The Production Function Approach 
The Production Function (PF) approach, by explicitly modelling potential 
output, has a firmer base in economic theory. Use of the PF methodology has become 
increasingly popular in recent years in the light of advancements in data collection. 
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For example, the European Commission has recently replaced the use of the HP filter 
and adopted their own PF approach - see EC (2002). 
To calculate potential output under the production function approach the 
starting point involves specifying an appropriate functional form for the economy's 
production function. The usual assumption is of a Cobb-Douglas production function 
with two productive factors (labour and capital) and constant returns to scale-
InY=lnA+alnN +(l-a)lnK+lnE (2.3) 
Or, 
y=a+an+(1-a)k+e (2.4) 
where Y is output, N is labour, K is capital, E is total factor productivity and 0. 
is the intensity of labour vis-a.-vis capital. In order to implement the PF approach it is 
necessary to have accurate measures (or estimates) of all factors of production. 
Clearly, while data on K and N are readily available obtaining a measure of total 
factor productivity (E) is more difficult. 
However, for a given value of 0., the total factor productivity series, E, can be 
calculated as the residual from an estimation of equation 2.4. By applying a de-
trending technique such as the HP or Kalman filter to this residual it is then possible 
to obtain a measure of trend total factor productivity (e*). Subsequently, by putting 
this generated series into the production function, along with the stock of capital 
(which is assumed to be fully utilised - see EC 2002 for why this assumption is made) 
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and potential employment (NAIRU), it is possible to obtain a measure of potential 
output (/). 
Having calculated potential output, it is then possible to obtain a measure of 
the output gap and hence estimate the structural fiscal stance. 
The main advantage of this methodology is the presence of a sound theoretical 
foundation and the explicit calculation of potential rather than trend GDP. However, 
its principle limitation is the depth and spread of data required. To make estimates of 
potential output, a set of assumptions (e.g. the exact form of the production function 
to be estimated) and auxiliary estimates are required (e.g. an estimate of total factor 
productivity, an estimate of the NAIRU and an estimate of the stock of capital). The 
drawback of this procedure is that the estimates involve several sources of uncertainty 
and potential estimation and measurement errors, which hamper the reliability of the 
potential output and output gap estimates. Such issues are likely to be of added 
concern when one is applying the technique across a number of different countries. 
Further, as in the HP approach, the reliability of the estimates of potential 
output and hence also cyclically adjusted budget balances, are particularly 
troublesome during periods of a major structural change in the economy. In particular, 
the assumption that unemployment fluctuates around some stable, or slowly changing, 
value for NAIRU, or that the production function itself remains stable over time, may 
be inappropriate. Despite the apparent difficulties, information on structural breaks 
(e.g. changes in productivity, technology, production structure, capital stock, labour 
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markets) can be more flexibly incorporated in the production function framework than 
is the case with the HP trend estimation method. 
2.2.3 The Blanchard Approach 
An alternative approach to measure fiscal stance, which does not rely on the 
calculation of potential or trend GDP, is the Blanchard Approach. This methodology 
was first applied in Blanchard (1990). The Blanchard Fiscal Impulse (BFI) is one of 
the most popular measures used to obtain an estimate of discretionary changes in 
fiscal policy applied in the literature and it is our favoured method of estimation. 
Unlike the aforementioned techniques, the Blanchard approach estimates the 
structural fiscal impulse directly rather than the structural balance. It is an indexed 
approach and can be summarised as follows. 
The Blanchard approach is based around the estimation of what government 
expenditures and revenues would be in any given year if the unemployment rate had 
remained the same as in the previous year. In undertaking these calculations, only the 
elements of fiscal policy deemed to be influenced by unemployment fluctuations are 
adjusted. Thus, as pointed out by Alesina and Perotti (1997), the BFI is essentially a 
cyclical adjustment that eliminates from the fiscal balance changes in taxes and 
transfers due to changes in the unemployment rate. 
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Formally, the calculations we perform are as follows ll . In the first step, for 
each country in our sample and for each tier of government (i.e. general, central and 
sub-central), social transfers and revenues both expressed as a percentage of GDP, are 
regressed on a time trend (T) and the unemployment rate (Ut) -
and, 
In line with Blanchard (1990), we choose to only adjust Social Transfers and 
Revenues (excluding grants) in this manner 12 . In contrast, Brunila and Tujula (1998) 
adjust all elements of expenditure for the economic cycle. 
Next, the level of transfers and revenues that would have existed in period t, 
had unemployment remained the same as in the previous year (i.e. t-1), are calculated. 
To do this, the estimated coefficients and residuals from equations (2.5) and (2.6) are 
used in the following -
and, 
11 See Alesina and Perotti (1995) for a fuller discussion. 
12 Alesina and Perotti (1995 and 1997), Alesina et al. (1998) and Alesina and Ardagna (1998) all adopt 
an identical approach however, they do not strip out intergovernmental grants given they are using 
general government data. 
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Using Trat(Ut-l) and ReVt(Ut-l), coupled with the 'non-cyclical' elements of 
fiscal expenditure (non_cy_exp) and revenue (non_cy_rev) it is possible to compute 
the primary deficit that would have prevailed in period t had the unemployment rate 
been equal to period t-1 's unemployment rate. That is, 
Bla deficitt = (Trat(Ut_l ) +non cylical eXPt) -(Revt(Ut_l ) +non cylical revt ) (2.9) 
Finally, to obtain the Blanchard fiscal impulse, one calculates the difference 
between this unemployment-adjusted measure of the primary deficit in period t 
(Bla-'pri_deft) and the previous year's primary deficit (pri_deft-l). 
BFlt = Blan primary deficitt - Unadjusted primary deficitt_1 (2.10) 
The inclusion of a time trend in (2.5) and (2.6) requires further explanation. 
The use of the time trend is purely a statistical tool to guarantee that the residuals 
from the estimating regression are stationary. Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alesina and 
Perotti (1997), Alesina et al. (1998) and DaIle Nogare (2003) all use a split time trend, 
with the sample split into two. 
In our analysis we adopt a different strategy for reasons outlined below. 
Firstly, our sample differs from the aforementioned studies and unlike their sample 
periods, ours is unbalanced. Thus a uniform split time-trend occurring halfway 
through the sample is inappropriate. 
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Secondly and more fundamentally, we believe that the use of a uniform split 
time trend is rather arbitrary. It implies the existence of a certain trend in revenues and 
transfers that is identical across all countries (and levels of government) in the sample 
period. We believe that this is likely to be too restrictive. The pattern of fiscal policy 
has varied considerably across countries. For example, government expenditures have 
risen far more sharply in some than in others. In addition, given that we are applying 
this measure across tiers of government, changes within particular countries would 
again suggest that a uniform approach is too simplistic. 
Thirdly, we believe that alternative time trend specifications will lead to 
improved estimates. The use of a split time trend implies that there is a distinct kink in 
the data series. This mayor may not be the case in our sample. Use of a split-time 
trend while able to account for linear trends fairly accurately cannot capture any non-
linear trends in the data series. In contrast, quadratic trends can perform well both 
when there are distinct kinks in the data series and in non-linearities. 
Therefore, when estimating equations 2.7 and 2.8 we initially include both a 
quadratic and a linear time trend -
(2.11) 
and, 
(2.12) 
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If the quadratic term is significant and the residuals appear stationaryI3, then 
we adopt this specification14. Ifthe quadratic term is insignificant but the residuals are 
stationary, we check to see whether the linear trend on it's own is sufficient to 
guarantee stationarity. Thus, we estimate a model, identical to that estimated by 
Brunila and Tujula (1998) -
(2.13) 
and, 
(2.14) 
As before, stationarity is assessed. If non-stationarity is found, we return to the 
previous specification - equations 2.11 and 2.12. If the linear trend is significant and 
the residuals are stationary then equations 2.13 and 2.14 are adopted. Finally, if the 
linear time trend is insignificant but the residuals are stationary, we re-conduct the 
analysis without time-trends i.e. -
(2.15) 
and, 
(2.16) 
13 We check for stationarity by looking at the correlegrams of the residuals and applying unit root tests. 
For a discussion on stationarity tests and their 'power' see Enders (2003). 
14 At no point do we find a significant quadratic term where the residuals are non-stationary. 
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If stationarity is found, this was the approach adopted. If not, we return to the 
previous linear trend specification. 
The above approach enables us to choose the most appropriate model 
specification for each country and each tier of government. In most cases, the 
quadratic trends perform well. In only 9 (3 at the general government level) out of 95 
regressions is the inclusion of a time trend rejected entirely. 
The following table contains a list of the time trend specifications adopted for 
each country and level of government. 
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Q = Linear and Quadratic trend 
L = Linear trend only 
x = No time trend 
Table 2.1: Time-Trend Sl!ecifications for Blanchard Fiscal Iml!ulse Calculations 
Country Revenues Transfers 
General Central Sub-Central General Central Sub-Central 
UK L X Q L L Q 
Nefuerlands Q Q L Q Q Q 
Ireland Q Q Q Q Q X 
France Q Q L Q X Q 
Denmark Q Q Q Q Q L 
Sweden Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Belgium X Q X L Q L 
Norway Q Q Q X X Q 
Finland L L Q Q L Q 
Spain Q Q L L Q L 
Australia Q Q Q X X Q 
Canada L L Q Q L Q 
USA L L Q L Q L 
Austria Q Q Q Q Q Q 
Germany L Q L Q L Q 
The Blanchard approach has a number of advantages. Firstly and most 
importantly, the measure appears to generate believable results. Alesina and Perotti 
(1995) report that use of the Blanchard method identifies all well documented 
episodes of fiscal consolidation previously discussed in the literature. Further, Brunila 
and Tujula (1998) show that the Blanchard approach captures relatively well the 
discretionary fiscal impulses in Finland in recent years in comparison to estimates 
requiring the estimation of potential output! 5 . 
15 This is shown to be especially evident in comparison to the HP filter approach. 
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Secondly, the approach is simple and transparent. In addition, it does not 
require the calculation of potential output, which as discussed above, can be both 
highly controversial and complicated. 
Thirdly, the Blanchard approach does not require the choice of some 'base 
year' upon which current policy outcomes can be compared. Since Blanchard's 
indicator focuses on the discretionary changes m underlying fiscal stance, the 
previous year's budgetary position is used as the benchmark. 
Fourthly, under the Blanchard method the results concemmg the past 
orientation of fiscal policy do not change in the course of time provided that the 
sensitivity of government revenues and expenditures with respect to changes in 
unemployment are fairly stable over time. As discussed above, unstable expenditure 
and revenue elasticities can pose difficulties for measures of discretionary fiscal 
impulses based on estimations of potential output. However, Kearney et al. (2000) 
note that the BFI assumes a stable relationship between changes in unemployment and 
economic activity, which may not be appropriate (especially during periods of 
structural change). 
Finally, and not necessarily an advantage in itself but an important 
justification nevertheless, is that the BFI has been the approach adopted in many 
previous empirical studies of fiscal consolidation attempts. Therefore, in order to best 
highlight the value added from our study, using the BFI has the benefit of applying 
consistency between this study and previous work in the literature. 
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There are however, some limitations with the BFI approach. Firstly, it is not as 
sophisticated as alternative methods such as the PF approach. However, sophistication 
does not necessarily imply accuracy and we have found that our use of the BFI 
generates believable results. In addition, while alternative procedures may exist which 
give highly accurate point estimates of discretionary and non-discretionary fiscal 
balances, for our purposes we simply require a method to discriminate between large 
fiscal impulses and all other periods. 
Secondly, the Blanchard approach only allows for a distinction between 
changes in economic conditions that are temporary versus those that are permanent 
and captured via the inclusion ofthe time trend(s). 
Thirdly, it is also possible to be critical of the use of unemployment as the 
explanatory variable upon which expenditures are adjusted. As pointed out by Heller 
(1996), lags in unemployment rates may lead to the results not accurately capturing 
changes in the cycle. Moreover, the BFI adjusts revenues solely for movements in 
unemployment despite the fact that important tax bases (e.g. consumption and wages) 
while cyclical, may not be perfectly correlated with unemployment movements. It is 
possible, as Brunila and Tujula (1998) have done, to use the real GDP lagged instead 
of the unemployment rate in the calculation of the BFI though their results do not alter 
substantially. 
Finally, the BFI only captures the effect of the cycle in a linear manner. More 
complex non-linear aspects of a downturn for example, are not accounted for. Despite 
these criticisms, the BFI is the primary measure of changes in discretionary fiscal 
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stance on which we base our identification of fiscal consolidation attempts. To check 
the robustness of our results we have also identified consolidation attempts based 
upon changes in the structural balance calculated via the HP filter approach and the 
use of an estimated potential output 'output gap' supplied by the OECD 16. As we will 
demonstrate, our results are relatively robust across all 3 estimation techniques. 
2.3. Identifying General Government Fiscal Consolidation Attempts 
Having constructed a measure of discretionary changes in fiscal policy for 
each country, there are two ways of proceeding. The first is simply to use this 
measure as part of a cross country panel dataset to examine common features which 
characterise shifts in general government discretionary fiscal policy. However, the 
problem with this approach is that the measured discretionary fiscal impulse is 
unlikely to be zero even if there is no discretionary policy action enacted by 
governments, simply because there is no perfect way of decomposing automatic and 
discretionary fiscal changes. The risk is that any statistical analysis based on this 
panel dataset will lack statistical power. A second way of proceeding is to focus on 
significant changes in discretionary fiscal policy. This will ensure that our results are 
not driven unduly by cyclical changes. The standard approach in the literature is to 
define some form of subjective criteria which allows one to discriminate between 
significant changes in discretionary fiscal policy and all other episodes based entirely 
on the data at hand. Given that there exists neither a fiscal consolidation 'script' which 
governments follow, or indeed comprehensive and accurate records of government 
16 The OEeD output gap is based on the production function approach. For a discussion of its 
calculation see Giomo et al. (1995). 
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policy shifts to improve their fiscal balances, the use of specific criteria to 
discriminate between observations is likely to be the most appropriate methodology to 
adopt. 
The use of structural balances and subjective criteria has been popular in the 
literature. In the following table we list both the subjective criteria used to identify 
consolidation attempts and the measure of discretionary fiscal policy adopted in a 
selection of previous studies. 
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Table 2.2: Fiscal Consolidation Identification & Measures of Discretionan: Fiscal Im~ulse 
Identification of Fiscal Consolidation Attempts Measure of Discretionary Fiscal Impulse 
Alesina & Perotti (1995) : Annual Fiscal Impulse 1.5% ofGDP, or BFI 
: Annual Fiscal Impulse + 1 standard deviation of individual country mean. 
IMF (1993, 1995) : Improvement in Structural Balance 1.5% ofGDP. IMF Structural Budget Balance 
McDermott and Wescott : Improvement in Primary Structural Balance 1.5% of potential GDP over two years and not OECD & IMF Output Gaps 
(1996) decrease in either year. 
Cour et al. (1996) : Three-year improvement in Primary Structural Balance 3% ofGDP. OECD Primary Structural Budget Balance 
De Menil (1996) : Annual improvement in Primary Structural Balance 1.5% of GOP. BFI 
Giavazzi and Pagano : Accumulated improvement in Primary Structural Deficit 5,4& 3% of GOP over 4,3 & 2 years OECD Primary Structural Budget Balance 
(1996) respectively, or 
: Annual improvement in Primary Structural Balance 3% of GOP. 
Alesina and Perotti : Annual Fiscal Impulse 1.5% ofGDP, or BFI 
(1997) : Two-year consecutive Fiscal Impulse 1.25% of GOP. 
Missale et al. (1997) : Annual improvement in Primary Structural Balance 1% of GOP. OECD Primary Structural Budget Balance . 
Alesina and Ardagna : Annual Fiscal Impulse 2%ofGDP, or BFI ! 
(1998) : Two-year consecutive Fiscal Impulse 1.25% of GOP. i 
Alesina et al. (1998) : Annual Fiscal Impulse 1.5% ofGDP, or BFI • 
: Two-year consecutive Fiscal Impulse 1.25% of GOP. 
Giavazzi et al. (2000) : Two-year improvement in Fiscal Balance 1.5% of GOP. OECD Fiscal Balance 
Steinherr et al. (2000) : Annual improvement in Primary Deficit 1% of GOP, or Ameco Database, EC Ecfin 
: Annual improvement in Primary Surplus 0.5% of GOP. 
Kamps (200 I) Two-year improvement in Structural Budget Balance 1.5% of potential GOP. OECD Structural budget balance 
Von Hagen et al. (2001) : Two-year consecutive improvement in Cyclically Adjusted balance 1.25% of cyclically adjusted GDP, or Cyclical adjustments based on a linear-
: Annual improvement in Cyclically Adjusted Balance 1.5% of cyclically adjusted GOP provided Balance quadratic time trend. 
did not deteriorate in following year. 
Mulas-Granados (2002) : Annual improvement in cyclically adjusted budget balance 1% of GOP HP Filter 
Lambertini and Tavares : Annual improvement in Primary Balance 1.5% of GOP. OECD Primary deficit (not cyclically 
(2003) adjusted) 
Purfield (2003) : Annual improvement in Primary Balance 2% of GOP, or Unadjusted Primary Balance 
: Two-year consecutive improvement in Primary Balance 1.25% ofGDP 
EC (2003 a and b) : Annual Fiscal Impulse 2.0% ofGDP, or HP Filter 
: Two-year consecutive Fiscal Impulse 1.5% of GOP. 
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As the above table highlights, a number of alternative methodologies have 
been applied in the literature to identify 'significant' consolidation attempts. 
Typically, most studies define a 'significant' consolidation attempt as having taken 
place if the measure of discretionary fiscal policy improves by at least 1 % of GDP; 
the most common requirement is around 1.5% of GDP. However, whether this 
improvement is required to occur in one, two or more years differs from study to 
study. In addition, Table 2.2 shows the alternative methods of measuring discretionary 
fiscal policy. Alesina and co-authors rely on the BFI measure while organisations 
such as the IMF and the OECD unsurprisingly base their analysis on their own 
measurements of the structural fiscal balance. While general government structural 
balances are widely available, neither the IMF nor the OECD construct such structural 
measures for central and sub-central units separately. Therefore, we have to rely on 
constructed measures of discretionary fiscal impulse as outlined in Section 2.2. 
In what follows, to remain consistent with the seminal paper in the field, 
Alesina and Perotti (1995), our primary analysis is based upon the following criteria 
for identifying general government consolidation attempts. 
Definition 1: 
A period of fiscal consolidation is deemed to have occurred in a given year if the 
discretionary fiscal impulse is greater than or equal to + 1.5 percent of GDP. 
A limitation of Definition 1 is that we cannot account for more gradual 
consolidations that involve small changes over longer time horizons. As Table 2.2 
shows, other studies have tried to circumvent this problem by allowing for two-year 
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consolidations. To test the robustness of our results we checked to see how our results 
altered if Definition 1 (a) is applied instead. 
Definition 1 (a): 
A fiscal consolidation will have deemed to have taken place if (1) a one year period, 
where the primary structural balance decreases by at least 1.5 percent of GDP or (2) a 
two year period where the primary structural balance decreases at least 1.25% of 
GDP17. 
Even in applying Definition l(a), there is the possibility that we may fail to 
capture consolidation attempts which take place over a number of years. However, 
while acknowledging this criticism, use of even more liberal criteria may lead us to 
include episodes that merely represent cyclical or automatic shifts in fiscal flows. 
Illera and Mulas-Granados (2002) explicitly look at the duration of consolidation 
attempts in the ED. They measure the time span between two consecutive years of 
discretionary fiscal expansion, or in other words, the number of years between the 
beginning and the end of a fiscal consolidation18. They find that 46% of all identified 
consolidation attempts lasted one year, 21 % two years, 13% three years and 20% 
lasted four years or more. By focussing upon Definition 1 (and to a lesser extent 
Definition 1 (a)) we can be reasonably confident that the majority of actual 
consolidation attempts will be accurately identified by our methodology. 
17 Definition 1 (a) is consistent with that adopted in Alesina et al. (1998) and Alesina and Perotti (1997). 
18 Their measure of discretionary fiscal policy stems from application ofthe HP filter. 
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2.4. Identifying Successful Consolidation Attempts 
Having identified fiscal consolidation attempts, these episodes can be 
classified into successful and unsuccessful attempts. Undertaking a consolidation is 
one thing, ensuring that it generates long-term improvements in the fiscal position is 
another19• When identifying consolidation attempts, the standard approach in the 
literature to classify success, has been to define certain subjective criteria upon which 
each identified consolidation can be assessed. 
In the following table we list the various criteria that have been applied in 
previous studies. 
19 For a discussion of recent 'success rates' of fiscal consolidations, see OECD (2002) and EC (2002). 
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Table 2.3: Measuring Success 
Definition of success 
Alesina & Perotti : Debt to GDP ratio 3 years after consolidation attempt (i.e. T+3) 5%ofGDP 
(1995) lower than in year of consolidation attempt (i.e. T). 
McDermott and : Debt to GDP ratio 3 years after consolidation attempt (i.e. T+3) 3%ofGDP 
Wescott (1996) lower than in year of consolidation attempt (i.e. T). 
Alesina and Perotti : Debt to GDP ratio 3 years after consolidation attempt (i.e. T+3) 5%ofGDP 
(1997) lower than in year of consolidation attempt (i.e. T). 
: Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance 3 years after consolidation attempt (i.e. 
T+3) is on average 2% of GDP healthier than in year of consolidation attempt 
(i.e. T). 
Alesina and : Debt to GDP ratio 3 years after consolidation attempt (i.e. T+3) 5%ofGDP 
Ardagna (1998) lower than in year of consolidation attempt (i.e. T). 
: Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance 3 years after consolidation attempt (i.e. 
T + 3) is on average 2% of GDP healthier than in year of consolidation attempt 
(i.e. T). 
Alesina et al. : Debt to GDP ratio 3 years after consolidation attempt (i.e. T+3) 5%ofGDP 
(1998) lower than in year of consolidation attempt (i.e. T). 
: Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance 3 years after consolidation attempt (i.e. 
T+3) is on average 2% of GDP healthier than in year of consolidation attempt 
(i.e. T). 
Steinherr et al. : Average annual growth rate of (real) labour productivity is higher in the 5 years 
(2000) following consolidation attempt (i.e. T + 1 to T +5) than in previous 5 years (i.e. 
T-5 to T). 
Von Hagen et al. : Two years after consolidation attempt (i.e. T+2) the government budget 
(2001) balance 75% of balance in year of consolidation attempt (i.e. T). 
Purfield (2003) : Average Primary Fiscal Balance two years after consolidation is 2% lower than 
in two years prior to adjustment. 
Lambertini and : Debt to GDP ratio 2 years after consolidation attempt (i.e. T+2) 3%ofGDP 
Tavares (2003) lower than in year of consolidation attempt (i.e. T). 
: Primary deficit remains constant in 2 years after consolidation attempt (T + 1 & 
T+2). 
Ardagna (2004) : Debt to GDP ratio 3 years after consolidation (i.e. T+3) 3% of GDP lower 
than in the year of consolidation (i.e. T). 
Virtually all previous studies use post-consolidation fiscal performance as a 
basis for measuring the success or failure of consolidation attempts. The change in the 
debt to GDP ratio is most often used, though changes in the structural balance have 
also been considered. The use of fiscal policy as the sole measure of success can be 
justified on the grounds that in most instances the primary motivation for undertaking 
a consolidation attempt has been to improve the national fiscal position2o. As can be 
20 It is possible that a government's motivation for implementing a consolidation attempt may be 
something other than addressing the debt to GDP ratio. For example, targeting the exchange rate, 
addressing output gap concerns etc. However, even if this is the case for some observations, the 
performance of debt to GDP ratios in the immediate aftermath of consolidation will remain a good 
'proxy' of success. 
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observed from Table 2.3 Steinherr et al. (2000) is the only paper which does not use 
fiscal policy to measure success. 
To retain consistency with Alesina and Perotti (1995), for the most part our 
analysis is based on the application of the following definition of success-
Definition 2: 
A fiscal consolidation IS successful if three years after the last year of the 
consolidation, the ratio of debt to GDP is at least five percentage points below the 
level observed immediately prior to the consolidation attempt. 
In addition to Definition 2, in line with Alesina and Perotti (1997) and Alesina 
et at. (1998), we check the robustness of our results by applying a variant which in 
addition to changes in debt to GDP, also measures success according to changes in the 
structural primary balance. This we term Definition 2(a). 
Definition 2(a): 
A fiscal consolidation is successful if 
1) three years after the last year of the consolidation, the ratio of debt to GDP 
is at least five percentage points below the level observed immediately prior to the 
consolidation attempt. 
2) in the three years after the last year of the consolidation, the cyclically 
adjusted primary balance is on average at least 2 percentage points of GDP greater 
than the level observed immediately prior to the consolidation attempt. 
The above definitions of success do not take into account the differential effort 
that would be required by governments to reduce their debt to GDP ratio given their 
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differing initial (pre-consolidation) conditions. If a government manages to stabilise 
its debt to GDP ratio from a previously explosive path it seems reasonable to view this 
as a relatively successful outcome. To better capture relative success, and to 
discriminate across a range of alternative outcomes following a consolidation attempt, 
we construct a more refined success index defined below. In the analysis that follows, 
we present our results based on both Definitions 2 and 3. 
Definition 3: 
An index of success/failure, SI, is classified as follows: 
SI = 3 if the level of the debt to GDP ratio falls by at least 5 percentage points 
in the three years following a consolidation attempt (equivalent to 
"success" in Definition 2). 
SI=2 
SI = 1 
SI= 0 
if the level of the debt to GDP ratio stabilises (within half a percentage 
point tolerance of the initial level rate) or if it decreases by less than 5 
percentage points over the three years following a consolidation 
attempt. 
if the growth rate of the debt to GDP ratio over the three years 
following a consolidation attempt is less than that observed in the three 
years prior to the consolidation attempt (here we use a tolerance of 
10% of the initial growth rate). 
if none of the above apply the attempt IS classified as a failed 
consolidation attempt. 
While the above index is also subjective, we believe that it is more effective in 
discriminating between alternative outcomes following consolidation. Such an 
approach no longer equates consolidation attempts that bring about cuts in debt to 
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GDP ratios which nevertheless do not exceed 5% of GDP, as equivalent to attempts 
which are completely reversed. 
2.5. Identifying Sub-Central Consolidation Attempts 
It seems likely that the majority of consolidation episodes are instigated at the 
level of central government. However, our dataset also allows us to identify 
consolidation attempts made by the sub-central tier of government. Given the smaller 
scale of sub-central budgets it is necessary to adapt Definition 1 for use at the sub-
central level: 
Definition 4: 
A period of sub-central fiscal consolidation is deemed to have occurred in a given 
year if the weighted discretionary fiscal impulse is greater than or equal to + 1.5 
percent of GDP or if the weighted discretionary fiscal impulse exceeds 1.25 percent of 
GDP for two consecutive years. 
The weight applied in each case is the sub-central tier's percentage share of general 
government expenditure. 
We allow for two-year consolidations at the sub-central level gIVen the 
relatively small size of this tier and the likelihood that in practice such consolidations 
are likely to be more gradual than those at the centre. We attempted to allow for only 
single year sub-central consolidations and full results are available on request. 
Degrees of freedom become relatively small however, and although our results remain 
robust, obtaining statistical inference with such limited observations is more difficult. 
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In characterising the success of sub-central consolidation attempts we are 
unable to measure success based upon changes in sub-central debt ratios as such data 
is not available on a cross-country comparative basis. In addition, even if this data 
existed, sub-central debt data is highly dependent on central government controls and 
hence may change for reasons other than sub-central fiscal policy shifts. Instead we 
judge success on the basis of prolonged improvements in the structural fiscal balance 
of the sub-central tier of government. 
Definition 5: 
A period of sub-central fiscal consolidation is deemed successful if over the following 
three years, the Blanchard structural fiscal balance is on average, as good as or better 
than in the consolidation year. 
2.6 Identified Consolidation Attempts and their Levels of Success 
2.6.1 General Government Consolidation Attempts 
Table 2.4 lists the years in which we have identified consolidation attempts at 
the general government level based upon Definition 1 together with those which we 
deem to be successful using Definition 2. 
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lIable 2.4: Identified General Government Consolidation Attem12ts and Success 
Year of Attempted General Government Year of Successful General Government 
Conso lidation Consolidation 
Australia 1982,96 & 98 1996 & 98 
Austria 1984 -
Belgium 1982,85,86 & 94 1994 
Canada 1982,87,95,96 & 97 1996 & 97 
Denmark 1983,84 & 86 1983&84 
Finland 1976,81,84,88 & 93 -
France 87 & 97 -
Germany 1976,77& 82 -
Ireland 1976,83,84,87,88&89 1987,88 & 89 
Netherlands 1983,85,88,91 & 93 -
Norway 1981,83,89,90 & 94 1981 & 94 
Spain 1985,86 & 97 1997 
Sweden 1981,82,83,84,87,92,94,95&96 1984,87 & 96 
UK 1976,77,87,88,96,97&98 1976,77,87,88,97&98 
USA - -
Total 61 22 
By applying the methodology outlined above we identify 61 general 
government consolidation attempts. As might be expected, nearly all (59 out of 61) 
general government consolidation attempts are either led by central government or 
involve both tiers of government simultaneously. There are only 2 cases in which the 
sub-central tier consolidated when no consolidation effort could be identified at the 
central tier. 
It is useful to note that a number of episodes that have been discussed at length 
in the existing literature are represented, including the UK in the late 1990s, and 
Denmark and Ireland in the early and late 1980s respectively. For studies of these 
consolidation efforts see for example, Dornbusch (1989), Giavazzi and Pagano 
122 
(1990), Bradley and Whelan (1997), Lambertini and Tavares (2003) and Hjelm and 
Johansson (2002). 
In the third column we indicate the dates of successful consolidation attempts, 
as classified using Definition 2 above. Of a total of 61 attempted consolidations, 22 
(36%) are classified as successful. Further, 27 general government consolidation 
attempts involve consolidation at the sub-central tier, of which 12 (44%) are judged 
successful. There are several sustained periods of consolidation (including the UK 
1996-1998, Ireland 1987-1989 and Sweden 1981-1984) and it is noticeable that 
successful consolidations tend to occur close to, i.e. within a two to three year period 
of, other attempted consolidations. 
In Table 2.5 we list the number of consolidation attempts and the relative 
success rates of these consolidations (as measured by the Success Index) for the 
countries in our study. 
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Table 2.5: Consolidation Attem,Qts2 Success Rates and Discretionan: EX,Qansions 1 
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Number of 9 7 6 5 5 5 5 4 3 3 3 3 2 1 0 61 
attempts 
Success 1.9 2.9 1.7 0.6 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.5 2.7 2 2.3 1 1 0 0 1.5 
index (SI) 
Number of 2 6 4 6 4 2 2 I 3 2 I 2 2 3 I 41 
expansions 
I We identified discretionary fiscal expansions in a symmetric manner to consolidations. That is, a discretionary expansion was deemed to have occurred if the fiscal impulse 
was at least 1.5% ofGDP. 
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It is apparent that certain countries have attempted to consolidate more 
frequently than others, notably the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden), though these attempts have not always been successful. A 
relatively large number of identified consolidation attempts and discretionary 
expansions took place in Denmark, the UK, Ireland, Finland and Norway. However, 
these countries are not uniformly associated with low rates of success: Denmark and 
the UK record relatively high success rates; but conversely Finland and Norway 
experienced relatively large numbers of discretionary adjustments with relatively low 
success rates. It has been hypothesised by Alesina and Perotti (1995) that certain 
countries appear to engage in 'stop-go' policies and this may be one explanation for 
the relative success and failure of consolidation attempts. They show that in the 
immediate aftermath of a consolidation attempt, a significant expansion can be 
observed from the data. We find some evidence to support this hypothesis for two of 
our countries - Finland and Norway. 
As a quick check of the relative performance of the two different types of 
political structures, unitary and federal, we can divide our countries into two groups. 
The unitary countries are the UK, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Norway, 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland. Our group of federations are the USA, Canada, 
Germany, Austria, Spain and Australia. It would appear that unitary countries have 
engaged in more consolidations than their federal counterparts. Out of the total 
number of attempts identified, 15 relate to federal countries and 46 to unitary 
countries. These consolidation attempts lead to consolidation ratios of 12% for federal 
countries and 23% for unitary ones. Overall there is little difference between the 
success rate of 33%, achieved in federal countries and that of 37%, achieved in 
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unitary countries. Table 2.5 shows the distribution of successful consolidations across 
countries. Among unitary countries the average value of the success index is 1.72 
while among the federal countries it is 1.1822. 
In the following table we assess the extent to which our consolidation attempts 
are re-classified as successful or unsuccessful if we use Definition 2(a) instead of 
Definition 2. 
Table 2.6: COIDRarison of Success Measures 
Definition 2 Definition 2(a) Consolidations in 2(a) and 
not in 2 
USA None None None 
UK 1976,77,87,88,97& 1976,77,87,88,96,97& 1996 
98 98 
Austria None None None 
Belgium 1994 1985 & 94 1985 
Denmark 1983&84 1983&84 None 
France None None None 
Germany None None None 
Netherlands None None None 
Norway 1981 & 94 1981 & 94 None 
Sweden 1984,87 & 96 1983,84,87,94,95&96 1983,94 & 95 
Canada 1996 & 97 1995,96 & 97 1995 
Finland None None None 
Ireland 1987,88 & 89 1987,88 & 89 None 
Spain 1997 1985 & 97 1985 
Australia 1996 & 98 1996 & 98 None 
Total 22 29 7 
Using this alternative measure of success forces us to re-classify only seven 
observations as successful as opposed to unsuccessful. Thus, the ratio of successful 
22 Of course it is possible that one reason why federal countries may engage in consolidations less 
frequently is because they run healthier fiscal positions in 'normal' times. 
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consolidations to unsuccessful consolidations across the whole sample increases. We 
find that the overall ratio stands at roughly 50% (29 successful, 30 unsuccessful and 2 
unclassified). Thus we can be relatively confident that according to our definition of 
success, our analysis is robust. 
U sing our more refined success index, 22 general government consolidation 
attempts achieved the toughest criterion of a fall in the debt to GDP ratio that exceeded 
5 percentage points (SI = 3); 12 resulted in a stable debt to GDP ratio or a decline of 
less than 5 percentage points (SI = 2); 17 attempts resulted in a reduction in the growth 
rate of the debt to GDP ratio, so satisfied our weakest definition of success (SI = 1) 
and the remaining 10 of the 61 consolidation attempts fell in the failed category (SI = 
0). 
Finally, it's worth examining the behaviour of the European countries in our 
sample in the run-up to the launch of EMU. During this period the Maastricht criteria 
was seen by some as having helped more lax governments in providing a credible 
'political pre-commitment' to the objective of reducing structural budget deficits. We 
can offer limited support to the success of this forced discipline. Of the EMU countries 
included in our sample, five made significant adjustments in the post-Maastricht 
period (Belgium 1994, France 1997, the Netherlands 1993, Finland 1993 and Spain 
1997); Germany and Ireland did not make significant consolidation attempts during 
the 1990s, though at this stage they already had deficit and debt ratios very close to, or 
within the thresholds set23 . 
23 In the case of Austria, our sample ends in 1994 and hence we are unable to detect any discernible 
effects attributable to the Maastricht criteria. 
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In Table 2.7 we compare our identified consolidation attempts with those 
obtained from a) the Alesina and Perotti (1995) study whose methodology we have 
followed and b) the consolidation attempts identified using Definition 1 but where the 
measure of discretionary fiscal impulse is obtained via use of the HP filter (with a 
smoothing parameter of 30 and 10024) and the OECD's Output Gap. The OECD's 
Output Gap is calculated via a PF approach and hence we are able to compare our 
results obtained from using the BFI with the two main alternative approaches 
discussed in Section 2.225 . 
24 A value of30 is that favoured by Boutevillian et aI., while a value of 100 by the EC. 
25 Note that the Alesina and Perotti (1995) study's sample ends in 1992. 
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Table 2.7: Comuarison of Identified Consolidation Attemuts According to Measure of Discretional): Fiscal Imuulse 
Country Blanchard Fiscal Impulse Alesina & Perotti OECD Output Gap HP Filter (A=30) HP Filter (A= 100) 
(1995) 
USA - - 1982 - -
UK 1976,77,87,88,96,97 &98 1977 & 1988 1976,77,80,81,96&98 1976,77,80,81,96 & 98 1976,77,80,81,96&98 
Austria 1984 1977 & 1984 1984 1984 -
, 
Belgium 1982, 85, 86 & 94 1982&84 1982, 85, 86 & 94 1982, 85, 86, & 94 1982, 85, 86, & 94 
Denmark 1983,84 & 86 1983, 84, 85 & 86 1983,84 & 86 1980,81,83,84,86&93 1980,83,84,86,92&93 
France 87 & 97 None 1980,87,96 & 97 1980,87,96 & 97 1980,87,96 & 97 
Germany 1976,77& 82 1976&89 1976,77,89 & 94 1976,77& 89 1976,77& 89 
Netherlands 1983,85,88,91 &93 1985 & 91 1982,91,93 & 96 1991,93 & 96 1991,93 & 96 
Norway 1981,83,89,90&94 1979,80,83,84,89 1981,85,90,94 & 95 1981,90,94 & 95 1981,90,94 & 95 
&90 
Sweden 1981,82,83,84,87,92,94,95&96 1983,84 & 87 1981,82,87,92,95,96& 1981,82,83,87,92,96& 1981,87,92,96 & 97 
97 97 
Canada 1982,87,95,96&97 1981 1986,87,94,95,96&97 1986,87,95,96&97 1986,87,94,95,96&97 
Finland 1976,81,84,88&93 1973, 76, 84 & 88 1988 & 93 1975,88 & 93 1975,88 & 93 
Ireland 1976,83,84,87,88& 89 1984,87, 88 & 89 1984,87,88,89,90&97 1976,77,83,84,87,88,89 1976,77,84,87,88,89,90, 
&97 &97 
Spain 1985,86 & 97 1986 & 87 1985,86,95 & 97 1985,86 & 97 1985,86 & 97 
Australia 1982,96 & 98 1987 1988,96 & 98 1982,86 & 96 1982 & 96 
Number 61 35 60 60 57 
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As can be observed from the above table, our results are relatively robust 
across all methods. Firstly, the dates in the first column are broadly similar to those 
reported in Alesina and Perotti (1995), allowing for the difference in our sample 
period and for minor revisions to the published data. Secondly, while not identical, 
similar episodes are identified when using our alternative measures of discretionary 
fiscal policy, the HP filter and the PF approaches. It is unlikely that we will achieve 
entirely consistent results given the differences in estimation between the BPI and the 
two output gap measures, however, we can be reasonably satisfied that the episodes 
identified by the various approaches are consistent with one another. Very few major 
discrepancies emerge, with small revisions in dates for France, Netherlands, the UK 
and Norway appearing to be the only differences. 
In addition, we can compare the identified episodes in Table 2.4 with those 
obtained if one replaces Definition 1 with Definition lea) - i.e. identification of 
consolidation attempts over two years. Our results are presented in Table 2.8. For 
two-year consolidation attempts the last year of consolidation is referenced. 
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Table 2.8: Com12arison of Identified Consolidation Attem12ts Definition I vs. 
Definition l{al 
Country Definition I Definition lea) 
USA - -
UK 1976,77,87,88,96,97 &98 1977 (two years), 1988 (two years), 
1997 (two years) & 1998 (two years) 
Austria 1984 1984 
Belgium 1982,85,86 & 94 1982, 1986 (two years), 1987 (two 
years) & 1994 
Denmark 1983,84 & 86 1984 (two years) & 1986 
France 1987 & 97 1987 & 1997 (two years) 
Germany 1976,77 & 82 1977 (two years) & 1982 
Netherlands 1983,85,88,91 & 93 1983, 1985, 1988, 1991 & 1993 
Norway 1981,83,89,90&94 1981,1983,1990 (two years) & 1995 
(two years) 
Sweden 1981,82,83,84,87,92,94,95 &96 1982 (two years), 1983 (two years), 
1984 (two years), 1987, 1992, 1995 
(two years) & 1996 (two years) 
Canada 1982,87,9596 & 97 1982,1987,1995 (two years), 1996 
(two years) & 1997 (two years) 
Finland 1976,81,84,88&93 1976,1981,1984,1988 & 1993 
Ireland 1976,77,83,84,87,88,&89 1977 (two years), 1983 (two years), 
1984 (two years), 1988 (two years) & 
1989 (two years) 
Spain 1985,86 & 97 1986 (two years) & 1997 
Australia 1982 & 96 1982,1996 & 1998 
Again, our results appear to be robust to the use of Definition lea). For the 
most part, similar periods are identified as consolidation attempts. In using Definition 
lea) only 6 additional years were identified as consolidations26 . 
In summary, we are confident that the methodology we have applied to 
identify general government fiscal consolidation attempts and measure their 
respective success is robust. In comparing our favoured methodology with alternative 
26 The six additional years are Belgium (87), Canada (94), France (96), Ireland (77 & 82) and Norway 
(95). 
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approaches both to measure discretionary fiscal policy and to discriminate between 
consolidation attempts and all other periods, similar years are identified. However, to 
ensure that our analysis is not unduly influenced by the preferred method of 
identification of such episodes, we re-conduct our core Chapter 4 analysis using these 
additional methods in an Appendix. 
2.6.2 Sub-Central Government Consolidation Attempts 
Having analysed general government consolidations we now tum to discuss 
the episodes where we have identified sub-central consolidations. In applying 
Definition 4 to the Blanchard Fiscal Impulse constructed for the sub-centre, the years 
listed in Table 2.9 have been identified as 'significant' consolidation attempts. In 
addition, Table 2.9 also contains a list of the identified general government 
consolidation attempts discussed above in order to identify those years in which sub-
central consolidations have contributed to overall general government consolidations. 
The final column displays those sub-central consolidation attempts that we deem to 
have been successful- see Definition 5. 
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l!able 2.9: Identified Sub-Central Government Consolidation Attemuts 
Year of Year of Year of 
Attempted Attempted Sub- Of which, Successful Sub-General Central Central 
Government Government collaboration Government 
Consolidation Consolidation between tiers Consolidation 
Australia 1982,96 & 98 1996* 1996 -
Austria 1984 1977,80 & 88 - -
Belgium 1982,85,86 & 94 1982,83,84,85, 1982, 85 & 94/5 1982,83 & 84 
91 & 95 
Canada 1982,87,95,96 1982,87,93 & 94 1982, 87 & 94/5 1993 & 94 
&97 
Denmark 1983,84 & 86 1983 1983/4 -
Finland 1976,81,84,88 1975,88 & 89 1975/6 & 88/9 -
&93 
France 87 &97 1980 & 86 198617 -
Germany 1976,77 & 82 1976,77 & 98** 1976,77 1976 
Ireland 1976,83,84,87, 1976,77,83 & 87 1976,77,83,87 1976 & 83 
88 & 89 
Netherlands 1983,85,88,91 1976,81,82,83, 1983,88/9 1976,81,88 & 89 
&93 88 & 89 
Norway 1981,83,89,90 1981,90 & 94 1981,90 & 94 1981 
&94 
Spain 1985,86 & 97 1983,87 & 92 198617 1992 
Sweden 1981,82,83,84, 1995,97* & 98** 1995 & 96/97 1997 
87,92,94,95 & 
96 
UK 1976,77,87,88, 1975,76,77,81 1976 & 77 1975 & 76 
96,97 & 98 &92 
USA - - - -
Total 61 47 27 17 
Notes: 
* Consolidations with only two observations to determine success. 
** Consolidations with insufficient observations to determine success. 
We identify 47 sub-central government consolidation attempts of which 17 
(36%) are deemed successful. 27 of the sub-central consolidations took place in years 
where there were wider general government consolidations. 
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Sub-central consolidations were frequent in certain countries such as Belgium 
and the Netherlands. Others, including Sweden, which engaged in general government 
consolidations on a number of occasions, (see Table 2.4) engaged in sub-central 
consolidations relatively less frequently. We find little evidence of a Maastricht effect 
at the sub-central government level. For the EMU countries, there were only six sub-
central consolidations in total during the post-Maastricht period, four of those 
occurring in Sweden and the Netherlands. This suggests that the 'Maastricht effect' 
may have been more of an issue at the central/generallevel rather than at sub-centre 
tiers. 
Successful consolidations tend to be shared amongst certain countries such as 
Belgium and the Netherlands. Interestingly, most successful consolidations at the sub-
central tier appear to have occurred in the pre-1990s period. 
Finally, in Table 2.10 we test the robustness of our identification of sub-
central consolidation attempts by comparing the episodes listed in Table 2.4 with 
those obtained using the HP filter (with a smoothing parameter of 30 and 100) and the 
OEeD's Output Gap. 
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Table 2.10: Identified Consolidation AttemI!ts 
Blanchard Fiscal OEeD Output HP Filter (A,=30) HP Filter (A,=100) 
Impulse - see Gap 
Table 2.4 
Australia 1996 1996 1996 1988,89 & 96 
Austria 1977,80 & 88 1977 & 88 1977 1977 & 88 
Belgium 1982,83,84,85, 1982,83,84,85, 1983,84,85,91, 1983,84,85,89, 
91 & 95 91 & 95 94 & 95 91,94&95 
Canada 1982,87,93 & 94 1982,83,87,93 1982,83,87,93 1982,83,87,93, 
&95 &95 94 &95 
Denmark 1983 1983 1983 1983 
Finland 1975,88 & 89 1988 & 93 1975,88,89 & 93 1975,88 & 93 
France 1980 & 86 1984,89 & 95 1988,89 & 93 1983,84,89 & 95 
Germany 1976,77 & 98 1976,77,83 & 98 1976,77, 83 & 98 1976,77,83,91 
&98 
Ireland 1976,77,83 & 87 1987 1976,77,83,84 1976,77,83,84 
&87 &87 
Netherlands 1976,81,82,83, 1976,81,82,84, 1976,77,81,82, 1976,77,81,82, 
88 & 89 88, 89, 95 & 97 88 & 89 88, 89,95 & 97 
Norway 1981,90 & 94 1981,85, 90 & 1981,84,85,90, 1981,85,90,94 
94 94 &96 &96 
Spain 1983,87 & 92 1983,87 & 88 1983,87,88 & 92 1983,87,88 & 92 
Sweden 1995,97 & 98 1995,96 & 98 1992,95,96 & 98 1992,95,96 & 98 
UK 1975,76,77,81 1975,76,77,81 1'975,76,77,81, 1975,76,77,81, 
&92 85,86 & 92 85 &92 85,86 & 92 
USA - - - -
Total 47 50 56 64 
Again, as the above table shows our results are generally robust to alternative 
measures of discretionary fiscal impulse. For the most part, similar episodes of sub-
central consolidation are identified by the four different methods. The HP filter with a 
smoothing parameter of 100, generates the highest number of observed consolidation 
attempts while our favoured method based on the BFI, the fewest. As for our general 
government analysis, in the following chapter we show that our analysis of sub-
central consolidation attempts are not unduly influenced by any small influences in 
identified consolidation attempts. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have outlined our methodology to identify both general and 
sub-central government consolidation attempts. We have shown that there are a 
number of alternative strategies each with their respective strengths and weaknesses. 
In attempting to identify fiscal consolidation attempts, it is necessary at the 
outset to obtain an accurate measure of changes in discretionary fiscal policy. One 
such approach is to obtain a measure of the output gap from which an estimate of the 
structural (i.e. discretionary) fiscal balance can be made. To obtain the output gap one 
method is to apply the HP filter to the series of GDP. In doing so, it is possible to split 
up movements in GDP into both trend and non-trend elements. The difference 
between actual GDP and this estimated trend GDP is the HP estimate of the Output 
Gap. While this approach has a number of advantages including its simplicity and 
transparency it does however, suffer from a number of weaknesses. Two of its main 
limitations are its lack of sound economic theory and the arbitrary choice of the 
'smoothing parameter'. An alternative, is to estimate potential GDP via some form of 
Production Function approach. The difference between this estimate and actual GDP 
also yields a measure of the output gap. While this approach is underpinned by firmer 
economic theory, it is less transparent and directly comparable data on a cross-
national level can be difficult to obtain. 
In contrast, our favoured approach the Blanchard Fiscal Impulse, does not 
require the measurement of potential output. Instead it relates changes in current fiscal 
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policy to previous periods unemployment rates. It is highly transparent, accurate and 
is used widely in the fiscal consolidation literature. 
Having obtained a measure of discretionary fiscal policy, we have discussed 
the actual identification of a consolidation attempt, citing a number of alternative 
strategies one can adopt. Our chosen methodology identifies 61 general government 
and 47 sub-central fiscal consolidation attempts. As discussed, not all consolidation 
attempts are successful and we are able to sub-divide our consolidations according to 
their post-consolidation fiscal performance. Around 1/3 of our general consolidations 
are deemed to have been successful, while the figure is slightly lower for sub-central 
consolidation attempts. 
Much of the analysis in subsequent chapters uses the identification of 
consolidation attempts and their classification of success discussed in this chapter. 
Given the robustness of our analysis to alternative identification techniques, we are 
confident that our results are not unduly sensitive to the methodology we have 
applied. 
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CHAPTER 3 
"Fiscal Consolidation and Fiscal Decentralisation: A Tale of Two Tiers!" 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter contributes to the established literature on fiscal consolidations by 
investigating the distinct behaivour of central and sub-central tiers of government 
during general government consolidation attempts. There is a well established 
literature examining fiscal consolidations however, it has exclusively focussed upon 
general (i.e. total) or central government fiscal policies2. In addition, by examining 
sub-central involvement in general government consolidation attempts and their 
behaviour during episodes when they consolidate themselves, we contribute to the 
decentralisation literature by assessing the role of the sub-centre in the conduct of 
national fiscal policy. As discussed in Chapter 1, this literature has been largely 
normative in nature and empirical examinations of the role of sub-central 
governments in shaping national policy and in the macroeconomy are m general 
relatively limited. 
1 Weare grateful to participants at the European Economic Association 2004 Conference, the Scottish 
Economic Society 2004 Conference, Department of Economics Staff Seminars at the Universities of 
Glasgow and Strathclyde and at the Scottish Graduate Programme's 2003 Conference for very useful 
comments on earlier versions of this Chapter. 
2 See for example, Alesina and Perotti (1995 and 1997), Alesina et al. (1998), McDermott and Wescott 
(1996) and Von Hagen et al. (2001). 
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As mentioned in the Introductory chapter, governments' attempts to improve 
the sustainability of their fiscal balances have been at the forefront of fiscal policy 
discussion for more than a decade. In some countries the consolidation effort has 
resulted in sizeable surpluses for the first time in a generation. Debt to GDP ratios 
have been stabilised and begun to fall. Elsewhere, some previous bastions of fiscal 
prudence are now struggling to maintain or regain sound fiscal positions. Lower 
interest rates have reduced debt servicing costs for the majority, but adherence to 
fiscal rules and the fiscal implications of ageing populations will ensure that the need 
to strengthen fiscal positions will remain a key issue in the years to come. 
The established literature has concluded that the composition of the 
consolidation effort is a crucial determinant of the ultimate effect on debt. Throughout 
this literature (see for example, Alesina and Perotti (1995) Alesina et al. (1998), 
McDermott and Wescott (1996) and Von Hagen et al. (2001)) the focus has been on 
general government data. This has one clear advantage in that large and consistent 
datasets such as the OECD Economic Outlook and the IMF Financial Statistics, are 
readily available. However, in our view, this advantage is outweighed by a key 
weakness. This approach implicitly assumes that governments behave as if a single 
authority exercises complete control over the size and composition of fiscal balances. 
Indeed, political economy models of fiscal consolidations, including Alesina and 
Drazen (1991), Roubini and Sachs (1989), assume a single tier of government. In 
view of the substantial role played by sub-central governments in the conduct of fiscal 
policy outlined in Chapter 1, we believe there is value in extending this literature to 
look at the distinct contributions made by sub-central and central government and 
examine how these tiers of government interact during consolidation attempts. 
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To anticipate our key results, we begin by verifying a result from the existing 
literature that successful consolidations tend to be based upon expenditure cuts as 
opposed to increases in revenue. We show however, that this result is robust to a more 
refined measure of the success of consolidation attempts, and holds at both central 
and sub-central tiers; indeed the majority of consolidations involve shared effort 
across tiers of government. 
Compositional analysis confirms another existing result; that tackling the 
government wage bill helps achieve lasting consolidation. We demonstrate that the 
involvement of sub-central tiers of government is crucial to achieving cuts in the wage 
bill. However, our results also demonstrate that a consolidation attempt is less likely 
to be successful if the relative brunt of the consolidation is skewed toward the sub-
central tier. Our analysis of revenue by source reveals that many central governments 
exert a strong influence on the expenditure of sub-central tiers through their grant 
allocations. Changes in these allocations essentially 'force the hand' of the sub-central 
tiers to adjust expenditures and consequently have a considerable impact upon the 
successfulness of consolidation attempts. An apparent downside is revealed in the 
analysis of the composition of expenditure in that there is a bias toward cuts in 
local/regional public investment programs (although the largest adjustment in absolute 
terms centres upon the wage bill). 
In addition to examining consolidations instigated by central governments we 
also look at those instigated by the sub-central tier. This enables us to ask if the sub-
central tier behave differently when consolidating alone. Interestingly, when shifting 
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focus to sub-central consolidation attempts we find a parallel result to the general 
government consolidation case, in that consolidations which focus upon expenditure 
cuts, are more likely to lead to healthier sub-central balances than those based upon 
revenue increases. Finally, when sub-central governments enact consolidation 
attempts that are not part of a general government consolidation, their cuts focus 
almost exclusively upon capital expenditure, as opposed to increases in 'own-source' 
revenues or cuts in current expenditure. The bias toward cuts in capital expenditure 
represents a genuine cause for concern, as they are likely to have long-term 
implications for local service provision. 
We discuss all these results in more detail below. Overall they lead us to 
conclude that the separate roles of central and sub-central tiers of government should 
not be ignored when analysing fiscal consolidations. The structure of the remainder of 
this chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2 we undertake a brief review of the fiscal 
consolidation literature and compare and contrast our analysis with previous studies. 
Section 3.3 presents a discussion of identified episodes of general government fiscal 
consolidation focussing on their size, the composition of the consolidations and the 
extent to which the attempts are co-ordinated across tiers of government. In Section 
3.4 we switch the focus from general government consolidations to sub-central 
consolidations and examine their composition. Section 3.5 concludes. 
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3.2. Fiscal Consolidations - Literature Review 
3.2.1 Brief Overview of Fiscal Consolidations 
As one may expect, given the relative prommence of fiscal consolidation 
effort in recent years, a substantial academic literature has been developed. This 
literature can be loosely divided into two strands. The first branch of papers study the 
macroeconomic consequences of consolidation attempts while the second, focuses on 
their relative success. We discuss each of these in tum. 
Traditional textbook Keynesian models such as the IS/LM predict that fiscal 
tightening, by reducing aggregate demand, generates a fall in consumption, 
investment and output. Thus, following a consolidation attempt, one should expect to 
observe recessionary pressures in the economl. However, this conclusion has been 
increasingly challenged in the literature. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and Bartolini et 
al. (1995) demonstrate that following well-documented consolidation attempts in 
Ireland (1987 - 89) and Denmark (1983 - 86) output actually accelerated4. The 
apparent evidence of 'non-Keynesian' effects has sparked a whole host of empirical 
and theoretical studies. Recent empirical re-examinations of consolidations and the 
impact on the macro economy include Perotti (1999), Giavazzi et al. (2000) and 
Alesina et al. (2002). Perotti (1999) find empirical evidence which suggests that 
3 In these models the effects are weakened somewhat through the associated declines in interest and 
exchange rates that cushion the fall in domestic demand by raising private wealth and stimulating net 
exports by depreciating the domestic currency. 
4 Note there is also evidence of decelerations in growth following fiscal expansions. For example, 
Sweden in the early 1990s, see Giavazzi and Pagano (1995). 
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private consumption increases in response to cuts in government spending, provided 
the debt to GDP ratio is growing rapidly. Giavazzi et al. (2000) on the other hand 
focus upon national saving and find analogous results5, while Alesina et al. (2002) 
find non-Keynesian effects in investment equations. In addition, the European 
Commission undertook a more general study in 2003 of post-consolidation economic 
performance. This found that in around half of all consolidations undertaken by EU 
countries, average real GDP growth rate was higher in the two years after 
consolidation than in the two years preceding it. 
Of more direct relevance to this chapter, the second major branch of the 
literature has focussed on the ability of consolidation attempts to generate long-term 
improvements in a country's fiscal position. In two complementary studies, Alesina 
and Perotti (1995) and McDermott and Wescott (1996) found that while following 
certain consolidation attempts there were substantial and sustained improvements in a 
country's fiscal position. In others, improvements were either far more modest or 
indeed, failed to materialise. The case of the Irish consolidations in the 1980s is again 
often cited as an example. Following previous attempts at consolidation in the early 
1980s, the Irish debt to GDP ratio continued to increase. However following the 
second round of adjustment later on in the decade, the debt to GDP ratio stabilised 
and ultimately began to falL 6. 
5 A more recent study by Miller and Russek (2003) also fmds limited evidence of non-Keynesian 
effects during unusual times. 
6 Prior to this second consolidation attempt the Irish debt to GDP ratio was well in excess of 100% of 
GDP. Since then, the ratio has fallen dramatically and now stands at around 60% ofGDP - see Bradley 
and Whelen (1997) and Dornbusch (1989). 
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While our primary focus is upon the second strand both are not mutually 
exclusive. As we will see in the next section, one of the main reasons certain 
consolidations are better placed to bring about falls in the debt to GDP ratio, is 
precisely because they are able to generate improvements in output (or at least limit 
any recessionary effects). 
3.2.2 Determinants of Successful Consolidation Attempts 
To date, the literature has established that the composition of a consolidation 
attempt in terms of its relative focus upon expenditures or revenues, is key to 
determining whether or not a consolidation attempt will bring about medium to long-
term improvements in a country's fiscal position. While the size of the consolidation 
is also important, i.e. the extent of the overall adjustment in the fiscal balance, it is 
thought to be of lesser significance. This result has been widely reported and can be 
found in Alesina and Perotti (1995 and 1997), Alesina et al. (1998), Alesina and 
Ardagna (1998), OECD (1996), Perotti (1996), Heylen and Everaert (2000), Von 
Hagen et al. (2001), EC (2003) etc. However, Ardagna (2004), finds that it is the size 
rather than the composition that is key to success. 
Consolidation attempts that are primarily based upon cuts to current 
expenditures, in particular social transfers and the government wage bill, have been 
shown to be far more likely to be successful than consolidation attempts which, rely 
upon revenue increases and cuts in public investment. For example, Alesina and 
Perotti (1995 and 1997) demonstrate that while the size of the fiscal improvement 
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tends to be similar across their identified consolidation attempts, in those where there 
is a substantial medium to long-term improvement in the debt ratio, expenditures were 
cut by a far greater extent than revenues were increased. The exact opposite occurred 
during consolidation attempts which brought about no such improvements. 
There are a number of channels of transmission which can explain why the 
composition of consolidation is important. Below we discuss three, however these are 
not mutually exclusive and they do not exhaust all possible channels through which 
fiscal stabilisations can be successful. 
A first argument is based on the concept that different types of fiscal 
consolidation may be inherently more or less permanent. Tackling elements of current 
expenditure such as the government wage bill and social transfers, are thought to be 
more durable than increasing taxation or limiting investment programs (e.g. limiting 
depreciation repayments), given the transaction costs both administratively and 
politically in altering them. For example, a consolidation based upon reform of benefit 
eligibility criteria for welfare payments is likely to require substantial consultation, 
possible revision and repeated readings in Parliament before it is passed as legislation. 
Thus, such a reform is likely to be relatively long term. However, adjusting tax rates 
or profit transfers from state-owned enterprises, postponing investment replacement 
etc, all have far fewer constraints on the ability to alter them in the near future. There 
is therefore a higher probability that such expenditures and revenues will return to 
previous levels7. Moreover, Alesina and Perotti (1997) argue that items such as the 
7 Maroto and Mulas-Granados (2001) found that the duration of fiscal consolidations in the EU during 
the last forty years has been influenced by among other things the extent of expenditure cuts with 
'longer' consolidations associated with larger cuts in expenditure. 
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government wage bill and social welfare payments are the most likely elements of 
fiscal policy to increase outside periods of adjustment. Thus by focussing on these 
elements, any trend increase in government size and/or deficit can be curbed. 
The second argument relates to the extent that certain consolidation attempts 
may be better placed to generate non-Keynesian effects in output than others. An 
improving macroeconomic environment can serve to reduce interest repayments and 
social transfers while increasing taxation revenues, complementing the direct attempts 
to strengthen the fiscal position. 
A number of explanations for the potential existence of a negative fiscal 
multiplier following consolidation attempts (i.e. contractions lead to accelerate 
growth) have been suggested - see for example, Blanchard (1990), Bertola and 
Drazen (1993), Barry and Devereux (1995), Sutherland (1997) and Perotti (1999). 
The 'expectation view', stems from an idea put forward by Feldstein (1982) 
who hypothesised that permanent public expenditure reductions may be expansionist 
if they are seen "as an indication of future tax cuts, giving rise to expectations of a 
permanent income increase". Note however, that it may not need to be expectations of 
future tax cuts, but that a substantial fiscal tightening now, "eliminates the need for 
larger, maybe much more disruptive adjustments in the future" - Blanchard (1990). If 
for example, taxes are distortionary so that tax increases imply a deadweight loss, 
adjusting sooner rather than later reduces such costs and the permanent distortions of 
the fiscal consolidation. In addition, by reducing future tax liabilities private sector 
wealth increases. Both the permanent income and wealth effects can boost private 
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consumption, aggregate demand and ultimately output. Moreover, by resolving 
uncertainty over the course of future fiscal policy, a credible consolidation may 
reduce precautionary saving. That expectation and private sector wealth effects in 
certain instances, may be sufficiently large to counteract the traditional demand side 
Keynesian effects of a consolidation attempt, has received qualified support in the 
literature. Bhattacharaya (1999) presents evidence that households move from non-
Ricardian to Ricardian behaviour at higher debt to GDP levels. Sutherland (1997) and 
Perotti (1999) argue theoretically that these expectation and wealth effects will be 
larger when there is a significant public debt to GDP ratio or budget deficit. This 
hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence provided in Alesina and Ardagna 
(1998). They argue it is therefore possible to observe non-linearities such as 
Keynesian effects in normal times and non-Keynesian effects in unusual times8. 
Clearly, expectation effects are likely to be more significant in response to 
larger than smaller consolidation attempts. In addition, Alesina et al. (1998) argue that 
by focussing on politically sensitive elements of fiscal policy, consolidation attempts 
that are based upon components of current expenditure rather than revenues or capital 
expenditure can lead to greater positive expectation effects. For example, cutting 
expenditure on welfare and wages can send a signal to the private sector that the 
government is serious about the adjustment being undertaken. Such elements are 
likely to be politically, the toughest cuts for a government to make. If a cut in current 
expenditure is viewed as being permanent by the private sector because it focuses on 
'sensitive' elements, the potential for wealth effects being sufficiently large to 
8 In contrast, the model of Bertola and Drazen (1993) predicts non-Keynesian effects in normal times 
and Keynesian effects in unusual times. 
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generate non-Keynesian effects is increased. Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) and 
Ardagna (2004) show that strong and persistent cuts to government expenditure rather 
than tax increases, are more likely to stimulate short-term economic growth. 
The above channel through which substantial fiscal retrenchment, can contrary 
to established theory boost output, stresses the importance of demand side effects. In 
addition however, it is possible that similar non-Keynesian effects can be generated 
from the supply side. More specifically, it is possible that certain types of fiscal 
consolidation may distort the labour market, leading to lower unit labour costs9. This 
approach is often called the 'labour market view'. A large purge of the government 
wage bill, government employment and social transfers, can reduce wage demands by 
limiting the bargaining power of unions. Following lower unit labour costs, 
profitability and international competitiveness can be increased 10. Union power is 
limited because lower levels of public employment and/or wages, reduces the 
reservation utility of union's members and the cuts to social transfers increases the 
cost of being unemployed. In contrast, increases in taxation shift the aggregate supply 
of labour, reducing after-tax real wages and inducing unions to demand higher 
nominal wages. The increase in real wages leads to a reduction in the equilibrium 
level of employment and of the shadow value of capital, with negative effects on 
capital accumulation and on growth. It follows therefore, that consolidation attempts 
based upon cuts to the government wage bill and social transfers, instead of increases 
in taxation, can generate positive supply side effects including the stimulation of 
9 For a discussion of how composition can lead to expansionary fiscal consolidations via the labour 
market channel see Alesina and Perotti (1997) and Daveri and Tabellini (2000). 
10 Clearly such effects are dependent upon institutional factors and the existence of non-perfectly 
competitive labour markets to be of significance. In addition, any benefits in terms of competitiveness 
will be more keenly felt in more-open economies. 
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investment, net exports and ultimately output. Furthermore, cuts to government wages 
as opposed to increases in labour taxation, will loosen rather than tighten the labour 
market. This increases the responsiveness of labour to improvements in 
competitiveness and demand brought on by the potential positive private sector 
demand effects discussed above. 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and Ardagna (2004) examine the significance on 
economic growth of both the effect of expectations and the labour market following 
consolidation attempts. They find that while the labour market effect is nearly always 
significant, the expectation effect is only significant in certain estimation 
specifications. They conclude that their results provide cautious support to the supply-
side view of non-Keynesian effects, without denying a more limited role for the 
demand-side channel. Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) and Giavazzi et al. (2000) find 
non-Keynesian effects are more likely to occur when the size of the consolidation is 
large. 
A third possible explanation for certain consolidations being more successful 
than others, relates to the impact on a government's borrowing requirement. High 
debt countries face 'premiums' on the interest rate that they can borrow (i.e. issue 
bonds) given the potential for default and inflation. A credible fiscal consolidation 
(perhaps based on cuts to 'sensitive' expenditure programs) can serve to reduce 
country's interest risk premiums. One major reason why countries fall into fiscal 
difficulties is through the 'debt trap', whereby ever higher primary surpluses are 
necessary simply to finance interest payment on outstanding debt. Clearly by reducing 
such payments, the ability to stabilise or even reduce the debt ratio is improved. In 
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addition, to the extent that in general lower premiums on government bonds also lead 
to lower real interest rates, this can lead to a crowding-in of investment, expansion in 
consumption and growth in output. Further, as pointed out by McDermott and 
Wescott (1996), falling real interest rates can increase the market value of asset 
portfolios held by consumers, triggering a consumption/investment boom. 
All three possible avenues suggest that consolidation attempts that are based 
upon adjustments to key elements of expenditure such as social transfers, government 
wages and so forth are more likely to be long-term, generate non-Keynesian effects 
and so forth than those based upon revenue increases. 
In summary, the composition and size of a consolidation attempt can be key to 
determining whether or not there are long-term improvements in the fiscal position of 
a country. Consolidations based on cuts to current expenditure such as social transfers 
and wages, by focussing on the most administratively and politically costly elements 
of the budget and those most likely to increase outside periods of adjustment, are 
more likely to lead to permanent improvements than those based on revenue hikes or 
cuts in investment programs. In addition, these same consolidation attempts appear 
best able to generate non-Keynesian effects in consumption, investment, output etc, 
which in turn can greatly assist long-term financial stability. 
In all these studies, the role of sub-central governments during the 
consolidation process is ignored. For example, in the descriptive analysis of Alesina 
and Perotti (1995 and 1997), McDermott and Wescott (1996) and Alesina et al. 
(1998), the size and composition of adjustment is analysed at the general government 
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level. It is not possible to make comment on the individual contributions of the centre 
and the sub-centre. Are national consolidation attempts instigated entirely by the 
centre? Do sub-central tiers assist or hinder such attempts? What is the size of the 
contribution of the sub-centre, especially in key areas of expenditure and revenue to 
the consolidation effort? How do sub-central governments themselves consolidate? 
These are all highly relevant questions which as yet have been unanswered. We seek 
to address these issues and more in this Chapter by conducting a descriptive analysis 
of fiscal consolidation attempts similar to previous studies but on this occasion 
separating out the unique contributions of the centre and sub-centre. 
3.3 Analysing General Government Consolidation Effort Across Tiers of 
Government 
We begin our empirical analysis with a discussion of general government 
consolidation attempts. In order to identify such consolidation attempts we apply the 
methodology outlined in Chapter 2. In the main body of the text we present and 
discuss our results based upon the application of the BFI to measure discretionary 
fiscal impulses, Definition 1 to identify consolidation attempts and Definitions 2 and 3 
to measure their relative success. See Table 2.4 in Chapter 211. 
We start by looking at the discretionary impulses attributable to each tier of 
government during a general government consolidation attempt and show that sub-
11 As a check on the robustness of our results we have re-conducted our analysis using a variety of 
different methodologies. A sample of our results is provided in an Appendix. 
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central tiers of government do play important roles in the consolidation process, 
contemporaneously with the central tier l2. We then look in more detail at the 
composition of the consolidation effort, first by separating out the changes in 
expenditure and revenue and then by breaking down these aggregates into their key 
components. 
3.3.1 Analysis of Discretionary Fiscal Impulses by Tier of Government 
Table 3.1 shows the average sizes of the discretionary fiscal impulse as a 
proportion of GDP, across all the identified consolidation attempts (refer back to 
Table 2.4 in Chapter 2 for details), across successful and failed attempts (denoted "s" 
and "F") respectively, and disaggregated by tier of government. The final column of 
the table indicates whether the difference between average impulses in successful as 
opposed to failed consolidation attempts is statistically significant on the basis of a 
two sample t-test13 . 
12 We have examined whether central government adjustments lead sub-central ones. However, the 
sub-centre's contemporaneous fiscal impulse is almost uniformly greater than that in T + 1 suggesting 
that sub-centre adjustment occurs in the same period as the centre. For a more comprehensive analysis 
of the timing and duration of various changes see Chapter 4. 
13 The null hypothesis in each case is that the size of the impulse is identical in successful and failed 
consolidation attempts. A single ,*, in the "signif:" column denotes significance at the 10% level, 
while ,**, and ,*, denote significance at the 5% and 1 % levels respectively. 
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Table 3.1: Discretionan:: Fiscal Iml1ulses During General Government 
Consolidation Atteml1ts 
(each shown as % of GDP) 
All/SuccessfullF ail ed All, n=61 S,n=22 F,n=39 signif: 
Central 2.08 2.47 1.86 * 
Sub-Central 0.40 0.43 0.38 
Success Index (SI): SI=3, n=22 SI=2, n=12 SI=I, n=17 SI=O, n=10 
Central 2.47 2.22 1.82 1.51 
Sub-Central 0.43 0.23 0.31 0.68 
The above results confirm that the average discretionary impulse at general 
government level, where general = central + sub-central, is larger in successful as 
opposed to failed consolidation attempts (as found by Alesina and Perotti (1995), 
Alesina et al. (1998) and Von Hagen et al. (2001)). The size of the central 
government fiscal impulse is larger in successful as opposed to failed consolidation 
attempts and this difference is statistically significant at the 10% level. In addition, the 
lower panel of the table reveals that the size of the central impulse is increasing in the 
degree of success (as measured by the success index). Sub-central impulses are also 
larger on average during successful as opposed to failed consolidation attempts but 
this difference is not statistically significant. 
The results based on the success index are more revealing: in the most 
successful consolidation attempts there are relatively large sub-central impulses but 
the average impulse is largest overall for the failed category, SI=O. It is interesting to 
note that in the more successful adjustments (SI=3,2,1) the sub-central tier achieves 
around 10-15% of the total impulse on average, while in the least successful case the 
sub-central tier's contribution exceeds 30% and the overall general impulse is 
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relatively small. We can interpret these results as demonstrating that the dominant 
adjustment in general government consolidation attempts is made by the central tier, 
though sub-central tiers of government are also generally actively involved. If 
however, the consolidation effort is skewed toward the sub-central tier, we observe 
that the attempt is less likely to be successful. 
3.3.2 Analysis of the Composition of Consolidation Attempts 
As discussed above, the existing literature has concluded that a consolidation 
attempt is most likely to succeed if it is focussed on cuts in expenditure, and in 
particular, on cuts in the government wage bill and transfer payments. In contrast 
consolidations based upon tax hikes and cuts in public sector investment seem more 
likely to represent short-lived effort and to end in failure. 
In Table 3.2 we present results, for the first time, of a compositional analysis 
of consolidation attempts using data disaggregated by tier of government as well as by 
function. 
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Table 3.2: Exnenditure and Revenue Changes During General Government 
Consolidation Attemnts 
(each shown as % ofGDP) 
Total Expenditure Total Revenue 
All, S, F, All, S, F, 
n=61 n=22 n=39 signif n=61 n=22 n=39 sign if 
Central -0.56 -1.19 -0.21 *** 0.76 0.51 0.89 
Sub-Central -0.24 -0.56 -0.07 *** 0.14 0.08 0.17 
SI=3, SI=2, SI=I, SI=O, SI=3, SI=2, SI=I, SI=O, 
Success Index: n=22 n=12 n=17 n=10 n=22 n=12 n=17 n=10 
Central -1.19 -0.46 -0.12 0.16 0.51 0.87 0.69 1.27 
Sub-Central -0.56 -0.32 -0.06 0.21 0.08 -0.17 0.34 0.29 
Table 3.2 reports average changes in total expenditure and revenue achieved 
during successful and failed consolidation attempts respectively14. 
We again begin by confirming the findings in the literature based on general 
government data (e.g. Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Von Hagen et al. (2001)) in that 
successful consolidation attempts are associated with large general government 
expenditure cuts, in excess of 1.7% of GDP on average. In contrast, failed attempts 
are associated with significantly smaller cuts in expenditure and somewhat larger 
revenue hikes (though note that the difference in revenue hikes across successful and 
failed attempts is not statistically significant). 
14 Total expenditure is defmed as primary expenditure less transfers (grants) paid from one tier of 
government to another. The focus on primary spending ensures that interest payments on outstanding 
debt are excluded from the analysis, since governments have little discretion over these in the short 
term. Transfers from the central tier of government to sub-central tiers will be recorded when they are 
spent at the sub-central level, so to include this as an element of central government spending would 
result in double counting. Total Revenue includes tax revenue, non-tax revenues (from fees and user 
charges) but excludes grants received from other levels of national government (though grants received 
from outside government, e.g. the EU, are included). 
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A new result revealed in Table 3.2 is that successful consolidation attempts are 
associated with substantial expenditure cuts by both the central and sub-central tiers 
of government. In failed consolidation attempts the expenditure cuts achieved across 
all tiers of government are significantly smaller, and the lower portion of the table 
reveals that in the least successful category, SI=O, expenditure of both tiers actually 
rises. The lower panel of Table 3.2 shows that the largest increases in revenue are 
recorded for both tiers when SI=O i.e. in the least successful consolidation attempts. 
The average increase in revenues collected by the central tier when SI=O is more than 
twice that achieved in the most successful consolidation attempts, i.e. when SI=3, 
while for sub-central tiers the adjustment to revenues is more than three times larger. 
Overall, these results offer clear support to the hypothesis that the composition of a 
consolidation attempt is critical to its probability of success. At each tier of 
government, the average cuts in expenditure associated with consolidation attempts 
fall in size as we reduce the stringency of the requirement for success; the reverse 
pattern is observed across revenue changes, whereby the greater success accords with 
less reliance on increases in revenue, and less reliance on adjustment at the sub-
central level. 
The above analysis has shown that all tiers of government, central and sub-
central, are actively engaged in most consolidation attempts. However, it does not 
allow us to disentangle which level of government takes the relative brunt of the 
expenditure or revenue adjustment. To examine this question, we have calculated the 
percentage share of general government expenditure and revenues conducted or 
received by the respective tiers both prior to and following each consolidation 
attempt. Overall, the average shares of general government expenditures conducted at 
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the sub-central tier alter little during consolidation attempts but if we differentiate 
between successful and failed attempts, the share of general government expenditure 
assigned to sub-central authorities is 19% higher on average after a successful attempt 
and some 5% lower after failed attempts. Again, this suggests that bias of expenditure 
cuts toward the sub-central tier is not conducive to success. The sub-central share of 
general revenues falls by some 18% on average during a consolidation attempt but 
this decline is more pronounced in successful (22%) as opposed to failed attempts. 
3.3.3 The Composition of Expenditure and Revenue Changes During 
Consolidation Attempts 
We extend our analysis by splitting up the expenditure aggregates into their 
key components: current expenditure (less interest payments) and capital 
d· 15 expen lture . 
15 As before, payments made by central to sub-central tiers of government are stripped-out of current 
and capital expenditure. 
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Table 3.3: Changes in EXl2enditure Coml2onents During General Government 
Consolidations 
(each shown as % of GDP) 
Current Expenditure Capital Expenditure 
All S F signif All S F signif 
Central -0.40 -1.18 -0.04 *** -0.16 -0.14 -0.16 
Sub-Central -0.15 -0.49 -0.03 ** -0.10 -0.16 -0.07 * 
Success Index: (3) (2) (1) (0) (3) (2) (1) (0) 
Central -1.18 -0.24 -0.07 0.35 -0.14 -0.24 -0.10 -0.18 
Sub-Central -0.49 -0.37 0.09 0.26 -0.16 -0.15 0.09 0.01 
Once again there is a clear correlation between the size of cuts in current 
expenditure and success. On average, the cuts are significantly larger during 
successful consolidation attempts, and across all tiers of government. Furthermore, the 
larger the cuts in current expenditure achieved the greater the success of the 
consolidation attempt, and again this result holds at each tier of government. 
Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997) identified cut-backs in capital expenditures as 
a sign of an unsuccessful fiscal consolidation. In contrast, we find that at the central 
government level there is no significant difference in the size of the cuts observed 
according to our measures of success. The pervasive nature of these cuts across all 
consolidations suggests that cuts in central government capital expenditure do not 
contribute to the success of a consolidation attempt. 
The absolute size of the cuts in capital expenditure as a proportion of GDP are 
small relative to the cuts in current expenditure, but it is important to note that the 
value of current expenditure is roughly ten times larger than capital expenditure for 
the countries in our sample, therefore the proportionate cuts in capital spending are 
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actually relatively severe. This is especially important when interpreting the figures 
for the sub-central tier, where around 40% of the overall contraction in expenditure is 
borne by regional and local public investment programs and where significantly larger 
cuts in capital spending occur during more successful consolidation attempts, as 
shown in the final row in Table 3.3. This reveals a clear downside of the consolidation 
process. Such cuts, where sustained can be expected to have a significant adverse 
consequences for local service provision in the long run. 
Table 3.4 presents a disaggregation of current expenditure into the government 
wage bill, transfers and subsidies, and purchases of goods and services. Across all 
three categories of expenditure larger expenditure cuts are associated with successful 
as opposed to failed consolidation attempts. The results also highlight the statistically 
significant role of cuts made at the sub-central level in each case. 
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Table 3.4: Changes in Comnonents of Current Exnenditure During General 
Government Consolidations 
(each shown as % of GDP) 
Goods and Services!6 Social Transfers & Wage Bill 
Subsidies!7 
All S F Sig All S F Sig All S F Sig 
Central ..o.06 ..o.16 ..o.Ql ** ..o21 ..o.76 0.10 *** ..o.14 ..o.19 ..o.12 
Sub- 0.00 ..o.09 0.05 ** ..o.06 ..o.15 0.00 ** ..o.12 ..o22 ..o.07 ** 
Central 
Success (3) (2) (1) (0) (3) (2) (1) (0) (3) (2) (1) (0) 
Indx: 
Central ..o.16 ..o.02 ..o.03 0.04 ..o.76 0.02 0.05 025 ..o.19 ..o24 ..o.09 0.00 
Sub- ..o.09 0.00 0.05 0.12 ..o.15 ..o.15 0.09 0.01 ..o22 ..o22 ..o.05 0.10 
Central 
Cuts in social transfers and subsidies are particularly large and not surprisingly 
skewed toward central government which plays the dominant role in these categories 
of expenditure - see Table 1.1 in Chapter 1. Evidently, a large and distinct tightening 
of welfare programs by the central tier increases the likelihood that a given 
consolidation will be successful. The role of the sub-central tier is more important in 
the remaining elements of current expenditure: during successful consolidations 
around one third of the total cuts in the purchases of goods and services and more than 
half the cut in the government wage bill stem from cuts made by the sub-central tiers 
of government. In fact, the significant element of cuts in the government wage bill 
relate solely to the sub-central tier, where the wage bill is cut by significantly larger 
amounts during successful as opposed to failed consolidation attempts. 
16 Lack of appropriate disaggregated data leads us to exclude Australia from these tables. 
17 Transfers and subsidies for Irish sub-central data includes inter-government transfers from the centre. 
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These are important results. Whilst prevIOUS studies have stressed the 
importance of reducing the government wage bill as a key determinant of success, the 
prominent role of the sub-central tier of government in this process has not previously 
been identified. A clear implication of this result is that central governments wishing 
to enact a successful fiscal consolidation should consider coordinating with the sub-
central tier and in particular should emphasise the importance of reducing their wage 
bill in this process. One way in which this may be conducted in practice is via some 
form of centralised element to public sector pay settlements, although adjustment to 
public sector employment and hours of work will also be important. 
In Tables 3.5 and 3.6 we switch our focus to decomposing changes in revenue 
during consolidation attempts. Recall that the aggregate figures in Table 3.2 suggested 
that failed consolidation attempts have tended to be associated with a greater increase 
in non-grant revenues at both the central and sub-central tiers as compared with 
successful consolidation attempts, although this difference was not statistically 
significant. In disaggregating total revenue into its components we are able to refine 
this result and pin down some significant differences between successful and failed 
consolidation attempts. 
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Table 3.5: ComRosition of Changes in Revenue During Consolidation AttemRts 
(each shown as % of GDP) 
Tax Revenues Non-Tax Revenues Grants I 8 
All S F Sig All S F Sig All S F Sig 
Central 0.70 0.60 0.73 0.02 -0.13 0.10 * 0.02 0.00 0.03 
Sub- 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.00 -0.08 0.06 ** -0.16 -0.47 0.02 *** 
Central 
Success (3) (2) (1) (0) (3) (2) (1) (0) (3) (2) (1) (0) 
Index: 
Central 0.60 0.84 0.52 1.03 -0.13 -0.09 0.09 036 0.00 0.09 0.00 -0.02 
Sub- 0.14 -028 028 021 -0.08 0.04 0.06 0.10 -0.47 0.02 -0.02 0.09 
Central 
In Table 3.5 we disaggregate revenues by source: taxes, non-tax revenues 
(essentially user charges and fees), and grants. Table 3.6 splits tax revenues accruing 
to the sub-central tiers into 'shared' taxes, that are controlled and distributed by the 
central tier, and 'own-source' tax revenues over which the sub-central tiers have a 
degree of autonomy. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, GFS does not distinguish between shared and own 
tax revenues and our data is based on calculations from OECD (1999) and from 
Rodden (2003). There are, however, two caveats with this dataset. The first is that it 
results in the loss of observations for two countries (France and Australia). The 
second is that the reference date for these measures of tax autonomy (see Table 3.7) is 
fixed at 1995 levels. Sub-central taxes are identified as 'own-source' if the sub-central 
18 For two of our observations, Spain 1985 and 1986, constitutional reform resulted in the assignment 
of certain expenditures to sub-central tiers to be financed by grants. Thus our data points are likely to 
be influenced by such changes. Upon elimination of these two observations, the average change in 
grants during unsuccessful consolidations stands at -0.05 and the difference between successful and 
unsuccessful consolidations remains significant. 
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authorities have the ability to control the tax rate, or the tax base, or both. To measure 
the extent of changes in sub-central revenue that we can identify as 'own-source' we 
multiply the change in sub-central taxation by the percentage of total sub-central tax 
revenues defined as 'own-source'. This clearly is a simplification and the actual 
changes in sub-central taxation may not be apportioned in this way, however, without 
more accurate information for each individual consolidation attempt it is the best 
approximation that one can make. 
As we would expect, the figures in Table 3.5 confirm that the largest source of 
increased revenues during consolidations stems from taxation and is mostly driven by 
changes at the central tier. Results relating to our success index support the view that 
outright failed consolidations, where SI=O, rely to a far greater extent upon tax hikes 
(as opposed to cuts in expenditure) than do successful ones. 
Table 3.6: Autonomous Sub-Central Changes in Tax Revenue During 
Consolidation Attem~ts 
(each shown as % of GDP) 
'Shared' Tax Revenues 'Own-source' Tax Revenues 
All S F Sig All S F Sig 
Sub-Central 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Success Index: (3) (2) (1) (0) (3) (2) (1) (0) 
Sub-Central 0.06 -0.05 0.06 0.11 0.08 -0.22 0.26 0.18 
Table 3.6 demonstrates that autonomous or 'own-source' changes in sub-
central taxation contribute a sizeable proportion of overall tax adjustment during 
consolidation attempts. The two least successful consolidations (SI=l,O) typically 
involve the largest increases in sub-central governments' 'own-source' taxation. 
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Conclusive results are uncovered in Table 3.5 in relation to non-tax revenues. 
When either tier of government tries to raise additional revenues from these sources 
the consolidation is likely to fail. Indeed, successful consolidation attempts appear to 
be associated with a decline, rather than a rise, in non-tax revenues. The difference is 
statistically significant in each case. 
The behaviour of grants from other tiers of government, again highlighted in 
Table 3.8, are also of clear interest. In successful consolidation attempts, grants to 
sub-central tiers of government are cut substantially while in failed consolidation 
attempts grants appear to alter very little. The difference between the average changes 
is statistically significant at the 1 % level. These results appear to show that central 
governments have been more successful in consolidation attempts when they have 
'forced the hands' of the sub-central tiers through reducing their grant allocations. 
Grant allocations tend to be highly visible and politically sensitive, so it seems 
reasonable to deduce that cuts in grants can have a strong signalling effect, thereby 
indicating that the central government is serious about addressing the fiscal position. 
In many cases the sub-central tier have little autonomy to raise other sources of 
revenue, or to borrow, therefore cuts imposed directly constrain the expenditure of 
sub-central authorities. The close correlation between cuts in grants and cuts in 
expenditure is essentially the reverse of the 'flypaper' effect documented by Gramlich 
(1977) and others19. Again, we note that a downside of this relationship is the 
substantial cut in public investment discussed above in relation to Table 3. Together 
these results suggests that it may be desirable for central governments to consider 
19 The 'flypaper' effect refers to the empirical phenomenon that increases in lump-sum transfers to sub-
central tiers stimulates increases in local spending to a far greater extent than increases in local income. 
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offering greater protection to regional and local public investment programs when 
following a strategy of cutting grant allocations. 
3.4. Consolidation Attempts Implemented by Sub-Central Tiers of Government 
Our analysis thus far has focussed on consolidation attempts identified in 
general government data, the majority of which we would expect have been instigated 
at the central government level. In this section we tum our attention to consolidations 
solely identified in sub-central government data. Here we explore the timing and 
composition of the adjustments undertaken by sub-central tiers of government and 
contrast these results with their behaviour during general government consolidation 
attempts. We are unaware of any previous studies into the mechanics of sub-central 
consolidations. A key question is whether the sub-central tiers behave differently 
when consolidating alone as opposed to when they adjust in conjunction with the 
centre. 
We begin by looking at all 47 sub-central consolidations identified (Definition 
4, Chapter 2) and the 20 of these attempts deemed to have been successful (Definition 
5). In terms of the size of sub-central consolidation attempts the mean impulse is 
0.95% of GDP2o. Estimates of average fiscal impulses during successful and 
unsuccessful consolidation attempts are virtually identical. Table 3.7 examines the 
composition of sub-central consolidations. 
20 There is a large outlier with an adjustment in Canada of over 3% ofGDP. 
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Table 3.7: EXI!enditure and Revenue Changes During Sub-Central 
Government Consolidation AttemI!ts 
(each shown as % of GDP) 
Total Expenditure Total Revenue 
All, S, F, 
Signif 
All, S, F, 
Signif 
n=47 n=17 n=30 n=47 n=17 n=30 
Sub-Central -0.18 -0.41 -0.04 * 0.21 0.03 0.33 ** 
Sub-central consolidations typically involve cuts in expenditure and increases 
in revenue. Interestingly, we discover a similar pattern to our analysis of general 
government consolidations in that successful sub-central consolidations typically 
involve significantly larger cuts in expenditure and smaller increases in revenues than 
unsuccessful ones. 
Table 3.8 decomposes the changes III expenditure and revenue into their 
various components. 
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Table 3.8: ComI!osition of Adjustments During Sub-Central Consolidation 
AttemI!ts21 
(each shown as % of GDP) 
Expenditure 
Current Capital 
Expenditure of which: Expenditure 
Goods and Wage Bill Transfers and 
Services subsidies 
All All All All All 
0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.15 
(0.73) (0.27) (0.36) (0.32) (0.26) 
S F Sig S F Sig S F Sig S F Sig S F Sig 
-0.18 0.10 * -0.08 0.03 -0.11 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.16 -0.15 
Revenue 
Taxation, of which: Non-Tax Revenues Grants 
Total Own-Taxes 
All All All All 
0.25 0.21 0.04 0.29 
(0.57) (0.50) (0.18) (0.62) 
S F Sig S F Sig S F Sig S F Sig 
0.06 0.20 * 0.04 0.18 -0.02 0.10 * 0.10 0.18 
While both current and capital expenditures are cut during sub-central 
consolidations, it is the latter which takes the brunt of the adjustment. Cuts to the 
wage bill and current expenditure during sub-central consolidations are on average 
smaller in relative terms than the corresponding cuts during general consolidations -
see Table 3.4. During general government consolidations, we have shown that sub-
central cuts in current expenditure and the wage bill amounted to a substantial 
proportion of the overall cuts in expenditure. In fact, on average current expenditures 
21 Standard deviations are given in brackets. 
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were cut by over 2 liz times more than capital expenditures. Here however, capital 
expenditure cuts appear to be the main instrument of adjustment. During unsuccessful 
consolidations, current expenditures actually increase. In contrast, during successful 
consolidations, current and capital expenditures are cut by roughly equal amounts. 
Interestingly, the largest increases in revenue originate from 'own-source' 
taxation and grants. Such increases appear to compensate for the nse III current 
expenditures during unsuccessful attempts. 
We again find evidence of an apparent distinction between successful and 
unsuccessful consolidations. Table 3.8 shows that successful consolidations at the 
sub-central tier typically involve larger cuts in the individual components of 
expenditure than occurs during unsuccessful ones. In contrast, taxation (both total and 
own-source) and non-tax revenues rise to a greater relative extent in unsuccessful 
consolidations. Thus, we can conclude that the composition of consolidation attempts 
appears to be important at both the general and sub-central levels. 
In Table 3.9 we concentrate on the composition of the 20 consolidation 
attempts identified in the sub-central government data that do not correspond to 
consolidation attempts at the general government level. 
A striking feature of consolidation attempts enacted by sub-central tiers alone 
is that cuts in capital expenditure dwarf those in other components of expenditure, and 
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the wage bill actually increases as a percentage of GDP22. Overall, cuts in capital 
expenditure occur in 15 out of the 20 observed consolidations while cuts in current 
expenditure occur in only 9 instances. 
We can surmise that this bias toward capital spending demonstrated in Tables 
3.8 and 3.9 may reflect a lack of alternatives given allocated spending commitments 
and constraints on required standards of provision imposed by central governments. It 
is also potentially consistent with myopic behaviour of local politicians who may wish 
to preserve current services at the expense of public investment. Finally, if the 
benefits of sub-central investment are not all captured within the region, externalities 
in the form of spillovers to other regions may also result in a tendency to under-
provision when financing constraints are tightened. 
22 The figures for spending on goods and services and for total expenditure are somewhat influenced by 
two outliers relating to Finland and the UK in 1975. Upon elimination of these two observations the 
change in current expenditure falls from +0.05 to -0.01 and the clear message that the relative burden 
of expenditure adjustment is centred upon public sector investment remains. 
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Table 3.9: ComI!osition of Adjustments During Lone Sub-Central Consolidation 
AttemI!ts23 
(each shown as % of GDP) 
Expenditure 
Current Capital 
Expenditure of which: Expenditure 
Goods and Wage Bill Transfers and 
Services subsidies 
0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.02 -0.12 
(0.76) (0.19) (0.44) (0.32) (0.25) 
Revenue 
Taxation, of which: Non-Tax Revenues Grants 
Total Own-Taxes 
0.25 0.21 0.04 0.29 
(0.57) (0.50) (0.18) (0.62) 
Relative to the pattern observed during general government consolidations, in 
lone sub-central consolidations changes in revenues appear to be relied upon more 
extensively. The revenue raising comes from both autonomous sources (i.e. "own" tax 
revenues and to a far lesser extent non-tax revenues), as well as higher grants 
allocations from central government24. 
In summary, there are clear distinctions between changes in sub-central 
revenues and expenditures that occur as part of a general fiscal adjustment and those 
that occur during an independent consolidation implemented by the sub-central tier. 
23 Standard deviations are given in brackets. 
24 The figures for changes in grants also contain two substantial positive outliers, which match those in 
the current expenditure calculations above. In fact these sub-central consolidations were conducted in 
conjunction with a period of decentralisation involving increases in sub-central current expenditure 
financed by increased top-down grants. Following elimination of these two observations the average 
change in grants falls to 0.19. 
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When central government consolidates it may force sub-central governments 
to cut particular expenditures, such as the wage bill, perhaps in part through centrally 
agreed pay settlements or through the grant system. In contrast, when sub-central 
governments consolidate alone, it would appear that the brunt of the adjustment is 
made in own tax revenues and capital expenditure, often assisted by increases in grant 
allocations from the central tier. 
3.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have examined fiscal consolidation attempts across a range 
of OEeD countries. In doing so, we have studied consolidation attempts at both the 
general and the sub-central tiers of government. Our main contribution has been to 
explore the implications of fiscal decentralisation for fiscal consolidation, an Issue 
which appears to have been ignored in the empirical literature to date. 
We have demonstrated that most successful consolidation attempts involve 
concerted adjustments by both central and sub-central tiers of government. A result 
from the existing literature, that successful general government consolidations tend to 
be based upon expenditure cuts as opposed to increases in revenue, has been verified. 
We have also revealed that the sub-central tier is crucial in achieving cuts in both 
capital and current expenditure, and particularly in the wage bill, a key area in which 
cuts appear to result in sustained improvement. We conclude that sub-central 
governments play a crucial role in contributing to the success of a general 
consolidation. Further, we have shown that cuts in grants from central to sub-central 
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tiers of government tend to be made during successful consolidation attempts. We 
suggest that these cuts act as both a visible signal of the central government's 
intention to consolidate but that they also 'force the hand' of the sub-central tier for, 
given their typically limited alternative sources of revenues, even marginal changes in 
grants can have a major impact on expenditure. An apparent downside appears to be 
the extent to which forced adjustments to sub-central expenditures appear to be borne 
by cuts in capital as opposed to current expenditures. 
The behaviour of sub-central tiers appears to differ, depending upon whether 
adjustment is conducted as part of a general government consolidation effort or is 
conducted by the sub-central tier in isolation. The latter concentrate upon revenue 
increases and cuts in capital expenditure, rather than focusing on areas that have been 
shown to result in more sustainable improvements in fiscal balances at the general 
government level. 
One limitation with this analysis is that the focus has been limited to 
contemporaneous changes in fiscal policy. It is clearly of interest to examine the 
behaviour of fiscal policy at the central and sub-central levels in the periods 
immediately before and following consolidation attempts. This would enable an 
improved understanding of the factors which make certain consolidation attempts 
more or less likely to be successful. We address this issue in Chapter 4. 
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3.7. Appendix: Robustness Tests 
In this section we demonstrate the robustness of our analysis outlined in the 
main body of the chapter to the different methodological approaches discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
As outlined in that chapter it is possible to obtain a different measure of 
discretionary fiscal policy than the BFI. In the first part of this appendix, we test 
whether our key results in sections 3.4 and 3.5 alter if we use a measure of 
discretionary fiscal impulse based upon the HP filter or OECD output gaps. In part 2, 
we test the robustness of our results to alternative identification criteria of both 
consolidation and success. 
To limit space, we provide evidence of the robustness on a select few of the 
tables in the main text-
i) size of fiscal impulse, 
ii) changes in total expenditure and revenue, and 
iii) the composition of total expenditure and total revenue. 
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Part fa): Alternative Measures of Discretionary Fiscal Impulse 
i) Discretionary Fiscal Impulse: 
Table A3.l(a): Discretionan:: Fiscal Impulses During General Government 
Consolidation Attempts 
(each shown as % ofGDP) 
HP Filter (30) 
AllISuccessful/F ailed All, n=58 S,n=22 F,n=36 signif: 
Central 2.00 2.28 1.84 
Sub-Central 0.50 0.69 0.37 * 
lIP Filter (100) 
AlliS uccessfullF ailed All, n=59 S,n=25 F,n=34 signif: 
Central 2.15 2.56 1.85 *** 
Sub-Central 0.30 0.30 0.30 
D Output Gap 
All/Successful1F ailed All, n=59 S,n=25 F, n=34 signif: 
Central 2.12 2.55 1.79 *** 
Sub-Central 0.36 0.32 0.38 
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ii) Expenditure and Revenue 
Table A3.2(a): EXJ2enditure and Revenue Changes During General 
Government Consolidation AttemJ2ts 
(each shown as % of GDP) 
lIP Filter (30) 
Total Expenditure Total Revenue 
All, S, F, All, S, F, 
n=58 n=22 n=36 signif n=58 n=22 n=36 signif 
Central -0.17 -1.13 0.44 *** 0.86 0.77 0.91 
Sub-Central -0.22 -0.55 -0.01 *** 0.22 0.31 0.29 
HP Filter (100) 
Total Expenditure Total Revenue 
All, S, F, All, S, F, 
n=59 n=25 n=34 Signif n=59 n=25 n=34 signif 
Central -0.23 -1.07 0.39 *** 0.77 0.68 0.84 ** 
Sub-Central -0.24 -0.52 -0.03 *** 0.21 0.09 0.29 *** 
OECD OutJ2ut GaJ2 
Total Expenditure Total Revenue 
All, S, F, All, S, F, 
n=59 n=25 n=34 signif n=59 n=25 n=34 signif 
-0.42 -1.20 0.16 *** 0.71 0.62 0.77 ** 
Central 
Sub-Central -0.31 -0.53 -0.16 *** 0.15 0.09 0.19 *** 
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iii) Composition of Expenditure Adjustment 
Table A3.4(a): Changes in Com)2onents of Current EX)2enditure During General 
Government Consolidations 
(each shown as % ofGDP) 
HP Filter (30) 
Goods and Services Social Transfers & Wage Bill Capital Expenditure 
Subsidies 
All S F Sig All S F Sig All S F Sig All S F Sig 
C 000 .()Q3 002 -D.12 -053 0.15 -D.I0 -0.12 -Ore -0.10 -0.13 -Ore 
s.c 002 .001 ODS -Oili -0.11 .()Q3 *** .QD5 -D.15 002 *** -0.10 -D.16 -Oili *** 
HP Filter (100) 
Goods and Services Social Transfers & Wage Bill Capital Expenditure 
Subsidies 
All S F Sig All S F Sig All S F Sig All S F Sig 
C 000 -Om 001 -0.15 -053 0.13 -0.10 -0.12 -Ore -OfJ7 -0.12 -Om 
023 0.17 007 om ODS 
s.c 001 -002. om *** -OfJ7 -0.11 .()Q3 *** .QD5 -0.14 002 *** -0.10 -0.14 -OfJ7 *** 
OECD Out)2ut Ga)2 
Goods and Services Social Transfers & Wage Bill Capital Expenditure 
Subsidies 
All S F Sig All S F Sig All S F Sig All S F Sig 
C -002. -Om 000 -023 -057 001 *** -Ore -0.13 -Om -0.10 -D.12 -D.I0 
s.c -002. .QD5 000 -OfJ7 -0.12 .()Q3 *** -D.I0 -D.16 -Oili *** -0.10 -D.13 -OfJ7 * 
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iv) Composition of Revenue Adjustment 
Table A3.S(a}: Com~osition of Changes in Revenue During Consolidation 
Attem~ts 
(each shown as % of GDP) 
HP Filter (30} 
Tax Revenues Non-Tax Revenues Grants 
All S F Sig All S F Sig All S F Sig 
Central 0.75 0.77 0.74 0.08 -0.07 0.17 0.02 0.00 0.03 
Sub- 0.18 0.18 020 0.02 -0.07 0.07 -0.12 -039 0.06 *** 
Central 
HP Filter (tOO} 
Tax Revenues Non-Tax Revenues Grants 
All S F Sig All S F Sig All S F Sig 
Central 0.69 0.68 0.70 0.06 -0.06 0.15 *** 0.02 0.00 0.04 
Sub- 0.17 0.13 020 ** 0.00 -0.07 0.07 *** -0.13 -037 0.05 *** 
Central 
I OECD Output Ga~ 
Tax Revenues Non-Tax Revenues Grants 
All S F Sig All S F Sig All S F Sig 
Central 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.03 -0.08 0.11 *** 0.02 0.00 0.04 
Sub- 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.00 -0.06 0.05 *** -0.17 -0.40 0.00 *** 
Central 
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Part (b): Consolidation Attempts using Definition 1(a) - i.e. Allowing for Two 
Year Consolidation Attempts 
i) Discretionary Fiscal Impulse: 
Table A3.1(b}: DiscretionarY Fiscal Impulses During General Government 
Consolidation Attempts 
(each shown as % of GDP) 
AlliS uccessfuIlF ailed All, n=61 S,n=22 F,n=39 signif: 
Central 2.01 2.35 1.79 ** 
Sub-Central 0.44 0.46 0.43 
ii) Expenditure and Revenue 
Table A3.2(b}: Expenditure and Revenue Changes During General 
Government Consolidation Attempts 
(each shown as % of GDP) 
Total Expenditure Total Revenue 
All, S, F, All, S, F, 
n=61 n=22 n=39 signif n=61 n=22 n=39 signif 
Central -0.47 -1.16 -0.20 *** 0.83 0.52 0.86 * 
Sub-Central -0.35 -0.60 -0.09 *** 0.10 0.01 0.16 
iii) Composition of Expenditure Adjustment 
Table A3.4(b}: Changes in Components of Current Expenditure During General 
Government Consolidations 
(each shown as % of GDP) 
Goods and Services Social Transfers & Wage Bill Capital Expenditure 
Subsidies 
All S F Sig All S F Sig All S F Sig All S F Sig 
C .(JffJ '().14 -002 ** '()23 .().75 0.10 *** '().15 '()21 '().12 * '().16 '().14 '().17 
s.c -001 -(0) om * -(0) .()2) -001 *** '().14 -024 -(0) *** .()JJ) '().16 .()Q5 * 
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iv) Composition of Revenue Adjustment 
Table A3.S(b}: Com,Qosition of Changes in Revenue During Consolidation 
Attem,Qts 
(each shown as % of GDP) 
Tax Revenues Non-Tax Revenues Grants 
All S F Sig All S F Sig All S F Sig 
Central 0.71 0.74 0.68 0.00 -020 0.13 *** 0.01 0.00 0.02 
Sub- 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.02 -0.07 0.07 *** -0.19 -051 0.02 *** 
Central 
Part (c}: Measure of Success using Definition 2(a} - i.e. Using im,Qrovement in 
Structural Balance as Additional Measure of Success25 
i) Discretionary Fiscal Impulse: 
Table A3.1(c}: Discretionan: Fiscal Im,Qulses During General Government 
Consolidation Attem,Qts 
(each shown as % ofGDP) 
All/SuccessfullF ailed All, n=61 S,n=29 F,n=32 signif: 
Central 2.14 2.39 1.90 * 
Sub-Central 0.37 0.37 0.36 
25 We cannot determine the success or failure of consolidations in France (1997) and Canada (1982). 
While these two observations do not satisfy our criteria based upon the necessary improvement in the 
debt to GDP ratio we do not have sufficient data on the structural deficit for the post consolidation 
period. In addition, the UK adjustment of 1996 does not have three full years afterwards to determine 
success, instead we base our judgement on the structural deficit performance over two years. 
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ii) Expenditure and Revenue 
Table A3.2(c): Ex~enditure and Revenue Changes During General 
Government Consolidation Attem~ts 
(each shown as % of GDP) 
Total Expenditure Total Revenue 
All, S, F, All, S, F, 
n=61 n=22 n=39 signif n=61 n=22 n=39 signif 
Central -0.51 -1.08 -0.11 *** 0.78 0.51 1.05 * 
Sub-Central -0.34 -0.51 -0.08 ** 0.13 -0.02 0.27 ** 
iii) Composition of Expenditure Adjustment 
Table A3.4(c): Changes in Com~onents of Current Ex~enditure During General 
Government Consolidations 
(each shown as % of GDP) 
Goods and Services Social Transfers & Wage Bill Capital Expenditure 
Subsidies 
All S F Sig All S F Sig All S F Sig All S F Sig 
C .oos .oro .om .()25 .{)67 0.16 *** -0.15 -022 -Offi ** -0.16 -0.15 -0.17 
S-C -002 .oos 001 -OfJ7 -0.16 001 ** -O.l3 -024 .()ffi *** -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 
iv) Composition of Revenue Adjustment 
Table A3.5(c): Com~osition of Changes in Revenue During Consolidation 
Attem~ts 
(each shown as % ofGDP) 
Tax Revenues Non-Tax Revenues Grants 
All S F Sig All S F Sig All S F Sig 
Central 0.71 0.67 0.75 0.02 -D.16 020 *** 0.02 0.03 0.00 
Sub- 0.08 -D.03 0.19 ** 0.00 -D.05 0.06 * -D.17 -D35 0.00 *** 
Central 
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CHAPTER 4 
"Fiscal Federalism, Fiscal Consolidations and Cuts in Central Government 
Grants: Evidence from an Event Study!" 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we extend the analysis of Chapter 3 in two principle directions. 
Firstly, we re-examine central and sub-central government fiscal behaviour during 
national consolidation attempts however on this occasion, we offer comment not only 
on the year of consolidation but also the years immediately preceding and following 
the consolidation attempt. A limitation of our research in Chapter 3 and in the 
majority of the current literature has been to restrict the analysis of fiscal adjustment 
to the actual contemporaneous period of consolidation. The behaviour of fiscal policy 
in the periods surrounding consolidations has largely been ignored. For instance, in 
Chapter 3 we examined the adjustments to central and sub-central fiscal policy in 
years of general government consolidation and discussed the factors which 
contributed to success. No effort was made however, to observe whether these 
consolidation attempts were part of a longer-term fiscal tightening or whether the 
adjustments were sustained in subsequent periods. Without full knowledge of such 
issues, it is unlikely that a complete understanding of successful and unsuccessful 
1 We are grateful to participants at the TAPES Conference on 'Fiscal Federalism' and especially our 
discussants, Thiess Buettner and Denis Epple for very useful comments on an earlier version of this 
paper. We are also grateful to particpants at the European Regional Science Association 2004 
Conference and at the Irish Economic Association 2004 Conference for comment and discussion. 
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consolidations can be obtained. While there have been a number of studies which 
have looked at the duration of consolidation attempts again however, such studies 
only focus on behaviour during the identified consolidations, all be it, the time 
duration is endogenous. A major contribution of this Chapter is to outline and apply 
an econometric technique whereby fiscal policy both in the period of consolidation 
and in surrounding periods can be analysed in a clear and insightful manner. 
In the second major extension we undertake a closer examination of the 
behaviour of sub-central governments in response to grant cuts. As observed In 
Chapter 3, a key element of successful consolidations are large and significant cuts in 
central to sub-central grants. We concluded that there was some evidence of central 
government's 'forcing the hand' of sub-central tiers into cutting their expenditures. 
The behaviour of sub-central governments in response to grant cuts is clearly of 
interest and we therefore extend our analysis by shifting focus away from 
consolidation attempts to years when central to sub-central grants were cut. While 
there is a substantial literature on the response of states in the USA to cuts in federal 
transfers, we are unaware of any previous study which has examined such episodes on 
a cross-national basis. 
To undertake these extensions, we focus on a natural experiment which allows 
us to explore changes in fiscal policy during episodes of interest2. The methodology 
we adopt can be classified as an event study approach. We believe that the use of this 
technique represents a major methodological improvement on prevIOUS 
2 Whilst it is difficult to analyse these issues in countries where the relationship between tiers of 
government has changed over time, we take account of major shifts in fiscal responsibility. 
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documentation of the 'stylised facts' of fiscal consolidation attempts and cuts III 
grants. 
Our analysis highlights a number of important points. First, successful general 
government consolidations bring with them similar, and sustained, cuts in expenditure 
at both the central and sub-central levels. Indeed a pattern emerges for successful 
consolidations in which central governments cut intergovernmental transfers to lower 
tiers of government, who then cut back expenditure since they have difficulty in 
raising sub-central taxation revenues. There appears to be little evidence that sub-
central governments react to cut-backs in grants by increasing their own-source 
revenues, in contrast to Gramlich (1987)3. 
Second, unsuccessful consolidations tend to be characterised by temporary 
increased taxation at the central level, with no fall back in intergovernmental grants 
and no tendency for sub-central taxation to change. It appears that there is a strong 
correlation between success in consolidating central fiscal deficits and similar actions 
from lower tiers of government. 
Third, in line with the results obtained in Chapter 3, we find that where 
consolidations are successful, sub-central tiers of government have to significantly 
cut-back on their capital expenditures. However, given the methodological approach 
adopted in this chapter we are able to demonstrate that such cut-backs appear 
sustained. This suggests that the burden of adjustment falls onto lower tiers of 
government and that central governments worry less about the long-term (i.e. public 
investment) consequences of consolidation if these decisions are taken at local level. 
3 Note that the study by Gramlich (1987) is limited to USA states. 
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In addition, there is evidence that when faced with cuts in intergovernmental grants 
during consolidations, sub-central governments tend to maintain expenditures on 
wages at the expense of capital expenditure. Thus, there seems to be a definite switch 
towards public consumption. This might be interpreted as a variant of the effect 
identified by Gramlich (1987) in that sub-central governments seek to defend current 
services as opposed to spending on infrastructure rather than raising taxation. This 
could be explained by the fact that in many of the OEeD countries in our sample the 
states/regions and local authorities have much more limited powers to vary taxation 
than in the USA. 
Fourth, our results shed some light on how sub-central governments react to 
cuts in grants and thus, at least indirectly, on the 'flypaper' effect4, by showing that it 
operates in reverse. As discussed above, it appears that successful fiscal 
consolidations are characterised by cut-backs in intergovernmental grants, which are 
more than matched by cut-backs in sub-central expenditures. In contrast, periods of 
unsuccessful consolidation, which are characterised by increases in central taxation 
and no change in intergovernmental grants, show only a small temporary reduction in 
sub-central expenditures. By examining in more detail episodes where central 
governments cut back grants to lower tiers of government, rather than just periods of 
significant fiscal consolidation, we find that this result is robust. Not only do sub-
central governments react to a cut in grants by cutting expenditures, but remarkably 
those countries with structures which are more decentralised and apparently involve 
4 It should be stressed that originally (Gramlich, 1977) the term 'flypaper' effect was used to describe 
the observation that the expenditure stimulus to local public expenditures from unconditional grants 
was in excess of equal increases in private income. However, since then, empirical studies (see e.g. 
Gamkhar and Oates, 1996, and Oates, 1999) have associated the term 'flypaper' with tests of the extent 
to which changes in government grants impact on local expenditures without reference to changes in 
private income. We discuss the 'flypaper' effect in more detail in Section 4.3. 
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greater fiscal autonomy tend to cut expenditures by more, and seem reluctant to raise 
sub-central taxes. This reverse 'flypaper' effect might highlight either a low degree of 
effective fiscal autonomy, or a high effective degree of tax competition at sub-central 
level which prevents any offsetting increase in local taxation. This contrasts with the 
hypothesis that more decentralised fiscal arrangements lead to a lower degree of 
macroeconomic control (cf. Tanzi, 2001, Rodden, 2002, Rodden and Wibbels, 2002), 
or to a greater degree of taxation (see Keen, 1997), with the qualification that central 
governments retain a degree of control through their grant allocations5. 
Finally, we find that the institutional arrangements in countries (the 
government type and the nature of the fiscal arrangements) impact at the margin on 
the results, and in particular that coalition governments tend to find it more difficult to 
cut grants to sub-central governments during fiscal consolidations. 
The chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2 we outline the event study 
approach adopted and in addition, we discuss in detail the econometric estimation 
techniques applied. In Section 4.3, we present and discuss our results with respect to 
general government consolidation attempts. While verifying many of our previously 
established results from Chapter 3 we also highlight the new insights obtained using 
this estimation technique. In Section 4.4 we examine episodes of cuts in central 
government grants. Section 4.5 concludes. 
5 We test this hypothesis directly in Chapter 6. 
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4.2 Event Study Methodology 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Event studies provide a method, based on regression analysis, to examine the 
collective time profile of key time series variables of interest around the time of 
defined events, in our case fiscal consolidations or cuts in central government grants. 
Event studies have a long history in applied econometrics with the first recognised 
study that of Dolly (1933). These types of studies are less common in 
macroeconomics, but are more commonplace in Financial economics6. For instance, 
in Finance these methods have been used to examine the impact of 'news' on share 
prices such as the announcement of profit figures, in the immediate and surrounding 
periods. A survey of the use of event studies in the determination of corporate asset 
prices is given by Brown and Warner (1985). 
In our case, by using event analysis we can compare and contrast changes in 
key fiscal variables before, during and after a year of fiscal consolidation/cut in grants 
with respect to 'normal' or reference conditions. In doing so, we can obtain a 
descriptive time profile of all the fiscal variables of interest during the period of 
consolidation/cut in grants and periods immediately prior to and after the 'event'. The 
lack of a specified structural model in our estimation is a clear advantage as by not 
imposing priors or theoretical structure we can obtain a clear pattern of the stylised 
facts during both consolidation attempts and episodes of intergovernmental grant cuts. 
6 See for instance MacKinlay (1997) and Campbell et al. (1997). 
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Our event study analysis will highlight patterns in the data demonstrating for 
example, whether fiscal reforms in period T were sustained, by comparing the 
behaviour both in period T and in the immediate aftermath with 'normal' conditions. 
By construction, while we should expect adjustments in fiscal policy in the period of 
the identified 'event', fiscal behaviour before and after this event is as yet unexplored. 
By applying event analysis we are able to identify patterns in the data which could not 
be identified when using the methodology applied in Chapter 3. 
When conducting event analysis, three tasks have to be addressed at the very 
outset. Firstly, the 'event' of interest must be defined. Secondly, the duration of the 
period upon which the analysis will focus has to be established: this is termed the 
'event window'. Finally, the econometric methodology to estimate the constructed 
model needs to be specified. We deal with each issue in tum. 
Definition of Event 
In our analysis, the 'event' corresponds to either a general government 
consolidation attempt or a cut in central to sub-central government grants. In the case 
of consolidation attempts, our 'events' are the identified general government 
consolidation attempts outlined in Chapter 2. To remain consistent with the analysis 
conducted in Chapter 3, our identified consolidation attempts are those fiscal years 
which meet the requirements of Definition 1. In addition, we differentiate these 
consolidations according to whether or not they are deemed to be successful 
according to Definition 2. 
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In our study of changes in intergovernmental grants however, cuts in central to 
sub-central grants as a percentage of total sub-central revenues now represent the 
'event', rather than consolidation attempts. The variable in question is the change in 
grants (at constant prices) as a percentage of the previous period's total revenue (at 
constant prices), i.e. ((GcGt_r)/TRt_r)*100. Here, unlike consolidations, we focus on 
all cuts in grants in real terms, which provides us with a total sample of 86 episodes. 
From these we exclude two, the UK in 1990/91, and Spain in 1985/86, where the 
adjustments in grants were linked to a major reform in local government finance, and 
hence did not represent an attempt to change the fiscal balance between tiers of 
government without an associated reform in local/state government finance. A list of 
all the episodes which are part of our sample is provided in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Chronology of Grant Cuts 
Year of Cut in Grants 
USA 1983 
UK 1977,78,79,8~82,85,88,93,95,97&98 
Austria 1985 & 89 
Belgium 1981,82,87,88,89,92,96&97 
Denmark 1981,83,84,85,86,87,95,96&97 
France 1984 & 96 
Germany 1976, 77, 81, 82, 83, 93,94,95,97 & 98 
Netherlands 1980,84,86,87,89,93,94&96 
Norway 1977,93,95 & 96 
Sweden 1978,82,83,85,86,88,91,94,95,96 & 99 
Canada 1980,84,86,88,93,95,96&97 
Finland 1993 
Ireland 1984, 86, 88, 89 
Spain 1997 
Australia 1982,86,87,8889,94 
Total 88 
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Duration of Event Window 
We define an event window of five years, i.e. two years prior to the event (i.e. 
consolidation or grant cut), the event period itself, and the two years following the 
evene. The width of the event window can, as we shall see below, be altered if some 
of the time dummies used in the regression analysis are not significant. The following 
figure contains the time line for our event window. 
Pre-event period Post-event period 
T-2 ________________ T ________________ T+2 
t 
Event 
Estimation Technique 
The econometric methods used are similar to those employed by Tomell and 
Westermann (2002) in an analysis of business cycles around the time of financial 
crises. Panel data methods are applied, where the panel regressions include Fixed 
Effects to account for cross-country heterogeneity and use Weighted Least Squares 
(WLS) to account for the effects ofheteroscedasticitl. 
7 Given we are dealing with annual data we feel that this length of Event Window is most appropriate. 
We have tested extending the Event Window and our results remain robust. However, statistical and 
economic inference is more limited as more than two years distant from the 'event' is a long time in 
fiscal policy terms. 
8 In a recent paper Bertrand et al. (2004) note that 'difference in differences' estimates might be affected 
by the presence of serial correlation. Although our study is not a conventional 'difference in differences' 
study, the presence of serial correlation may result in inconsistent standard error estimates. In order to 
check if this is a problem, we conducted two robustness checks: first we added a lagged dependent 
variable to our event study regressions; and second, we re-estimated our regressions using a GLS 
(Cochrane-Orcutt) estimator. In all cases we found little change in the sign, size and significance of the 
time dummy variables. We continue to report the OLS estimates because of the difficulty in plotting 
event windows in the presence of lagged dependent variables. We are grateful to our discussant at the 
NBERICESifo TAPES 'Fiscal Federalism' conference, Thiess Buettner, for pointing this issue out to 
us. 
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(4.1) 
The Xit matrix is comprised of a series of time dummies designed to capture 
the time profile of changes in the fiscal variables of interest. More precisely, the time 
dummies capture the differences between each period in the event window and either 
non-consolidation years or years when grants were not cut for our consolidation study 
and our cuts in grant study respectively. We present a fuller discussion of the time 
dummies in Section 4.2. 
With Fixed Effects, the individual country ai's are allowed to differ by 
estimating different constants for each cross section9. This is important as it allows us 
to conduct our analysis on a cross-national database. As highlighted above, much of 
the literature on sub-central behaviour during cuts in intergovernmental grants has 
been limited to US data. In addition, such studies tend to focus on specific 
jurisdictions such as individual school districts. In adopting this methodology we are 
able to offer the first cross-country examination of changes in sub-central fiscal policy 
during changes in intergovernmental transfers. 
4.2.2 Estimation Technique: General Government Consolidations 
To apply event study methods to our consolidation attempts we carry out two 
sets of regressions. 
9 For a discussion ofthe use of Fixed Effects in more general see Baltagi (1994). 
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First we examine all consolidation attempts collectively, where T denotes the 
actual year of consolidation: 
(4.2) 
where Yit is the fiscal variable of interest in country i at period t, and Di,T±j are 
time dummies, equal to 1 in +j/-j periods from the consolidation period, and zero in 
all other periods. 
Second, we subdivide the identified fiscal consolidations into the 'successful' 
and 'unsuccessful' categories and perform the following regression: 
s s s s S 
Yi,1 = a i + 6 1 Di,P-2 + 6 2 D i•P_1 + 6 3Di,P + 64 D i,p+l + 65 D i,P+2 
+ rplDi~Q-2 + rp2Di~Q-l + rp3Di~Q + rp4Di~Q+l + rp5Di~Q+2 + &2i,l (4.3) 
where again Yit is the fiscal variable of interest in country i at period t, Dtp±} 
are time dummies, equal to 1 in +j/-j periods from the successful consolidation period 
(denoted t=T) and zero in all other periods, and DfQ±} are time dummies, equal to 1 
in +j/-j periods from the unsuccessful consolidation period (denoted t=V) and zero in 
all other periods. 
Each estimated coefficient (~k, Ok, Sk) captures the estimated difference 
between period k in the event window and the average position in non-consolidation 
years. Thus, for instance, if the dependent variable is the annual change in central 
government expenditure, a significantly negative ~2 implies that in the year prior to 
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the consolidation the change in central government expenditure was significantly 
lower than in non-consolidation years (the 'normal', or reference period). 
As we shall see below, having estimated the standard event study regression it 
may be useful to see if individual countries or groups of countries display 
significantly different behaviour from the rest of the countries in the event sample. 
For instance, we might wish to consider whether those countries with different types 
of government (e.g. coalition or single-party governments) display different behaviour 
in terms of fiscal adjustment at central and sub-central level. Or we might want to 
consider if countries with federal rather than unitary structures display a different 
adjustment pattern. Equation 4.2 can be modified as follows, to include an interactive 
dummy variable: 
(4.4) 
where C1 is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity in the case of a 
particular country or group of countries and is equal to zero in all other cases. The 
estimated coefficient on the interactive dummy variable captures the additional effect 
of this category of country over and above the standard dummies. For instance, taking 
the previous example, if Cl is a dummy representing the current Eurozone countries, a 
significantly negative /..3 would indicate that in the year of consolidation central 
government expenditure is significantly lower than in non-Eurozone countries during 
fiscal consolidations. 
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4.2.3 Estimation Technique: Cuts in Grants 
As before, the basic event study regression is given as follows, where T now 
denotes the actual year of the cut in grant: 
y, = a. + fJlD.1·_~ + fJ~D. T-I + fJ3D. T + fJ4D. T -I +fJSD. T ~ + &4' I, I I, _ _ I, I, I, + I, +_ 1,1 (4.5) 
where Yit is the fiscal variable of interest in country i at period t, and Di.t+j are 
time dummies, equal to 1 in +jI-j periods from the period where the cut takes place, 
and zero in all other periods. As above, we focus on a variety of different variables: 
total expenditure, taxation, fees and user-charges, the wage bill, social transfers, 
expenditure of goods and services, and capital expenditure. 
It is also informative to divide the events into two categories, defined by 'large' 
and 'small' cuts in grants. These are defined below. We then perform the following 
event study regression: 
(4.6) 
where again Yit is the fiscal variable of interest in country i at period t, DJp±i are time 
dummies, equal to 1 in +jl-j periods from the period when the small cut in grants took 
place (denoted t=T) and zero in all other periods, and DfQ±i are time dummies, equal 
201 
to 1 in +j/-j periods from the period in which the large cut in grants took place 
(denoted t=V) and zero in all other periods. 
As shown in equation 4.4, we can modify this regression to take account of 
particular individual or groups of countries to see if their behaviour deviates from that 
of other countries in the sample. 
A popular approach in event study analysis is to formally test whether or not 
there is a statistical difference in the variable(s) being analysed between the pre- and 
the post-event period. Two such methods are the Non-Parametric Sign for the Median 
and Paired-Sample Means tests lO . 
Such techniques however, are of less relevance for our analysis. Our goal is to 
obtain a time profile of fiscal variables not only in the year of consolidation or cut in 
grants but also in the surrounding years. Thus, whether changes in fiscal variables are 
different in the pre-event versus the post-event periods is of little direct concern. We 
wish to examine whether behaviour in both periods are different from 'normal' (i.e. 
reference conditions) across the whole sample. Instead therefore, we adopt a graphical 
approach in line with Tornell and Westermann (2002) and Eichengreen and Arteta 
(2000). 
Each figure is sub-divided into a number of panels. The upper row of graphs 
in each panel shows the time profile for the fiscal variable of interest (e.g. fiscal 
impulse, change in expenditure etc) for respectively, all consolidations, successful 
10 For an example application of such approaches, see MacKinlay (1997). 
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consolidations and unsuccessful consolidations. Alongside the coefficients we also 
plot the standard error bands which allow easy identification of the time periods in 
which the time profile implies a change which is significantly different from zero. The 
lower row of graphs in each panel shows the cumulative change in the fiscal variable 
of interest, obtained by summing the respective coefficients over all periods. Again, 
for the cumulative effect we show asymptotic standard error bands 11. 
4.3. Results from Consolidations Event Study 
The results of this consolidation event study are presented as a senes of 
graphs, shown in Figure 4.1, panels A to V. As noted above, we consider all the 
consolidations which fall into Definition 1, and then sub-divide them into the 
categories of successful and unsuccessful, using Definition 2. 
Panel A shows the extent to which these consolidations involve an 
improvement in the fiscal position of the central government, as measured by the 
annual change in the Blanchard fiscal impulse. As can be seen from panel A, fiscal 
consolidations involve sizeable central government fiscal impulses in period T. It is 
also interesting to note that the time profile of the consolidations around period T is 
very similar regardless of whether the fiscal consolidation is ultimately successful or 
not. As can be seen from the cumulative graphs however, the successful fiscal 
" These asymptotic standard errors bands are calculated using the respective Variance Covariance 
matrix and the fact that the variance of a linear combination of independent parameters (b, and b2) is 
equal to var(b,) + var(b2) + 2cov(b"b2) 
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consolidations typically involve a larger cumulative positive fiscal impulse, as the 
improvements at time T are amplified in post-consolidation periods. 
Panel B shows the discretionary fiscal impulse implemented by the sub-central 
tiers of government, and shows how they fared during these fiscal consolidation 
attempts. It is interesting to note that our results support our conclusion in Chapter 3 
that the consolidation effort is shared between tiers of government. All period T 
dummies attract positive and statistically significant coefficients, suggesting that the 
change in the discretionary fiscal balance is more favourable during consolidation 
years as opposed to non-consolidation years12. Interestingly, we see that there is a 
major difference between successful and unsuccessful consolidations: in the former, 
sub-central tiers of government share a considerable part of the burden of 
macroeconomic adjustment. The other point to note is that in the period following the 
discretionary fiscal tightening there is a partial reversal at sub-central level (the T + 1 
dummies are significantly negative). This may indicate some resistance to the 
consolidation effort. 
Rodden (2002) and Rodden and Wibbels (2003) as well as Tanzi (2001), have 
argued that greater fiscal decentralisation might result in a potential deterioration in 
macroeconomic control, as sub-central tiers of government have the incentive to 
myopically focus on local issues. Whilst we do not attempt to answer this question 
directly in this chapter (see Chapter 6), we do examine the extent to which the most 
decentralised countries contribute to overall consolidation attempts, and gauge 
12 Note that the movement in the sub-central impulse will also be affected by any change in grants from 
central government. 
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whether there is evidence of greater resistance to central government consolidation 
efforts within such countries. In Figure 4.1, panel C we have divided the sample into 
countries with 'high' and 'low' degrees of fiscal decentralisation. To be precise, we 
divide our set of countries into these two categories on the basis of the percentage of 
expenditure and revenue assignment at the sub-central level, with seven countries in 
the 'high' category 13 . Figure 4.1 (panel C) shows clearly that the fiscal impulse is 
larger in the 'highly decentralised' countries at time T, involving an improvement 
relative to non-consolidation years of 0.5% of GDP). Thus, this exploratory analysis 
suggests that a high degree of decentralisation does not seem to be inconsistent with 
sub-central tiers of government sharing the burden of adjustment. As we shall see 
below, concurrent cuts in central government grants appear to be an important 
element behind this shared adjustment. 
Having looked at the time profile of the overall fiscal positions, we now 
examine the evolution of expenditures and revenues during the event window, both 
their total values and their individual components. As before, note that in the case of 
total expenditure we examine total primary expenditure excluding transfers, i.e. 
excluding interest payments and transfers to other levels of national government. 
Similarly total revenue includes all tax and non-tax revenues but excludes grants 
received from other tiers of national government. Intergovernmental grants and 
transfers are analysed separately. 
13 The countries were split into two groups along expenditure decentralisation lines, with seven 
countries in the 'high' category (Australia, Canada, Germany, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the USA), 
and eight in the 'low' category (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, France, the UK, Ireland, and the 
Netherlands). The results seem reasonably robust to a classification along different lines, e.g. overall 
fiscal decentralisation based on both expenditure and revenue considerations. In addition, we also 
attempted to differentiate our sample along a related characteristic, i.e. whether the countries are 
federal or unitary. In practice there is a substantial overlap between these two categorisations, and the 
results for 'federal' countries were similar to those for 'highly decentralised' countries. 
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Panels D and E in Figure 4.1 show the evolution of total expenditures in 
central and sub-central government. Panels F -M show the equivalent plots for the 
components of total expenditure (respectively wages, social transfer payments, goods 
and services and capital expenditure). A number of points can be noted from these 
results. First, as can be seen from panels D and E, the key difference between 
successful and unsuccessful consolidations is that expenditure is tightened 
consistently over time during successful consolidations, and not just in the period 
where the consolidation takes place (T). This sustained cut is evident in the majority 
of the components of spending, with the exception of central government capital 
expenditure which we discuss below. Furthermore, this progressive tightening is also 
evident at the sub-central level, confirming the important role of the sub-central tier. 
Second, as discussed in Chapter 3, cuts in social welfare spending and wages tend to 
distinguish successful consolidation, and that this is linked to an important signalling 
effect: by cutting these types of expenditures central governments can indicate an 
important commitment to fiscal control. Panels F and G confirm this: while 
significant and sustained cuts are made in the central government wage bill across 
both successful and failed consolidations, the size of the cut is clearly larger, and the 
demonstration effect stronger, in the successful case. Third, as discussed above, it is 
usually argued (Alesina and Perotti 1995, 1997, and McDermott and Wescott, 1996) 
that capital expenditure cuts tend to be unsustainable and hence are more of a feature 
of unsuccessful consolidations. Panels L and M show that capital expenditure cuts by 
central governments do tend to be larger during unsuccessful consolidations, but that 
the picture is reversed at sub-central government. As the analysis in the previous 
chapter suggested, it does appear that some of the pressure on sub-central 
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governments is translated into lower levels of public investment, and the difference 
between successful and unsuccessful consolidations is particularly marked. 
Turning now to the revenues side, Panels N-S in Figure 4.1 show the evolution 
of central and sub-central government revenues and their components. Panel N shows 
the point made in Chapter 3 that in the year of the consolidation unsuccessful attempts 
are characterised by increases in fiscal revenues rather than expenditure cuts in period 
T. Note that central government revenues rise in both successful and failed 
consolidation attempts, but that the new higher level of revenues is almost completely 
reversed in the next year, with a significant negative effect at T + 1. Thus the 
cumulative change in revenues profile is not actually different for successful and 
failed consolidation attempts. This is something which is not evident from our 
analysis in Chapter 3 because we do not analyse the periods subsequent to the 
consolidation attempts. Panel 0 shows that unsuccessful attempts seem to be more 
characterised by an increase in sub-central governments' revenues. Breaking down 
revenues into taxation and other charges (including user charges), shown in panels P-
S, one can see that although there is a tendency for sub-central governments to raise 
taxation in the period of the consolidationl4. There is also a tendency for user charges 
and fees to be lower in the case of successful consolidations, although these effects 
are barely significant. We conclude that revenue adjustments appear to contribute 
little to the cumulative profile of fiscal consolidations at central or sub-central levels, 
and where present they appear to be more connected with unsuccessful consolidations 
or to be temporary measures. 
14 Although it should be remembered that we do not distinguish here between taxation increases where 
the base and yield is under the control of sub-central government and increases in shared taxation 
revenues. 
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What seems to matter more, in terms of fiscal consolidations, is the role 
played by intergovernmental grants and transfers. Panel T shows the extent to which 
central governments adjust sub-central grants around the time of fiscal consolidations. 
It is important to remember from our analysis in Chapter 1 that all the countries in our 
sample exhibit some degree of vertical imbalance in that expenditures at the sub-
central tier exceed own-source revenues with the difference being financed by central 
government grants. Any changes in grants will therefore impact heavily on sub-
central governments. 
The significant negative dummies in periods T, T + 1, and T + 2 in the upper row 
of panel T shows that, relative to the reference category, grants to sub-central 
governments are cut substantially both during and after years of consolidation. It is 
also apparent that this result is driven almost entirely by successful consolidations. 
The cumulative change in grants during successful consolidations is about -1.3% of 
GDP, while the average change outside the event window is 0.2%. In contrast during 
unsuccessful consolidations the cumulative coefficient is insignificantly different 
from the average fixed effect. Clearly cuts in grants are central to fiscal consolidation 
efforts by central governments: by cutting the finance available to lower tiers of 
government they in effect force their hand. Below we will examine cuts in grants 
more closely, to see whether, and when, sub-central governments respond to such 
pressures by cutting expenditures, and when instead they choose to raise taxes. For 
the moment, at least when we focus on fiscal consolidations, there would appear to be 
a reverse 'flypaper' effect, in that cuts in grants lead to cuts in sub-central expenditure. 
Again, we will return to this theme below to see whether it applies more generally to 
all cases where central governments cut grants to lower tiers of government. 
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Finally, we examine the extent to which the nature and stability of the central 
government impacts on these fiscal decisions. Using the data provided in Budge et al. 
(2000), we differentiate the identified consolidation episodes along 'type of 
government' lines. Although Budge et al. define six alternative forms of government, 
we group these into three types: single party parliamentary majority, coalition 
parliamentary majority and parliamentary minority with a single party or a coalition). 
The form of government in the actual period of consolidation is used as the 
discriminating factor 1 5 • Panels U and V in Figure 4.1 show, respectively, the annual 
change in government expenditures by single party and coalition central governments, 
and the cuts in grants by these two categories of government. As can be seen in panel 
U, there is only a slight difference in the expenditure-cutting behaviour of single-party 
and coalition governments. However, panel V demonstrates that coalition 
governments are not able to cut sub-central grants. All single-party dummies are 
significantly negative at the 10% level. Cutting sub-central grants, like any other 
current expenditures is likely to be politically difficult and strong governments may 
find it easier to deal with the potential backlash from local government. The 
reluctance to address sub-central finances may partially explain the lower probability 
of success in fiscal consolidations of coalition governments widely discussed in the 
literature16 . 
15 Potentially different types of government can be in power across our event window. We find, 
however, that this happens rarely and does little to alter our results. 
16 For a fuller discussion of the political economy of fiscal consolidations see Chapter 6. 
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4.4. Cuts in Grants: How do Sub-Central Governments React? 
4.4.1 Introduction 
From the previous section and the analysis in Chapter 3 we observe that 
central governments engaged in fiscal consolidations use intergovernmental grant 
allocations as an important instrument for controlling public finances. We now 
broaden the horizon to ask how these moves to cut grants impact on the adjustment 
decisions made by lower tiers of governments. The reason for doing this is that fiscal 
consolidations may not be typical of a more general tendency for different tiers of 
governments to adjust financial flows between them. For instance, in the previous 
section we saw that cuts in grants during fiscal consolidations were not characterised 
by increases in taxation, but instead led to cuts in sub-central expenditures (including 
capital spending). In other words, fiscal consolidation seems to diminish fiscal 
decentralisation. Our goal in this section is to examine whether or not this result holds 
more generally in a wider range of circumstances not formally defined by an attempt 
to restore the public finances. Some writers have suggested for instance that changes 
in grants between tiers of government may be used to affect the relationship between 
federal governments and states (see Quigley and Rubinfeld, 1996). 
A substantial literature has been written on the behaviour of sub-central 
governments following alterations in their grant allocations. However, the vast 
majority of any empirical studies have been limited to US data, see for example Hines 
and Thaler (1995), Gamkhar and Oates (1995) and Stine (1994). The few exceptions 
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include Mangan and Ledward (1997) for the UK, Levaggi and Zanola (2003) for Italy 
and Moisio (2003) for Finland. 
A key observation has been the apparent existence of a 'flypaper' effect. 
Strictly speaking, the 'flypaper' effect, termed by Arthur Okun, refers to the 
observation that the expenditure stimulus to local public expenditures from 
unconditional grants exceeds that generated by increases in private income. That is, 
money 'sticks where it hits' 17. However, since then, empirical studies have associated 
the term 'flypaper' with tests of the extent to which changes in government grants 
impact on local expenditures without reference to changes in private income (e.g. 
Gamkhar and Oates (1996) and Oates (1999). 
The 'flypaper' effect is a puzzle because increases in grants are in effect 
equivalent to an exogenous increase in sub-central income. There is no apparent 
theoretical reason why the vast majority of any increase in exogenous income, 
stemming from an increase in lump-sum transfers, should necessarily pass through to 
increases in sub-central public expenditure. Instead, theory would predict that some of 
these extra resources should either be saved or used to reduce the tax burden on local 
residents. The elasticity of sub-central public expenditure to income is thought to lie 
between 0.1 0 and 0.20. The 'flypaper' effect however, is consistent with a value 
closer to 1. In the case of the strong 'flypaper' effect (a value equal to 1) any increase 
in intergovernmental grants is spent entirely on public projects. 
17 Note that a related 'flypaper' effect has been found with respect to firms who seem to spend all the 
money received from a lawsuit victory immediately. 
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There have been a number of suggested explanations for the 'flypaper' effect. 
Most postulate that an error was made, either by the economist studying the problem 
or by the residents in the jurisdictions receiving the aid. An example of the first type 
of error is provided in Knight (2000). There it is argued that economists fail to 
account fully for the institutional framework which links sub-central expenditures and 
the bargaining process for grants. Knight concludes that one cannot view increases in 
income from grants as equivalent to increases in private sector income. Instead, grant 
increases are more often than not, the result of bargaining by sub-central jurisdictions 
for increased aid to finance higher expenditure. An alternative explanation, which 
stresses the importance of errors being made by sub-central residents, is that there is 
some anomaly in the rational behaviour of individuals. One such suggestion by 
Cournat et al. (1979), is that individuals confuse the average and marginal price 
effects of changes in lump-sum transfers and that a 'fiscal illusion' effect is in place. 
Such transfers reduce the average cost of local government expenditures, without 
affecting the marginal cost. However, if voters believe that the marginal cost has been 
reduced, they may react to unconditional grants by demanding significant increases in 
government expenditures at this new, perceived to be lower price. A perhaps more 
sinister view, is given by Filimon et al. (1982) who hypothesise that self-interested 
politicians may prevent voters from obtaining full information on intergovernmental 
grants, thereby affording bureaucrats etc the luxury of spending any marginal funds 
transferred from the centre18. 
Hines and Thaler (1995) provide a relatively recent survey of the empirical 
18 Other explanations include omission of important variables such as 'wage discrepancies' (Hamilton, 
1983), the behaviour of other governments (see Case et al. 1993) etc. 
212 
literature examining the 'flypaper' effect. They conclude that it is widely accepted 
that a 'flypaper' effect does exist, though it must be stressed that most studies are 
limited to the US. Having accepted the existence of such an effect, the literature has 
switched focus to examining the actual magnitude of the 'flypaper' effect. Most 
studies find strong evidence of a 'flypaper' effect. The following table is taken from 
Hines and Thaler (1995). 
Table 4.2: Examinations of the 'Flypaper' Effect 
Paper/Sample Change in Spending 
as Grant Changes 
Inman (1971): Panel study of 41 city budgets 1.00 
Weicher (1972): State aid to 106 municipal governments 0.90 
Gramlich and Galper (1973): Federal grants to local and state 0.43 
governments 
Gramlich and Galper (1973): Federal and state aid to 10 large urban 0.25 
governments 
Bowman (1974): Federal education grants to West Virginia to school 1.06 
districts 
Bowman (1974): State grants to West Virginia school districts 0.50 
Feldstein (1975): State grants to Massachusetts towns 0.60 
Olmsted et al. (1993): Missouri state aid to local school districts 0.58 
Case et al. (1993): Federal grants to 48 states, 1970-1985 0.65 
The majority ofthese studies however, assume that the response of sub-central 
governments to cuts in grants is the reverse of that observed during grant increases. 
An interesting, but less developed question, is whether or not the effect of grant 
changes is symmetrical. Gramlich (1987) argues that asyrt1J11etries could be in place, 
with expenditures matching any increase in grants but being cut by smaller amounts 
when grants fall back. Gramlich argues that following an increase in grants and 
expenditure a clientele of those who benefit from the grant is developed. After the 
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grant is eliminated, the clientele starts to lobby sustaining their welfare through 
increases in local taxes. Thus, due to political reasons local expenditures may be 
insensitive to decreases but sensitive to increases in grants. 
The evidence for asymmetric responses IS mixed. Gramlich (1987) finds 
evidence of fiscal replacement so that during periods of grant tightening, sub-central 
governments responded by increasing their own taxation so as to maintain current 
programs. Thus, he observes an asymmetric response to intergovernmental grants: 
while sub-central spending is highly sensitive to increases in grants, it is relatively 
insensitive to the loss of grants. In contrast, Stine (1994) finds evidence of a 'super-
flypaper' effect with a difference being observed not only in magnitude but also in 
size. He shows that for his sample, not only did expenditures decline in response to 
reductions in grants, but own-revenues did as well. Thus in contrast to the study by 
Gramlich, Stine finds a negative replacement of lost funds, suggesting that central 
tightening induces sub-central tightening. Gamkhar and Oates (1995) however, find a 
symmetric response; expenditures move in equal magnitudes in response to cuts and 
increases in grants. 
In our event study by focussing upon cuts in grants we can contribute to this 
literature by examining the behaviour of sub-central governments during episodes of 
intergovernmental grant changes. In doing so, we are able for example, to examine 
whether 'own-source' revenues rise or not and on which elements of expenditure any 
relative burden of adjustment falls upon. 
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4.4.2 Estimation Issues 
One issue is whether there is some non-linear effect present which cannot be 
captured by focusing on all real cuts in grants. For instance, it might be possible, 
given a certain degree of fiscal autonomy for a sub-central government to react to a 
small cut in grants by raising taxation, whilst a large cut could not be accommodated 
in this way and might require a significant cutback in spending. In order to check 
whether the results are affected by the size of the grant cut we divided our sample as 
shown in equation 4.6. We ranked our sample of 86 observations by size and then 
divided them into two equal sub-samples of 'large cuts' and 'small cutsr19. The largest 
cuts averaged 2.77% of total sub-central government revenues, whilst the smallest 
cuts averaged 0.59% of total revenues. Note that both of these categories of cuts are 
generally sustained. On average, the grants in period T+l increased by only 0.1% of 
total revenues for the large grants cut, and by 0.27% for small cuts. In other words, 
large cuts are substantial and hardly reversed in the following period, whilst small 
cuts on average tend to be partially, but not wholly, reversed. 
Another key issue is potential endogeneity and the causal link implied by the 
event study. In this study we interpret cuts in grants by central government as 
19 An alternative to dividing grant cuts into different categories is to take account of non-linearities by 
scaling the effects of events by the magnitude of the events. Thus, one could run a regression of the 
form: 
Yit = Po + (P1Di,T-2+··· .. P5Di,T+Z)'f'i.T + TJil 
where 'Pit is the size of the impulse of the grant change. We have experimented with this approach, and 
so far have found that the predicted path for the fiscal variables around the mean impulse and the 
average size of a 'large' or 'small' cut in grant is similar to that using our methodology. Clearly, 
however, the standard error bands will be different, and it is difficult to provide a graphical analysis of 
this non-linear regression. We leave this to further extensions of our work, but note that it does not, at 
least at a first pass, suggest very different conclusions in terms of a reaction of sub-central governments 
to cuts in grants around the mean value. We are grateful to our discussant at the NBERJCESifo Tapes 
Fiscal Federalism Conference, Dennis Epple, for suggesting this potential extension. 
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exogenous and as causing reactions by sub-central governments. But what if central 
grants were to adjust to shifts in expenditure or taxation decisions by sub-central 
governments?20 Gamkhar and Oates (1996) take account of potential endogeneity by 
estimating instrumenting regressions for the cuts in grants. Clearly IV regressions are 
not appropriate to event study regressions as the potentially endogenous variable, the 
cuts in grants, do not actually enter the regression. The question is instead whether 
one should take account of potential endogeneity by estimating instrumenting 
regressions for the cuts in grants and using predicted rather than actual episodes of 
cuts in grants, and whether this will lead to very different event study regressions. To 
check whether this was a problem we estimated some instrumenting regressions for 
cuts in grants and found very little change in the way sub-central fiscal variables react 
to predicted as opposed to actual cuts in grants21 . In any event, even if one does not 
accept a strong causal link for all the cuts in grants events identified, the event study 
can still be seen as uncovering empirical regularities "stylised facts" that in some 
cases are picking up causal effects. 
4.4.3 Results 
As before, we plot the results from the event study regressions to show how 
the fiscal variables for the sub-central governments behave in proximity of the cuts in 
20 For instance, excessive sub-central expenditures or reductions in sub-central taxation by might lead 
to increases in intergovernmental grants. 
21 To be precise, our instrumenting regressions regressed cuts in grants on some political variables 
(political party in power, type of government using the data from Budge et al. , 2000) as well as some 
conditioning economic variables (lagged unemployment, output). We then used these regressions to 
identify predicted cuts in grants episodes, and used these to re-run the event study regressions. The 
signs, sizes and standard errors of the time dummies were very similar and hence accounting for 
endogeneity would not seem to produce very different results. 
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grants event. These are shown in Figure 4.2, panels A-G. In each row of the panels in 
Figure 4.2 we again plot both the annual change and the cumulative change in each 
fiscal variable. Panels A-G show the reaction of each of the seven fiscal variables to 
the cuts in grants during the event window, and for each variables the results are 
divided into all cuts in grants, small cuts in grants, and large cuts in grants. Unlike our 
research of fiscal consolidations, we find that for the cuts in grants regressions the T-2 
dummies are always insignificant, and hence they have been dropped from our 
regresSIOns. 
A number of points emerge from Figure 4.2. First, it is apparent from panel A 
that there is a sustained cut in total expenditures at sub-central level, and there is even 
evidence that some of these cuts are anticipated as the T -1 dummy variable is 
significant. This might be the result of planned or signalled cuts by central 
governments. Second, as is apparent from panel B, sub-central governments do tend 
to react significantly in period T to a cut in grants, by raising taxation. Notice that, 
unlike the fiscal consolidation study, the estimated increase in sub-central tax revenue 
is significant at time T for all grant cut episodes. The response of sub-central taxation 
revenues tends to be immediate for large cuts in grants, and delayed (at T + 1) for small 
cuts, although the cumulative change is more sustained in response to small grant 
cuts. This is a richer picture than emerged from our fiscal consolidation study, where 
there seemed to be little impact on revenues: although the cumulative effect here is 
not significant by T + 2, there does appear to be a shift towards sub-central taxation as 
a result of cuts in grants, with a delayed effect in the case of small cuts in grants. 
However, the impact is less than that on expenditures, and in general this supports the 
notion that the 'flypaper' effect operates in both directions, in that local governments 
217 
choose not to fund certain expenditures if they have to provide funds from their own 
taxes. This is generally supportive of the results in Gamkhar and Oates (1996), and in 
contrast to Gramlich (1987). Similarly, there is little evidence that non-taxation 
revenues from fees and user charges are used to offset the cuts in grants (panel C). 
Third, the impact of cuts in grants on the sub-central government wage bill is 
significant at time T for all cuts, and there is a significant (though small) reduction in 
social transfers and purchases of goods and services (see panels D-F). In the case of 
the wage bill, the cut in this following a large cut in grants is large and significant at 
time T and T + 1, but is very different in the case of small cuts, where the response of 
the wage bill is barely significant at time T and never significantly below the starting 
point, even at T+2. This might be due to the fact that large cuts elicit major 
adjustments in sub-central governments such as adjustments in the wage bill of local 
governments. Clearly in the case of social transfers any effect is small because the 
majority of social welfare expenditures are likely to be the responsibility of central 
governments for most of the countries in our sample, and this is similar across size of 
grant cut. Overall the major impact of the cuts in grants appears to fall on the wage 
bill of sub-central governments, and this ties in with the evidence presented in 
Chapter 3 which suggested that sub-central governments play an important part in 
stabilisations. Fourth, as in the case of fiscal consolidations, cutting capital spending 
by sub-central governments is a standard reaction. Panel G shows clearly that cuts in 
capital spending constitute a large proportion of the overall adjustment, and that 
indeed the T -1 dummy is significant, so that some cuts are brought forward ahead of 
the cuts in grant. Overall the graph shows a substantial tightening across the event 
window, and this is made even more significant by the fact that capital expenditures 
tend to be only a small proportion of total expenditures at the sub-central level - see 
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Chapter 1. Small grant cuts account for more significant and sustained changes in 
capital expenditure than large grant cuts, as in the latter case the cut in spending 
appears temporary. 
4.4.4 Dependence on Central Government Grants 
One question which arises in analysing these responses to central government 
grant cuts is whether there is a significant difference in the responses of sub-central 
governments which are highly dependent on grants and those who depend on grants to 
a lesser extent. In Table 4.3 we have divided the sample into a small group of five 
countries (the UK, Spain22 (post-1985), Belgium, Ireland and The Netherlands) which 
exhibit a high degree of dependence on central grants (above 50%) and those where 
the dependence is less (below 50%). 
22 Given Spain underwent major reforms in the financing of sub-central governments in the 1980s, we 
have divided the observations for Spain into two groups, those relating to the pre-1985 reforms period, 
where Spanish sub-central governments depended less on central grants, and the post-1985 period 
where intergovernmental grants were more prevalent. 
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Table 4.3: Ranking by Del!endence of Grants: (Grants as % of Total Sub-Central 
Revenues) 
Countries with Low Grant Dependence 
Spain (pre-1985) 18.56 
Sweden 21.59 
Germany 23.25 
Canada 26.00 
Austria 26.11 
USA 29.53 
Finland 32.19 
France 37.14 
Norway 37.41 
Australia 44.82 
Denmark 45.64 
Countries with High Grant Dependence 
UK 55.74 
Spain (post-1985) 56.42 
Belgium 57.87 
Ireland 69.77 
Netherlands 77.41 
Figure 4.3 shows the annual change in the fiscal variables following a cut in . 
central grants, in each of panels A-G. What is striking about these results is that those 
countries that are least dependent on central grants seem to cut expenditure more (i.e. 
there is a stronger reverse 'flypaper' effect). From the results in Figure 4.3, panel B, it 
appears that fiscal autonomy23 does not necessarily imply a willingness to offset grant 
cuts through increases in taxes. Similarly, those countries that are less dependent on 
grants are more responsive in cutting all the components of spending (goods and 
services, social transfers, wages, and capital expenditure). 
23 Although one has to recall that many of those who are less dependent on grants do benefit from tax-
sharing arrangements. 
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This result does suggest that cuts in grants elicit different reactions in different 
institutional settings, although it is interesting to note that those countries that are least 
dependent on central government grants are more likely to adjust. To check the 
robustness of this result, we conducted some further analysis to check which countries 
and what institutional features were driving this result. 
4.4.5 Fiscal autonomy and Reaction to Grant Cuts 
One way to examine how individual countries react during the events is by 
introducing interactive dummies in our event study regressions (see equation 4.3). 
These show whether individual countries display a behaviour which is significantly 
different from that of other countries in terms of the coefficient on the time dummies 
in the regression. To put this another way, it shows whether for individual countries 
the profile of the fiscal variables evolves in a significantly higher or lower path. In 
general, these results were not very informative, and for some countries (Spain and 
Finland) there were too few observations to allow us to introduce country dummies24. 
Some consistent results do emerge: for instance, Belgium shows a lesser cut in 
expenditure relative to the reference value, Canada and the US display a smaller 
increase in taxation, and Austria and France showed a larger increase in taxation and 
higher expenditure, following cuts in grants episodes. Germany and France also 
displayed a significantly larger cuts in capital spending, but Austria displayed 
significantly smaller cuts, following cuts in grants. In the UK sub-central 
governments seem to anticipate cuts in grants with bigger cuts in expenditure at T -1. 
24 These results are not tabulated for reasons of space. However, the results are available on demand. 
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In order to obtain more informative results, which use up less degrees of 
freedom, we tried grouping the countries into different categories, depending on the 
institutional features of their fiscal arrangements. 
Table 4.4 shows the ranking of the countries in our samples by expenditure 
decentralisation. A greater degree of decentralisation in spending should presumably 
allow sub-central governments greater scope to adjust to a cut in grants. 
Table 4.4: Ranking by EX:Qenditure Decentralisation: (Sub-Central EX:Qenditure as 
% of Total Government EX:Qenditure} 
Least Decentralised Countries 
Belgium 11.82 
Spain (pre-1985) 15.74 
France 16.93 
Netherlands 24.99 
Ireland 25.27 
UK 25.37 
Spain (post-1985) 27.83 
Austria 30.73 
Most Decentralised Countries 
Norway 33.63 
Sweden 36.19 
Finland 38.86 
Australia 41.43 
Germany 41.77 
USA 44.51 
Denmark 45.01 
Canada 57.34 
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The first row of Table 4.5 shows that this does seem to be the case, with 
taxation, total expenditures, and expenditures on goods and services lower than the 
reference value25. 
Table 4.5 Summary of Results Using Country Groupings 
Criteria used for Grouping Countries 
Highest Expenditure Decentralisation 
Highest Tax Autonomy 
Highest Borrowing Autonomy 
Significant NEGATIVE Effects 
Total Expenditure 
Expenditure on Goods and Services 
Taxation Revenue 
Total Expenditure 
Taxation Revenue 
Total Expenditure 
Capital Expenditure 
We next attempted to see whether by grouping the countries by the degree of 
taxation autonomy this might explain some of the reactions to the cuts in grants. In 
order to do this, we use the measures of taxation autonomy published in OECD 
(1999) and Rodden (2002)26. We group our countries according to either High or Low 
levels of Taxation Autonomy - see Table 4.6. 
25 In tabulating these effects we focus on the interactive dummies at time T. In some cases, we found 
that the interactive dummies were significant in other time periods. However these effects are difficult 
to explain in terms of institutional features in the country groupings, and seem to be less important. 
26 For a discussion ofthis information see Chapter 1. 
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Table 4.6: Ranking by Tax Autonomy 
Sub-Central Tax % of Sub-Central Taxation Tax Autonomy: 'Own 
Revenues as % of for which Sub-Central Taxes' as % of Total Sub-
Total Sub-Central controls Tax Rate and/or Central Revenues 
Revenues Tax Base (C) = (A) x (B) /1 00 
(A) (B) 
Countries with Greatest Tax Autonomy 
Sweden 61.47 100 61.47 
Canada 56.41 86 48.51 
Finland 49.53 89 44.08 
Denmark 43.75 95 41.56 
USA 47.46 76 36.07 
Countries with Least Tax Autonomy 
Belgium 34.25 97 33.22 
Spain 40.71 67 27.28 
UK 24.15 100 24.15 
Ireland 10.25 100 10.25 
Netherlands 7.12 100 7.12 
Germany 54.45 13 7.08 
Austria 51.21 11 5.63 
Norway 45.74 3 1.37 
Australia 32.88 N.A. N.A. 
France 43.06 N.A. N.A. 
Sources: Column (A) - IMF Government Financial Statistic (2002), calculated 
as sample averages. 
Column (B) - Estimates for Canada and USA were provided by Jonathan Rodden and 
are based on control of both the tax rate and base, the remaining data 
are OECD (1999). All figures are for 1995. 
The second row of Table 4.5 show that in fact few significant effects could be 
found at time T, so that tax autonomy does not appear to be a significant feature 
explaining how sub-central governments react to cuts in grants. It is interesting to 
know that a higher degree of taxation autonomy still involves a reverse 'flypaper' 
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effect and that there is no attempt by sub-central governments to offset the 
consequences of lower grants on sub-central spending. 
Finally, we group the countries according to a measure of borrowing 
autonomy (see Table 4.7). 
Table 4.7: Ranking by Borrowing Autonomy 
Lowest Levels of Sub-Central Borrowing Autonomy 
Belgium 1.45 
Denmark 1.45 
UK 1.5 
Austria 1.6 
Norway 1.6 
Ireland 1.75 
Highest Levels of Sub-Central Borrowing Autonomy 
Netherlands 2.3 
Germany 2.3 
Australia 2.5 
Spain 2.6 
Canada 2.7 
France 3 
Finland 3 
Sweden 3 
USA 3 
Source: Rodden (2003) - see Chapter 1. 
The final row of Table 4.5 shows that the countries with the greatest 
borrowing autonomy react to cuts in grants through lower total expenditure and lower 
capital spending, relative to the reference value. It appears that, even for countries 
with high levels of autonomy, sub-central expenditures and grants are strategic 
complements. 
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4.5. Conclusion 
In this Chapter we have re-affirmed our belief in the importance of sub-central 
governments during national fiscal adjustments. Using comparative data on sub-
central government variables and on inter-governmental grants, we have provided a 
picture of how sub-central tiers of government behave during periods of fiscal 
consolidation, and how grants play a key role in forcing sub-central governments to 
adjust. We use event study analysis to examine not only how governments react to 
these adjustment episodes, but also the time profile of the adjustment. 
The results which emerge are varied and are set out in detail in the body of the 
Chapter. However, it is worth highlighting three general points which emerge from 
our empirical analysis. The first is that consistent with out findings in Chapter 3, sub-
central governments playa key role in successful fiscal consolidations. This provides 
further support for the argument that understanding sub-central government behaviour 
is important in overall macroeconomic stabilisation. However, this result is tempered 
by the observation that fiscal decentralisation does not seem to necessarily imply loss 
of control, as suggested by some observers (cf Rodden, 2002, Rodden and Wibbels, 
2002), or to a higher degree of taxation, provided that the centre retains a degree of 
control through grants. Sub-central governments do not appear to react to fiscal 
consolidation attempts by increasing own taxes. Furthermore, the largest cuts in sub-
central expenditure in response to a cut in grants from central government seem to 
have occurred in countries with greater expenditure decentralisation. This implies 
that, even within countries which have high degrees of decentralisation, grant 
allocations provide a mechanism whereby central governments retain considerable 
226 
effective control over aggregate sub-central expenditures. In Chapter 6 we focus more 
exclusively on the implications of alternative forms of fiscal decentralisation on the 
nature and success of consolidation attempts. 
The second general theme is that we present some evidence that cuts in grants 
play an important role in fiscal consolidations. We also demonstrate that cuts in grants 
are not generally offset by increases in sub-central taxation revenues. Overall, the 
increase in sub-central taxation following episodes of cuts in grants tend to be weak, 
and this is generally supportive of the presence of a reverse 'flypaper' effect, but 
without evidence for an asymmetric 'flypaper' effect as suggested by Gramlich 
(1987). 
The third general point is that capital spending is an important adjustment 
mechanism for sub-central governments following fiscal consolidations or cuts in 
grants. Although the nature of the adjustment does depend on the degree of success of 
the consolidation or the size of the cut in inter-governmental grant, what is striking is 
that capital spending does tend to suffer at sub-central level following a fiscal 
adjustment. This is despite the relatively small size of capital expenditure compared to 
total sub-central budgets, and possibly highlights a degree of short-termism on the 
part of local governments in adjusting their fiscal position. 
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FIGURE 4.2 
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CHAPTERS 
"Assessing the Degree of Central Government Effective Control: Grants versus 
Tax sharing!" 
5.1. Introduction 
Obtaining an accurate measure of the level of central (i.e. vertical) control 
over sub-central fiscal policy is an important pre-requisite for any empirical study of 
fiscal decentralisation. As outlined in Chapter 1, there exist substantial differences in 
the sub-central financing regimes adopted by industrial countries. In some, sub-central 
tiers rely heavily upon inter-governmental transfers and hence the degree of central 
control is relatively high, while in others, sub-central tiers have far greater revenue 
raising responsibility. As discussed in Darby et al. (2002), substantial central control, 
by reducing the effective autonomy of sub-central governments, can serve to weaken 
sub-central accountability and legitimacy. On the other hand, more limited control has 
the potential to lead to policy conflict between tiers, especially during periods of 
instability or reform such as during a national consolidation attempt2. In this chapter 
we discuss the implications of alternative sub-central financial regimes on the 
effectiveness of central governments to control sub-central fiscal policy and hence 
freely dictate not only central but also national fiscal policy. To do this, we construct 
a simple stylised budgetary accounting framework from which we are able to compare 
1 We are grateful to participants at the Scottish Graduate Programme 2004 Conference and the Royal 
Economic Society 2004 Easter School for comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
242 
and contrast the policy options available to the central government to control sub-
central fiscal policy during consolidation attempts. 
While the degree of central control over national fiscal policy is obvious in a 
fully centralised system, in decentralised systems we show that the degree of 
'effective' central control depends critically on how sub-central expenditures are 
financed. 
In the past, researchers typically measured sub-central autonomy and by 
implication the degree of central effective control over national fiscal policy, as the 
ratio of sub-central expenditure relative to national expenditure (see Oates (1999) for 
a survey of this literature). However, while this method remains popular, it fails to 
acknowledge the revenue source which finances these expenditures. If the central 
government finances a large proportion of such expenditures via vertical inter-
governmental transfers the centre can retain a substantial degree of 'effective' control 
over expenditure. By altering the revenue source financing certain expenditures, the 
centre is able in many cases to 'force the hand' of the sub-centre to make cuts even if 
they are unwilling to do so. For example, in Chapters 3 and 4 we found strong 
evidence of a reversed 'flypaper' effect. Therefore, for a given level of sub-central 
expenditure, the degree of effective central government control over the sub-centre, 
and hence by implication over national fiscal policy, depends critically upon whether 
or not such expenditures are financed by own-source sub-central revenues or by 
central grants/tax sharing arrangements and so forth. 
2 For a discussion of the sources of such policy conflicts see Chapter 6. 
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Stein (1999) was the first to fully acknowledge the importance of accounting 
for central to sub-central grants in any cross-country empirical examination of fiscal 
decentralisation. However, Rodden (2002), Pola (1999) and Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) 
have argued that relying upon grants as the sole measure of central government 
control may itself be inaccurate. As discussed above, datasets such as the GFS make 
no distinction between sub-central tax revenues that are 'own-source' and those that 
are raised from vertical tax sharing arrangements. As evident from OEeD (1999) 
under most tax sharing regimes, the central and sub-central shares of the total pool of 
revenues raised from shared taxes are fixed either by the constitution or by some 
previously mutually agreed means-tested formula. However, even though the tax 
'shares' each tier receives are fixed, the centre does retain full control over the base 
and the rate of the commonly shared revenue source. Typically, sub-central 
governments have no authority to alter these revenues, instead they depend entirely 
upon the policy decisions of the central government to raise a given level of resource 
and the pre-determined formulas in place to allocate these revenues. Thus, Rodden 
(2002), Pola (1999) and Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) argue that revenues from tax sharing 
arrangements should in fact be classified as central to sub-central transfers since like 
grants, the sub-centre is entirely dependent upon the policy choices of the centre. 
In this chapter however, we demonstrate that the degree of central government 
effective control over sub-central fiscal policy is in fact different under a) tax sharing 
and b) grant financing regimes. To highlight this, we again focus upon national 
consolidation attempts. We demonstrate that for a given level of sub-central 
expenditure, the degree of effective central government control is higher under a 
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system of grants than under tax sharing. Therefore it follows that, grants and tax 
sharing should not be viewed as identical tools of central control over the sub-centre. 
This conclusion has important implications. While both tax sharing and grants 
represent a reduction in sub-central financial autonomy relative to full tax autonomy, 
the degree of effective central control is higher under a system of grants than under 
tax sharing. Therefore, switching from grant finance to tax sharing, which has been 
advocated in many countries including Scotland3 on the grounds of improved 
incentives for sub-central governments, does contrary to established thinking, 
represent a substantial loss in central effective control. It is necessary therefore, to be 
aware of the substantial alteration to the public finance arrangements of a country if 
such a reform were to take place4. This result also has important implications for 
academic research. It implies that the recent trend in the literature to classify grants 
and tax sharing arrangements as equivalent sources of intergovernmental transfer is 
inappropriate. While both involve a transfer of resources, the relative ability of the 
centre to control these transfers is substantially different. Thus, empirical research 
while acknowledging the fact that the GFS measure of taxation does not accurately 
reflect 'own source' taxation should also be wary of classifying the remaining 
taxation revenues as identical to grants. 
The outline of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. In Section 5.2 we 
introduce and develop our basic accounting framework upon which our discussions 
are based. In Sections 5.3 through 5.6 we compare and contrast the level of effective 
3 See for example Hallwood and MacDonald (2004). 
4 Equally, moving toward increased grant finance in systems where tax sharing has been popular in the 
past implies a substantial reduction in sub-central autonomy. 
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central government control of sub-central expenditures in a variety of alternative 
decentralisation regimes during national consolidation attempts. We show that while 
the level of central control in a system of grant finance mirrors that under full 
centralisation, tax sharing in contrast, is in fact more akin to full decentralisation. 
Section 5.7 concludes. 
5.2. The Basic Framework 
In order to highlight the differences in effective central control under 
alternative decentralisation regimes we construct a simple stylised budgetary 
accounting framework. While, many of the assumptions are undeniably umealistic, 
their use illustrates any important differences between alternative financial regimes. 
More specifically, our motivation for building such a stylised model is to compare and 
contrast the level of 'effective' central government control in being able to eliminate a 
national fiscal deficit. More complex models are possible, however this framework 
clearly illustrates the issues involved without becoming immersed in discussion over 
extraneous issues. 
We begin by assuming that there are two tiers of government, the centre (C) 
and the sub-centre (S)5. Each tier of government undertakes expenditure (E), denoted 
CE and SE respectively. We assume that central expenditure (CE) is comprised of two 
components: non-cyclical (or autonomous) expenditure a and cyclical expenditure 
5 For simplicity we assume that there is only one sub-central government. While in practice there are a 
number of individual sub-central governments, for this analysis, the actual number is unimportant. Our 
goal is to demonstrate the level of central control over the sub-central tier as a whole, irrespective of 
the number of sub-central units. 
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B(y): where y is the deviation in output from the natural rate (y = y -Y*). Thus, in this 
simple framework with a zero output gap, cyclical expenditures are zero. For 
simplicity we assume that the parameter B is fixed and that government expenditures 
do not impact on output. By implication, the central government only has 
discretionary control over the non-cyclical component of their expenditures cx. Thus 
CE can be defined as: 
CE = a+ P(y) 
aCE 
where, - = P'(y) < 0 
By 
(5.1) 
(5.2) 
We assume that while output effects the fiscal balance, changes in fiscal 
policy have no immediate impact on output. The inclusion of output in this way is 
simply to generate a negative fiscal position that requires action. We could for 
example let fiscal policy affect output but in a way in which would retain a negative 
fiscal balance or we could simply assume that the central fiscal position is negative at 
the outset and adjustment is necessary, perhaps to meet EMU criteria. 
In contrast, and without loss of generality, we assume that sub-central 
expenditure (SE) is not influenced by the economic cycle. Both SE and CE represent 
current expenditures; there are no capital investments. 
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The centre raises revenue through taxation CT, which can also be broken into 
non and cyclical taxation components - 8 and <p(y) respectively6. Thus CT can be 
defined as 
CT = 6' +q>(y) 
aCT 
where, - = q>'(Y) > 0 
ay 
(5.3) 
(5.4) 
In contrast, the sub-centre raises their revenue (SR) either through own-source 
non-cyclical taxation (ST) or via inter-governmental transfers. The latter can either be 
in the form of grants (SG) or via revenues from tax sharing (STshare) arrangements. 
For simplicity, we assume that under each scenario (e.g. grants, full decentralisation 
etc) all sub-central revenues (SR) are raised from a particular single source, e.g. 
autonomous taxation, grants etc. 
To complete the budgetary framework we assume that no government can 
issue debt. Given the assumption of zero capital goods and the lack of a dynamic 
framework, this translates itself into a simple balanced national/general budget 
requirement. However, a 'fiscal deficit' within a particular tier of government can be 
financed by a parallel surplus at the other tier. Thus for example, sub-central 
governments could run a deficit provided that their excess expenditures were fully 
financed by a surplus at the centre or vice versa7. 
6 As before, we assume that y is the deviation in national income from the natural rate (y = Y -Y*) and 
that the parameter <p is fixed. 
7 In such a scenario, the resources from the central government's fiscal surplus can be transferred to the 
sub-centre. Without this 'additional' transfer, sub-central expenditures (revenues) would have to be cut 
(increased) to balance their budget. 
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We assume that the centre has a pre-determined 'optimal' level of both 
autonomous expenditure and revenue denoted ex and r5 respectively. They have a 
similar pre-determined 'optimal' level of sub-central expenditure (SE) and revenue 
(SR). Given that central governments are accountable to the national electorate and 
are the ultimate guarantors of macroeconomic stability, it is likely that they will have 
an optimal sub-central policy stance they would like as an implementation preference 
(even if this is inconsistent with the sub-centre's preferences). In the UK for example, 
much of the local government reforms over the last two decades have been in 
response to policies being pursued by local governments which were inconsistent with 
those of the centre. These reforms have been clearly designed to give the Westminster 
government greater control thereby reducing such conflict over policy8. 
In contrast, the sub-central tier is also assumed to have an 'optimal' level of 
their own expenditure and revenue, sft and SR , but they have no concern for the level 
of central government expenditure and revenue. This final assumption is not critical 
and our analysis does not alter if we specify an optimal level of central 
expenditure/revenue from the viewpoint of sub-central politicians. In practice, sub-
central politicians realise that they have little or no direct influence over central fiscal 
policy and are instead likely to be almost exclusively concerned with the 
expenditures/revenues within their local jurisdiction. 
Given the likelihood of different preferences and political motivations etc, 
optimal sub-central expenditures as viewed by the sub-centre may not necessarily 
8 The frequent use of powers of the centre to 'cap' the autonomous tax revenues of UK Local 
Governments is a prime example - see Emmerson et al. (1998). 
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coincide with the equivalent optimal level preferred by the centre (i.e. 
SF;"# SEand,SR"# SR). We assume that each government's preferences for 
expenditure and revenue are single-peaked9. 
The general government (or national) fiscal balance can be written as follows: 
Gbal = CT+SR-CE -SE (5.5) 
which by substituting 5.1 and 5.3 can be re-arranged to give: 
Gbal = 5 + cp(y) + SR - a- fJ(y) -SE (5.6) 
To analyse the budgetary accounting implications of alternative fiscal 
decentralisation structures during consolidation attempts, we introduce a negative 
output 'shock'. This forces firstly the central and then by implication, the general 
government fiscal positions into deficit. Given our assumption that the general 
government fiscal position must always be in balance, consolidation is required. 
To illustrate this, suppose that initially both the central and sub-central fiscal 
positions are balanced but there is a negative shock to output (y)lO. Consequently, 
given equations (5.1) and (5.3), central government expenditures will rise (by the 
amount ~y), while central tax revenues will fall (by the amount cpy). Thus, Gba1 given 
9 Thus if actual expenditure differs from optimal expenditure any policy option which has the potential 
to more closely align actual with optimal expenditure will be adopted. 
10 Given our simple framework there is no incentive for either government to run anything other than 
balanced budget at the outset. 
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by (5.6) will be negative and hence a national consolidation to expenditures and 
revenues is necessary (either at the central, sub-central or both tiers of government) -
l.e. 
Gbal = 5 + qy(y) + SR - a - p(y) - SE < 0 (5.6a) 
In what follows we compare and contrast the ability of the centre to respond to 
this situation by examining the policy instruments available to them under alternative 
sub-central financial arrangements. 
5.3. Centralisation 
In the first scenario we assume that all fiscal instruments are assigned to the 
central level - i.e. there is no decentralisation. In this case, the expenditure and 
revenue denoted SE and SR are effectively individual components of non-cyclical 
central government expenditure and revenue. Thus, central government has direct 
control over both their 'own' instruments b and u, but in addition, sub-central 
expenditure and revenue (SE and SR). Given the preferences of the central 
government discussed above, these expenditures and revenues will initially be set 
equal to SE and SR respectively. 
Following the negative output shock the central fiscal balance will be 
negative: 
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Cbal = "5 + <p(y) - a - P(y) < 0 (5.7) 
which in tum feeds through to a negative general government balance: 
Gbal = "5 + <p(y) + SR - a - P(y) - SE < 0 (5.6a) 
In such a situation the central government has a number of fiscal instruments it 
can use to restore general balance. Firstly, the centre can adjust their 'own' non-
cyclical expenditures and revenues denoted by 8 and a respectively. By increasing 8 
and cutting a by appropriate amounts they can restore equilibrium. Secondly a surplus 
can be generated on the 'sub-central' balance, compensating for the deficit at the 
central level: i.e. -
SCbal = SR"ew - SE
new > 0 (5.8) 
where it is possible that, 
C SC new 
- bal = bal (5.9) 
Thus the centre has the ability to adjust both their 'own' expenditures and 
revenues but in addition, they can alter those of the sub-centre. Clearly this simple 
framework cannot determine the actual composition of the adjustment chosen (the 
exact change will depend upon utility costs associated with moving away from 
'optimal' levels of central and sub-central expenditures and revenues). It is sufficient 
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to note that under a system of centralisation the centre is able to effectively control all 
instruments of national fiscal policy to assist in any adjustment. 
The case of full centralisation is a useful benchmark against which alternative 
scenarios of decentralisation can be compared. We begin with the polar opposite case, 
full autonomous fiscal decentralisation. 
5.4. Full Decentralisation 
Under full decentralisation, we assume that the sub-central tier has full fiscal 
autonomy in that their expenditures (SE) are financed entirely from own-source 
taxation (ST). In the literature, own-source taxation revenues can be referred to as 
assigned, devolved and autonomous taxation revenues. They are identical however, in 
that they refer to revenues received from taxation which the sub-centre is able to raise 
and administer, independently from the centre. 
In this scenario, the sub-central government will set SE = sft in line with their 
pre-determined exogenous preferences. Consequently, given their inability to issue 
debt this implies an optimal level of revenue SR = sf so that, sft = sf. In such a 
scenario, the general government budget balance, 
Gbal =S+cp(y)+SR-a-fJ(y)-SE (5.6) 
where, SR = sf and SE = sft can be re-written to give, 
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Gbal = "5 + tp(y) + sf - ex - f3(y) - SE (5.10) 
Given SE = ST, the general government fiscal position III equilibrium 
becomes, 
Gbal = "5 + tp(y) - a - f3(y) (5.11) 
As before, following a shock to output, the central fiscal balance is negative, 
forcing the general government balance (5.10) to be negative as well: 
Gbal = "5 + tp(y) + sf - ex - f3(y) - SE < 0 (5.10a) 
and given SE = sf , 
Gbal = "5 + tp(y) - ex - f3(y) < 0 (5.11a) 
In contrast to the situation under full centralisation, the central government's 
ability to respond to the shock is more limited. The centre is unable to run a surplus 
on the sub-central fiscal position to help finance their deficit brought on by the 
negative shock to output. Under full fiscal autonomy, any such surplus is run at the 
discretionary will of the sub-centre. However, from the sub-centre's perspective, their 
fiscal policy has been unaffected by the shock and hence they face no direct incentive 
to run a surplus (either by cutting expenditures or increasing revenues), as this would 
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mean moving away from their' optimal' levels sft and sf . In this instance, as can be 
observed from (5.11 a), the only fiscal instruments available to the centre are 
autonomous expenditure (a) and revenue (8). Consequently, the various options 
available to the centre to implement a consolidation are significantly more limited 
than under centralisation. 
In the following section we depart from these two polar cases and assess the 
level of effective central control in decentralised systems but where the central 
government plays a key role in the financing of sub-central fiscal policy. We begin by 
analysing grant finance. 
5.5. Grant Finance 
For simplicity, we assume that in this instance all sub-central revenues are 
raised from central government block grants (i.e. they have no autonomous revenue 
raising power). Thus, SR = SQ. 
Under a system of grant finance, the level of grant assigned to the sub-centre 
is typically determined unilaterally by the centre or through some form of 'needs-
based' formula ll . While certain sub-central governments may have limited influence 
or bargaining power regarding their grant allocation, the ultimate decision on how 
much each sub-central government receives, typically remains the sole prerogative of 
the centre. Rodden (2003) points out that unlike revenues that arise as tax sharing 
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revenues, revenues from intergovernmental grants "are likely to be most subject to 
yearly central government discretion in their determination,,12. 
To best capture the situation, we can interpret grant finance as a situation in 
which the centre raises an amount of revenue, via central taxation, to fund a pool of 
revenues (which we will denote X), which in tum, it transfers/redistributes to sub-
central tiers in the form of grant allocations (SG). At the outset, we assume that the 
amount the centre raises in X is fully transferred to the sub-centre (via grants SG)I3. 
Given the centre's pre-determined preferences for SE, SE this yields: 
X=SG=SE (5.12) 
when, Sft;:::SE 
Provided that the 'optimal' level of SE as viewed by the centre (SE) is less 
than or equal to the optimal level of SE as viewed by the sub-centre (sft), actual sub-
central expenditure will equal SE . Otherwise the sub-centre would set SE = sft and 
there would be a sub-central surplus of X - sft 14: 
11 Even such 'formulas' are often highly dependent on the discretion of the centre - see Rodden (2003) 
and Stegarescu (2004). 
12 Rodden (2003). 
13 There is no reason to expect that the centre will set X>SG at the outset, as then the centre would be 
running a pointless surplus. 
14 We would expect that the optimal level of sub-central expenditure as viewed by sub-central 
politicians be higher than the equivalent central government optimal level. Empirical evidence of the 
'flypaper' effect (see Hines and Thaler (1996)) shows that increases in grants bring about equal 
increases in expenditure, suggesting that the actual level of sub-central expenditure is lower than the 
optimal level from the viewpoint of sub-central governments. While the existence of 'targets' and 
guidelines suggests that central government preferences for particular expenditures may be lower than 
the centre would like, for the most part, we would expect that sub-central preferences for total 
expenditure will be higher. 
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X=SG>SE=SE 
A 
X - SE = S Sllrplus 
(5.12a) 
when, SE <SE 
Under a system of grant financed sub-central expenditure the general 
government budget constraint 5.6 can be re-written as 
Gbal =6+lP(y)+X -a-fJ(y)-SG (5.6a) 
If SE ~ SE , given 5.12, the budget constraint in equilibrium is identical to 
that under full decentralisation - i.e.: 
X=SG=SE (5.12) 
Hence, 
Gbal = :5 + lP(y) - a - fJ(y) + [X - SE] 
Gbal = :5 + lP(y) - a - fJ(y) + [X - SG] (5.11 ) 
Gbal = :5 + lP(y) - a - fJ(y) 
While if SE < SE , given 5.12a: 
A 
X=SG>SE=SE 
x - SE = S surplus 
(5.12a) 
the general government budget constraint becomes -
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Gbal = 5 + lP(y) - a - fJ(y) + [X - sft] (5.13) 
Following a shock to output as before, both the central and general 
government fiscal balances move into deficit: 
-
Gbal = S +lP(Y) + x - a - fJ(y) -SE < 0 (5.6b) 
As above, in order to balance the budget a consolidation is necessary. Clearly, 
one option open to the centre is to adjust their own non-cyclical expenditure (a) and 
revenue (8). However, in contrast to the full autonomy case discussed above, there is 
now an important additional instrument the centre can exploit. Following the shock, 
the centre can drive a wedge between the amount of money raised in the revenue pool 
assigned for sub-central grant transfers (X) and the actual level of grant (SG) they 
transfer. That is, X"* SG. By cutting the level of grant SG (while holding X 
constant), the central government can in effect generate a fiscal 'surplus' at the sub-
central level which can be used to compensate for the deficit at the central level. 
To illustrate this point, consider the case where sft ~ SE - i.e. the respective 
optimal sub-central expenditure levels are higher for sub-central as oppose to central 
administrations. As discussed above, this corresponds to X = SG = SE . 
Consequently, any reduction in SG (below X) will bring about a corresponding fall in 
SE (as the starting point SE is below the sub-central's optimal level of expenditure 
sft and hence any expenditure smaller than that allowed for by the grant, will be sub-
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optimal given the assumption of single-peaked preferences). By reducing SG to SGnew 
and hence SE to SEnew, the central government can retain the difference X_SGnew as a 
contribution to the consolidation attempt. Thus in effect, the central government can 
generate a cut in national expenditure for the same level of national revenue with the 
cut in expenditure being purely limited to the sub-central tier. In an extreme case the 
government could set X_SGnew to be sufficient to eliminate the general government 
deficit generated by the output shock - i.e. 
Gbal = 5 + qJ(Y) - a - fJ(y) + [X - SGnew ] = 0 (S.6b) 
In essence, the centre is able to 'force the hand' of the sub-centre into 
adjusting their expenditures without requiring a similar cut at the central level or a 
reduction in national revenue. Thus in line with our observations from the previous 
two chapters, during consolidation attempts the centre can exploit the reverse 
'flypaper' effect, generating cuts in sub-central expenditure for the same level of 
national revenue. 
Alternatively, by raising the amount of revenue located in the pool of 
resources for sub-central transfers (X), provided that this increase in revenue is not 
passed on to the sub-centre in the form of grants, the centre is again able to generate a 
surplus on sub-central finances 15 . That is, the centre could raise X to Xnew and keep 
SG constant, retaining the difference Xnew - SG as surplus. In an extreme case the 
15 Any increase in X that is passed on to the sub-centre in the form of grants will lead to an automatic 
rise in sub-central expenditures SE. 
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government could set Xnew - SG to be sufficient to eliminate the general government 
deficit generated by the output shock - i.e. 
-
Gbal = 5 + (jO(y) - a - f3(y) + [x new - SG] = 0 (5.6b) 
Thus under a system of expenditure decentralisation financed by grants the 
centre's effective control of aggregate national fiscal policy is identical to that under a 
system of full centralisation. By raising X they can in effect increase sub-central 
revenues for a given level of national expenditure or by cutting SG they can cut sub-
central expenditures for a given level of national revenue. 
In the unlikely case where SE < SE (5.12a), cutting the grant will initially 
have no impact on SE as the level of grant provided by the centre exceeds the sub-
centre's 'optimal' level of expenditure and hence a surplus is already being run. In 
this case, only when the cut in grants is sufficiently large so that SG < SE (i.e. the 
case outlined above in 5.12), will sub-central expenditures start to fall. However, 
given that a surplus exists in the first place there is no logic in adopting such a 
strategy. The centre could of course increase the sub-central surplus in this scenario 
by raising the amount of revenue located in the pool of resources for sub-central 
transfers (X). 
Note that when sub-central expenditures are financed by block grants, it is 
only the level of expenditure that can be controlled by the centre. The sub-centre will 
be able to alter the composition of this expenditure as they wish. However, if the 
grants are instead specific grants then the centre is able to control both the total size of 
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expenditure and the composition. As discussed in Chapter 1, in many instances, grants 
are tied to specific elements of sub-central expenditure such as education, health etc. 
By altering specific grants the centre can have direct control over particular elements 
of expenditure that they wish to target. This can be especially useful when profligacy 
in particular elements of sub-central fiscal policy, has been the primary cause of a 
deteriorating fiscal position. In addition, as we observed in Chapters 3 and 4, sub-
central governments appear to have a bias toward cutting capital expenditures during 
periods of consolidation or central government tightening of resources and this can be 
prevented under a system of specific grants. Thus, under a system of grants, with 
many of these being specific, the centre is ideally placed not only to control the level 
of sub-central expenditure, but also the actual composition of any adjustment. 
In summary, when sub-central expenditures are financed by grants, the level 
of central government effective control of national fiscal balances is similar to that 
under full centralisation. The centre is able to adjust not only their 'own' expenditures 
and revenues but also those of the sub-centre via manipulation of the grant system. In 
general, one can expect that cutting grants can lead to corresponding decreases in 
expenditure for a given level of national revenue. Alternatively, increasing revenue, 
provided such additional resources are not passed onto the sub-centre in the form of 
higher grant allocations (i.e. increase X but not SG), can generate an increase in 
general government revenue for a constant level of national expenditure. Thus, a 
central government wishing to undertake a consolidation attempt is not limited to their 
'own' expenditures and revenues; they can in fact control sub-central expenditures 
and revenues even without the sub-centres' voluntary consent. 
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We contrast this situation of a high level of effective central control with that 
observed under a system of central and sub-central tax sharing. 
5.6. Tax sharing 
As in the case of grants, we assume that the sub-centre receives its entire 
resource allocation from tax sharing revenues (i.e. they have no autonomous revenue 
raising power). Thus, SR = STshare. Further, in line with the majority of tax sharing 
arrangements (for example, Germany and Austria) the centre and the sub-centre are 
assumed to raise these 'shared' revenues from a common pool of resources with the 
shares assigned to each tier of government pre-determined I 6. Thus for example, a 
50:50 split requires that 50% of all revenues raised from shared tax source be 
allocated to the sub-centre with the centre retaining the remaining 50%. 
Further, for simplicity we assume that the tax sharing arrangement is such that 
the common pool of resources is a non-cyclical revenue pool with the tax share 
division 1:0 in favour of the sub-centre l7. In other words, all tax revenues received 
from this pool of resources are assigned to the sub-centre. Therefore, X (the pool of 
resources used to finance sub-central expenditure) equals S T share. 
Like most tax sharing arrangements, we assume that the centre unilaterally 
controls the size of the pool of resources that the sub-centre receives via the tax 
16 Stegarescu (2004) in a study of sub-central tax arrangements in 23 OEeD countries concludes that 
tax-shares are "in general fixed by laws or constitution". 
17 More complicated allocations (i.e. 50:50 or 75:25 etc) are possible and they do not alter our 
conclusions. 
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sharing arrangement. Therefore, the centre determines both the tax base and tax rate 
and hence ultimately the total revenue raised. The sub-centre is assumed to have no 
authority over the raising and collection of these revenues. Given this, it is quite clear 
why it is justifiable to view such revenues as purely a central to sub-central transfer of 
fiscal resources. 
For instance, given the centre's pre-determined preferences for SE, SE, the 
centre can determine the appropriate tax base and rate that will give: 
ST:hare = SE (5.14) 
provided, SE ~ SE . 
If the centre's 'optimal' level of SE (SE) is less than or equal to the optimal 
level of SE as viewed by the sub-centre (SE), actual sub-central expenditure will 
equal SE . That is, the pool of resources assigned to the sub-centre equals the amount 
spent by the sub-centre ST:hare = SE . Therefore, as under a system of grants (and full 
centralisation) the centre is able to determine the exact level of sub-central 
expenditure even if this falls short of what the sub-centre would ideally like. 
Moreover, by cutting STshare the centre can (just like under a system of grants) 'force 
the hand' of the sub-centre into cutting expenditure (SE). Clearly, in the alternative 
scenario where the centre's optimal level of SE (SE) exceeded the sub-centre's 
optimal level (SE) sub-central politicians would set SE = SE generating a surplus 
equal to the difference STshare - SE: 
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ST,hare > SE = sft 
ST,hare - sft = Ssurplus 
(S.14a) 
Therefore, at a first glance, tax sharing and grants appear to be very similar. 
However, in the context of a national fiscal consolidation attempt there are important 
differences between grants and tax sharing arrangements which we outline below. 
Under a system of tax sharing the general government budget constraint S.6 
can be re-written as 
Gbal = 5 + 9(Y) + ST,hare - a - fJ(y) - SE (S.6c) 
If sft '? sf , given S .14 the budget constraint is identical to that under full 
decentralisation - i.e.: 
ST,hare = SE (S.14) 
Hence, 
Gbal = 5 + 9(Y) - a - fJ(y) (S.ll) 
While if sft < sf ,given S.14a: 
ST,hare > SE = SE (S.12a) 
ST,hare - SE = Ssurplus 
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the general government budget constraint becomes -
Gbal = "5 + lfJ(y) - a - f3(y) + [S~hare - SE] (5.l5) 
As above, following a shock to output both the central and general 
government fiscal balances (5.6a) move into deficit: 
Gbal ="5 + lfJ(Y) + S~hare - a - f3(y) - SE < 0 (5.6d) 
As in the previous examples, one option open to the centre is to adjust their 
'own' non-cyclical expenditure (a) and revenue (8). However, unlike the situation of 
grants (or indeed full centralisation) these are likely to be the only policy options 
available. 
Under a system of tax sharing with pre-determined shares, provided that 
A _ 
SE ;::: SE (the most realistic case), the centre is unable to alter their fiscal 
instruments/elements of sub-central control in such a manner so as to generate a sub-
central fiscal surplus. While the centre can 'force the hand' of the sub-centre to 
determine the actual level of expenditure they cannot force the creation of a fiscal 
surplus. 
To illustrate this, when SE;::: SE this corresponds to S~hare = SE (so 
SE > S~hare) and the general government balance can be re-written as: 
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Gbal =b+qJ(y)+ST.,hare-a-jJ(y)-SE <0 (S.16a) 
Suppose the centre tried to increase the pool of resources from which STshare is 
drawn from (i.e. increase X to Xnew), keeping the STshare constant and hence retaining 
the additional revenue for itself (i.e. Xnew -STshare); in effect, attempting to drive a 
wedge between the pool of resources for sub-central transfers (X) and the amount 
actually redistributed (STshare) just like in the case of grants discussed above. Such 
action is however, not possible. In doing so the central government would violate the 
tax sharing agreement, which requires that the share of revenues from the common 
pool distributed between the central and sub-central tiers remain fixed. While the 
centre has full authority to alter the size and composition of the common pool of 
resources used in the tax sharing arrangement, it cannot alter the shares assigned to 
each tier. In our case the tax share was assumed to be set at 1:0 in favour of the sub-
centre (so X = STshare at all times). If the centre retained an amount of this additional 
revenue, their share of the shared tax would be non-zero 18• 
If sF; > ST.,hare' any attempt to raise revenues by increasing STshare will fail to 
improve the general government balance (Gba1). The increase in STshare would be 
matched by a compensating increase in SE as sub-central politicians more closely 
align actual expenditure with their own desired expenditure sF; 19. Thus, any sub-
central fiscal surplus generated from increased revenues would be cancelled out by 
18 A tax sharing arrangement where the centre is able to unilaterally alter the tax shares, as is in 
Norway, is however, more reconcilable with grant finance. 
19 This implication is discussed in a different context in De Mello (2000). He points out that "in the 
case of revenue sharing arrangements, every time a central government raises taxes to improve its own 
fiscal position, subnational governments receive a corresponding revenue benefit which they are free to 
spend." 
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the increased expenditures. In effect, if SE > ST,hare then up to the point where 
ST.,hare = SE the general government budget balance (5.14a) following the output 
shock can be re-written as: 
Gbal = "5 + <p(y) - 7i - j3(y) < 0 (5.11) 
Therefore, the fiscal instruments available to the central government are 
limited to their 'own' autonomous expenditure (ex) and revenue (8). Note that this is 
identical to the situation under full decentralisation. Ultimately, if ST,hare = sF; then 
any increase in STshare would improve Gba1 as the additional revenues would no longer 
be spent on higher expenditures as optimality has been reached. As mentioned above 
however, if sF; exceeds ST,hare = SE by a substantial amount (which is quite possibly 
the case), this option may be unrealistic. 
An alternative strategy for the centre, instead of increasing revenue, is to 
'force the hand' of the sub-centre to cut their expenditures. Applying the same 
reasoning as in the case of grants, the centre can cut STshare. While this will bring 
about a corresponding fall in SE (as the starting point SE is below the sub-central's 
optimal level of expenditure Si), it in tum implies a cut in national revenue given the 
pre-determined fixed tax shares (i.e. X = STshare). Therefore, both X and STshare must 
fall. The two effects (cut in expenditure and cut in revenue) cancel each other, leading 
to no improvement in the general government deficit (Gbal). Therefore, under a system 
of tax sharing with pre-determined or fixed tax shares, the centre cannot instigate a 
cut in sub-central expenditures for a given level of national revenue. 
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As an important aside, it is possible that central governments may be 
unwilling to cut revenues from tax sharing arrangements in any instance. It is possible 
that the revenues received by sub-central governments from tax sharing will be 
viewed differently by both governments than revenues received from grants. From the 
fiscal illusion literature2o, it is possible to argue that individuals view 
intergovernmental transfers and 'own-source' revenues through different lenses. 
Under tax sharing it is highly plausible that the revenue raised from tax sharing is 
interpreted as having been 'earned' by a particular region/government and not a fiscal 
handout from the centre. Grants on the other hand, create the appearance of funding 
by non-residents. This is especially likely to be the case ifthe shared tax-base relates 
to income or corporation profits; two of the most commonly shared taxes. In fact, the 
view that shared tax revenues are 'earned' raised is one of the main arguments in 
favour of tax sharing as opposed to grants. Under tax sharing while the sub-centre has 
no responsibility over the setting of the actual tax base or tax rate, they can control the 
size of the tax base within their own jurisdiction. Policies and innovations which 
improve the tax base within their region (for example policies which encourage 
inward migration, innovation, business start-ups etc) can boost the revenues they 
receive. On the other hand, policies which harm the tax base only serve to reduce 
revenues. Each sub-central jurisdiction has therefore, the incentive under tax sharing 
systems to aim to be as successful as possible, increasing their 'earnings' from the 
shared taxes. In our case above, while the sub-centre cannot control the tax rate or 
what the actual tax base is, they can boost revenues by increasing the size of the tax 
base that the revenues are drawn from. An effective tax sharing system therefore, 
20 The Fiscal Illusion literature argues that certain 'types' of fiscal policy may be viewed differently 
from each other by the private sector even ifthey have the same effect on the economy. For a 
discussion and theoretical application to intergovernmental grants see Oates (1979). 
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should not be viewed in the same light as grants. Thus, to the extent that revenues 
from tax sharing are believed to have been 'earned' by a particular sub-central 
government, the degree of practical central control may be less than that under grants. 
As altering these revenues has the potential to be politically more sensitive and 
problematic than cutting gra~t levels. 
Being seen to be taking resources from a particular region as to opposed to 
reducing resources given to a particular region is likely to be far more politically 
difficult. In this sense, even during consolidation attempts, the centre may be less able 
in practice to alter tax sharing revenues as opposed to grants. This is likely to be 
especially relevant if the tax being shared is one where the base of the tax is 
influenced heavily by sub-central policies. For example, in Norway the central and 
sub-central tiers of government, share revenues from income tax. One of the main 
motivations behind this policy is to encourage sub-central governments to try to 
increase their tax base by implementing 'good government', in order to gain from 
high revenues in the future21 . While the Norwegian central government is able to 
unilaterally alter the tax shares allocated to each tier, they may be unwilling to do so 
for fear of eroding these performance incentives for sub-central tiers. 
If SE < SF (i.e. optimal sub-central expenditures were less than the centre 
would like) any increase in STshare to STsharenew could lead to an automatic 
improvement in Gbal. In this situation, the increase in revenue would fail to generate 
an increase in sub-central expenditure as it is already at optimum. The difference 
between the new higher STsharenew and SE could be retained as surplus (i.e. STsharenew 
21 See IMF (1997). 
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- SE). In an extreme case the government could set STsharenew - SE to be sufficient to 
eliminate the general government deficit generated by the output shock - i.e. 
Gbat = 5 + rp(y) - a - f3(y) + [ST,harenew - SE] = 0 (S.6c) 
However, it is still the case that the centre is unable to bring about a cut in sub-
central expenditures without altering STshare. In this case, a cut in SE will only occur 
when STshare falls by a sufficiently large amount such as to generate ST,hare < SE . Once 
again, with fixed tax shares, any attempt by the centre to cut sub-central expenditure 
requires a corresponding fall in national revenue. 
It is therefore, clear that tax sharing and grant based sub-central financing 
systems imply very different degrees of effective central government control over 
sub-central fiscal policy in the context of a fiscal consolidation attempt. Only in the 
special and probably unrealistic case of optimal expenditure from the perspective of 
sub-central politicians being less than that which the central government would like, 
can the centre use sub-central balances to assist in any consolidation attempt under a 
system of tax sharing. Even then, any adjustment is limited to increases in sub-central 
revenue, changes in sub-central expenditure cannot be induced by the centre's actions. 
This inability of the centre to generate a sub-central fiscal surplus is more akin to the 
situation under a system of full decentralisation. Moreover, revenues from tax sharing 
are typically block transfers and are not tied to specific elements of expenditure. 
Therefore, unlike under a system of specific grants where the centre is able to control 
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both the level of expenditure and the composition, under tax sharing, they are unable 
to control either. 
The tax sharing structure that we have outlined in the above is such that the 
sub-centre has no control to alter the tax rate or the tax base. In many countries 
however, the sub-centre is able to set (within limits) an autonomous tax rate on a tax 
base which they share with the centre. This is the system of income tax sharing 
common in Scandinavian countries. In practice as discussed in Chapter 1, nearly all 
sub-central governments set their tax rates at the 'ceiling' level. In such a situation, 
the analysis discussed above still holds. In order to increase sub-central taxation 
revenues the centre must lift the 'ceiling' level so that the sub-centre can set a higher 
tax rate, however increased revenues are likely to be passed on to increased 
expenditures. If the centre wished to cut sub-central expenditures, a lowering of the 
'ceiling' is possible but this would also result in declining national revenues. 
Therefore, under this system of tax sharing, an analogous result is obtained; the level 
of effective central control is relatively limited. 
In summary, via some simple budgetary accounting we have shown that, while 
both grants and tax sharing result in a degree of central control over sub-central 
expenditure and revenue, there is an important difference between the two in the 
context of a national consolidation attempt. Under a system of grant finance the centre 
is able to 'force the hand' of the sub-centre to cut their expenditure for a given level of 
national revenue. In contrast, this is not possible in a tax sharing system. Provided that 
sub-central politicians have a preference for expenditures that exceed the level of 
resources the centre is willing to transfer (i.e. ST"hare < SF.), any attempt to lower sub-
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central expenditure requires a reduction in national revenue. Thus, while a system of 
grants can be closely aligned to a system of full centralisation, a tax sharing 
arrangement substantially reduces the de facto power of the central government to 
consolidate national fiscal policy. 
5.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter we have demonstrated VIa simple budgetary accounting 
analysis important differences in the level of effective central government control 
under alternative sub-central financing regimes. 
An important element of the recent fiscal decentralisation literature has been 
to criticise previous empirical studies for failing to accurately measure the level of 
central control over sub-central finances, by attributing all sub-central taxation 
revenues as being 'own-source'. It has been argued that the failure to take into 
account the existence of tax sharing arrangements can result in a serious 
underestimation of the level of effective central government control. 
We have shown in this chapter however, that there are important differences 
between tax sharing systems and grants in terms of the level of effective central 
government control in the context of a consolidation attempt. While under a grant 
based system, the central government retains the same degree of effective control as 
under full centralisation, this is not the case under a tax sharing system. Under the 
most common form of tax sharing system, where the shares of the total tax pool each 
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government receIves are either pre-determined, or where alteration reqUIres the 
mutual consent of both tiers, the level of effective central control is in fact much more 
limited. Furthermore, given the different incentive effects inherent in tax sharing and 
grant regimes, coupled with the use of specific grants, it is our opinion that the 
relative control by the centre during consolidation attempts is further enhanced under 
a system of grants relative to a system of tax sharing. 
In summary, we consider that it is inappropriate to view grants and tax sharing 
as identical methods of transferring resources from the centre to the sub-centre since 
the degree of effective central control over these transfers differs substantially. This 
conclusion has important policy implications for countries debating whether to switch 
from a system of grant finance to one of tax sharing or vice versa. 
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Chapter 6 
"The Impact of Decentralisation on National Consolidation Attempts l " 
6.1 Introduction 
In previous chapters we have analysed the important but previously ignored 
role of sub-central tiers of government during consolidation attempts and we have 
shown that they are a key element in successful attempts. Interesting related questions 
concern the ways and extent to which decentralisation within a country impacts on 
consolidation attempts. The increased drive toward greater decentralisation across 
many countries has led a number of economists to ponder whether or not there are any 
side effects for the macro economy. Tanzi (2001) and Prud'homme (1995) both 
hypothesise that increased levels of decentralisation, by limiting both the economic 
and political authority of the central government, can lead to greater macroeconomic 
instabilitl. They argue that divisions between tiers of government will serve to 
reduce the instruments available to the centre to protect the economy from unforeseen 
shocks. In the context of a consolidation attempt, their argument would suggest that, 
by weakening the fiscal tools of the centre, decentralisation could reduce the 
1 We are grateful to participants at the Regional Science Association British and Irish Section 2004 
Conference for comments and discussion on an earlier draft of this Chapter. We would also like to 
thank the course instructors at the European Science Foundation Workshop on Limited Dependent 
Variable analysis, Professors J. Hagenaars and A. McCutcheon, for guidance on estimation techniques. 
2 For example, Tanzi (2001) argues that "with a decentralised fiscal structure, it becomes more difficult 
to co-ordinate the fiscal actions of national and sub-national jurisdictions to achieve the 
macroeconomic objectives of a counter-cyclical policy". 
276 
likelihood of successful consolidation. As yet, to our knowledge, there have been no 
empirical studies to test whether this is true. We aim to shed light on this question in 
this chapter. 
The potential avenues through which decentralisation can impact on the 
consolidation process stem primarily from the political economy literature. Political 
economy approaches to fiscal policy conduct have become an important area of 
research in recent years3. In the context of the performance of fiscal policy, this has 
involved studying the influence of different forms of government, electoral laws, 
political polarisation and budgetary procedures on fiscal outcomes. At the same time, 
it is highly probable that the course of politics can be affected by economic events, 
with the electoral fortunes of many incumbent governments being determined by their 
economic and fiscal policy record. 
One area of this literature which is largely underdeveloped but has received 
more recent attention, is the impact of decentralisation on fiscal outcomes. For the 
most part, the federalism literature has been normative in nature, discussing topics 
such as the optimal size of sub-central jurisdictions, the most appropriate form of 
local taxation and so forth4. However more recently, there has been more limited 
research from a 'positive' viewpoint. One branch of this literature has been to 
examine the relationship between decentralisation and size of government - again see 
Chapter 1. The Leviathan hypothesis, postulated by Brennen and Buchannan (1980) 
argues that decentralisation can yield positive benefits to society by curtailing the 
3 In fact, the general exploration of the boundaries between politics and economics pertinent to 
macroeconomic policy, is one of the most studied areas of modem macroeconomics. For a textbook 
analysis of these issues see Persson and Tabelleni (2000). 
4 See Chapter 1 and the references therein. 
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rent-seeking tendencies of central governments, however, as already discussed, 
empirical support for this hypothesis is mixed. 
Apart from these limited studies of government size, there has been little 
analysis of the potential political economy aspects of decentralisation on fiscal 
outcomes. In this chapter we therefore discuss the potential impact that 
decentralisation may have on the consolidation process. While it is possible that 
successful consolidations may be considered easier to implement in a decentralised 
environment, the balance of political economy literature would suggest that by 
fragmenting fiscal policy decision making across tiers of government, successful 
consolidation is more difficult to achieve under decentralisation. The question we aim 
to empirically test is whether such issues have any practical relevance. 
The outline of the remainder of this chapter is as follows. In Section 6.2 we 
present a brief review of the political economy approach to fiscal policy and examine 
the extent to which similar issues and concepts from this literature are relevant to our 
discussion of fiscal decentralisation and consolidation. One key argument that we 
observe from the political economy literature is that fragmentation in the budgetary 
process can lead to delayed, smaller and ultimately more temporary consolidation 
attempts than otherwise would have been the case. Additionally, and arguably more 
importantly, it can lead to a bias toward reliance upon revenue as oppose to 
expenditure adjustments. In Section 6.3 we test directly whether decentralisation, 
having conditioned upon various economic and political variables, is a significant 
determinant of both the composition and size of our identified consolidation attempts. 
From this, in Section 6.4 we are able to apply limited dependent variable analysis to 
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assess directly whether decentralisation increases or reduces the likelihood of a 
successful consolidation being implemented. We make use of the alternative measures 
of success outlined in Chapter 2 to differentiate between consolidation outcomes, 
applying both binary and ordered limited dependent methods to the respective 
classifications. 
Our analysis extends the current literature in two directions. Firstly, there have 
been few studies examining the impact of both political and 'economic' factors on the 
likelihood of successful consolidation. The majority of the literature to date has 
tended to focus upon one particular aspect (i.e. political or economic factors). For 
example, Von Hagen et al. (2001) compare and contrast the macroeconomic 
conditions associated with successful and unsuccessful consolidations while Alesina 
et al. (1998) examine the ability of alternative central government types to implement 
successful consolidations with little consideration of the macroeconomic environment. 
Secondly, our main contribution is to examine the implications of decentralisation on 
consolidation attempts controlling for 'other' political factors. As mentioned above, 
prior studies of fiscal consolidation implicitly assume that national fiscal policy is 
conducted at a single level of government and the potential for politics to playa role 
in budgetary formation occurs only within this tier. As we have demonstrated 
throughout earlier chapters of this thesis, sub-central governments play an important 
and active role in national fiscal policy and hence consideration of the potential 
implications of decentralisation is warranted. 
Our key empirical results can be summarised as follows. The analysis 
conducted in this chapter suggests that there is some evidence that decentralisation 
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has an impact on the nature of consolidation attempts. We find limited evidence to 
suggest that consolidation attempts implemented in countries with higher levels of 
decentralisation tend to rely heavily upon revenue increases as oppose to expenditure 
cuts. However, our analysis also reveals that inference on the relationship between 
decentralisation and success depends upon the methodological approach adopted, and 
for the most part we do not observe a significant relationship. The analysis in this 
chapter is very much a first pass at this issue and there are no similar attempts that we 
are aware of in the current literature. The key to obtaining improved inference will 
probably lie in developing better measures of politic all institutional indicators. 
While we have constructed as accurate a measure as currently feasible of the 
extent of decentralisation within our sample countries we recognise the need for 
further research in this area. Therefore, in the penultimate section of this chapter we 
summarise some aspects of fiscal and political decentralisation and the potential for 
fragmentation between tiers of government, which our approximations do not fully 
capture. We briefly discuss some potential avenues of improvement for future 
research in this area. This is part of an agenda for future work in post-doctoral studies. 
6.2 The Political Economy of Consolidations5 
One of the most actively discussed questions in modem fiscal policy thought 
relates to the apparent observation of a 'deficit. This can be demonstrated by the fact 
5 For a survey ofthe political economy literature on fiscal policy consolidations see Perotti (1998). 
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that the average public debt ratio in the OECD has increased steadily over the last 
couple of decades - see Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1: OECD Average Debt to GDP Ratio 1970 - 2002 
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The pattern of fiscal policy conduct and the levels of debt between countries 
has however, been far from homogenous with cross-country differences becoming as 
intellectually challenging to economists as the overall rise in debtlGDP ratios. 
Countries such as Germany and the UK have maintained relatively manageable debt 
levels, while others like Italy and Belgium, have suffered chronic deficits and/or high 
debt levels. Additionally, countries such as Ireland with historically high levels of 
debt, have recently managed to achieve significant reductions. The opposite is 
currently the case for Japan. 
Attempting to explain these stylised facts in purely economic terms is both 
theoretically and empirically unsatisfactory. Country specific 'shocks' or prolonged 
influences of common 'shocks' are undoubtedly contributory factors however, it is 
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unlikely that they alone are sufficient to explain either the widespread debt 
accumulation or cross-country differences. In addition, recent fiscal performance in the 
OECD questions the relevance of the traditional approach to debt policy; the 
equilibrium (or tax-smoothing) theory of the budget6. 
More recent research has focussed on 'politico-institutional' factors by 
emphasising the interaction between economics and politics. The major strand 
running through this literature is that where there is some degree of fragmentation, 
either within the government or parliament, the greater the likelihood of weaker fiscal 
positions. Roubini and Sachs (1989) undertook the first formal examination of the 
relationship between politics and fiscal outcomes. They ran standard OLS regressions 
of the growth rate of debt to GDP on various economic and political controls. Their 
most important result was the observation that coalition and minority governments in 
the OECD where associated with higher public debt growth rates than their single 
party counterparts. Similar results can be found elsewhere. For example, Grilli et al. 
(1991) obtain an analogous result however, instead of discriminating between 'types' 
of government, they group countries according to whether they are deemed to be 
Representative, Majoratarian or Presidential democracies; Alesina et al. (1996) find a 
similar relationship between coalition governments and fiscal performance for Latin 
America; and Persson and Tabellini (2001) and Carmingani (2001) have found similar 
6 In this model, a benevolent fiscal authority uses budget deficits/surpluses to act as a buffer to 'smooth' 
the optimal tax rate, minimising the distortions associated with non lump-sum taxation. Consequently, 
the budgetary position of a country should move in and out of both surplus and deficit. 
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conclusions using more complex panel data methods 7. 
It is also possible that partisan differences (i.e. left wing versus right wing 
parties) may also have an effect on fiscal outcomes. For example, Hibbs (1977) 
hypothesised that parties of the left are more concerned about unemployment than 
inflation than right wing parties and hence their monetary and fiscal policy strategies 
may be influenced by this. To test the significance of such effects, a number of 
studies including those that have examined the impact of coalition government on 
fiscal performance, have also tested the significance of political ideology. In the main, 
these studies have found no strong evidence of any relationship between political 
ideology and fiscal deficits. There is however, evidence that political ideology does 
determine government size, with left wing governments being associated with larger 
expenditure and revenue increases when in power than their right wing counterparts 
(see for example, Roubini and Sachs (1989), De Haan and Sturm (1997) and Alesina 
and Perotti (1995)). 
In addition to political factors, there is a related less developed literature which 
emphasise the role of budgetary procedures. These are defined by Alesina and Perotti 
(1996) as the "rules, regulations and institutions determining how budgets are 
prepared, approved and implemented". A number of studies, including V on Hagen 
(1992), Von Hagen and Harden (1994) and Stein et al. (1998) have found that 
countries which have more collegial institutions at the central level (e.g. weak Finance 
7 This relationship has however, been disputed by Edin and Ohlsson (1991) who use the same data and 
estimation technique as Roubini and Sachs (1989) but re-classify government 'type' in certain 
observations in a manner which they believe to be more appropriate. In general however, it is widely 
accepted that fiscal performance in countries which typically return multi-party governments has been 
relatively weaker than in other countries. For a survey of this literature see Aleisna and Perotti (1994). 
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Ministers, longer legislative scrutiny of budgetary proposals etc) tend to have weaker 
fiscal positions8. 
Overall, the political economy literature offers the potential for explaining 
cross-country fiscal performance given that countries differ quite substantially in their 
electoral systems, party structures and political polarisation. What is more problematic 
however, is explaining why these factors have resulted in the patterns of fiscal policy 
observed in the last twenty years and not before. 
One branch which can explain differences in recent fiscal performance is the 
political economy consolidation literature. This approach concentrates not on whether 
governments intentionally add to the debt, but on the relative abilities of different 
institutional frameworks to stabilise and ultimately eliminate the debt once it is in 
existence. This hypothesis stresses the significance of the 'debt trap' in that failure to 
address increasing debt levels in a swift and decisive manner may lead to weak long 
term fiscal positions as future primary surpluses may be insufficient to neutralise 
interest payments on outstanding debt (i.e. to service the debt). Roubini and Sachs 
(1989) hypothesise that the apparent deficit bias throughout the OECD, together with 
the heterogeneity in debt levels results from the first major oil shock in 1973, which 
forced all OECD countries into high debt, and that certain countries undertook 
substantial adjustments more swiftly than others. 
8 In this thesis, in line with Mulas-Granados (2002), Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alesina et at. (1998) 
and Alesina and Ardagna (1998) we have chosen to focus only on political factors in our analysis of 
consolidation attempts. The issue of budgetary institutions is important but it generates a number of 
additional complications as knowledge is required of institutional arrangements at both tiers and is best 
left for future research. 
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In essence, the literature argues that fragmentation within the budgetary 
process can impinge on both the timing and the nature of a consolidation attempt - see 
Perotti (1998) for a survey. 
For example, Alesina and Drazen (1991) demonstrate that budgetary 
negotiations undertaken by coalition governments can resemble a 'war of attrition', 
with each party in the coalition willing to postpone consolidation in an effort to shift 
the burden of adjustment onto the other party. Ultimately, adjustment will take place 
when the cost of delaying another round of negotiations exceeds the cost of conceding 
and bearing the brunt of adjustment. This creates a greater delay than would have 
been the case in a unified coalition or single party government. 
From an empirical point of view, there has been strong evidence to suggest 
that political factors do matter. Perhaps the most famous studies are those of Alesina, 
Perotti and a number of co-authors. In Alesina and Perotti (1995 and 1997), Alesina et 
al. (1998) etc, the relative abilities of different types of government to undertake 
successful fiscal consolidation attempts are assessed. They find that while coalition 
governments have just as high a probability as single party governments of attempting 
a consolidation, more often than not they fail to be successfu19. 
It is argued that the primary reason for this distinction in success rates, is that 
III coalition governments the composition of their consolidations appear skewed 
toward revenue increases rather than expenditure cuts (see for example, Alesina et al. 
9 Poterba (1994) obtains somewhat similar results when analysing US states. He finds that states in 
which one party controls both the upper and lower houses in the legislature are more likely to respond 
quickly to unexpected/large deficits than their divided-government counterparts. 
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(1998), Grilli et af. (1991), Knotopoulos and Perotti (1999) and Hallerberg and Von 
Hagen (1997) and Mulas-Granados (2002)). As demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4, 
consolidation attempts of this type are likely to be unsuccessful and coalition 
governments appear less able to implement the cuts to social transfers, wages and 
current expenditures in general that are critical to success. Our analysis in Chapter 4 
adds an additional element to this conclusion. We observe that during consolidation 
attempts coalition governments did not tend to cut sub-central grant allocations as 
much as their single party counterparts. 
A possible reason for this bias in composition is thought to be the following. 
The political costs of cutting government wages and employment, social transfers etc 
are likely to be quite high, and not just at the ballot box, because such policies go 
against the interests of entrenched bureaucracies. Therefore, strong, non-fragmented 
governments are required in order to deal with the potential political ramifications of 
any unpopular decisions. It is believed therefore, that coalition governments are 
ceteris paribus less able to make such cuts than single party governments (see Alesina 
et af. (1998)). Furthermore, in line with the Alesina and Drazen (1991) 'war of 
attrition' model, coalition governments may succumb to inter-coalition conflicts 
concerning the distributional consequences of any adjustment. To the extent that 
expenditures tend to favour particular groups in society more than general taxation, 
one should expect consolidation attempts that are implemented by coalition 
governments to have a bias against expenditure cuts. It is thought that such divisions 
become more relevant, and more problematic, as the number of players in the 
budgetary process increases, see for example Spolaore (2004). In addition, as 
demonstrated in Budge et af. (2000), coalition governments have shorter average 
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tenures than single party governments. The average duration of single party 
governments is 836 days, while for coalition governments the average duration is 537. 
Coalition governments therefore have less incentive to undertake fiscal reforms that 
generate long term improvements if such improvements will accrue outside their 
period of office. In fact, Grilli et al. (1991) demonstrate that budget deficits are 
themselves positively correlated with government durability 
At the same time, Alesina and Perotti (1995) and Alesina et al. (1998) have 
found that left wing parties in OECD countries are more likely to implement a 
successful consolidation than either centrist or right wing parties. In fact, they find 
that centrist governments (in terms of ideology) seem incapable of undertaking 
successful consolidations. Mulas-Granados (2002) undertakes a more recent 
examination of the impact of ideology on consolidation in OECD countries but on this 
occasion focusing on composition rather than success. This study is an improvement 
on previous studies in that economic controls such as the output gap and monetary 
policy stance are also taken into account. He finds that left wing governments are 
more likely to base their consolidation attempts on revenue adjustment as oppose to 
expenditure adjustment. It is argued that this is consistent with the hypothesis that left 
wing governments favour larger sized governments than their right wing counterparts. 
Note however, revenue adjustments are less likely to be successful so there is an 
apparent inconsistency between this result and that of Alesina and Perotti (1995) and 
Alesina et al. (1998) discussed above lO. 
10 This apparent inconsistency is also evident in the results discussed below. 
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While this has been a rich area of theoretical and empirical analysis, existing 
studies have ignored the potentially significant impact of decentralisation. In our 
opinion, this is a significant weakness in that an important institutional element of 
national fiscal policy conduct is ignored. It seems to be the case that decentralisation 
itself can via political economy explanations have an impact on the consolidation 
process. 
Firstly, it is possible that decentralisation may assist consolidation. One 
commonly cited argument in favour of decentralisation, is that it will limit the rent-
seeking power of central governments. It follows that a Leviathan central government 
may be less willing to undertake necessary but difficult reforms than a central 
government whose power is actively constrained by sub-central unitsll. In addition, 
through encouraging greater participation in the political process, decentralisation 
may improve policy making in general. Undertaking difficult reforms may be easier 
given better-informed general public debate and understanding. 
On the other hand, it is clear that decentralisation has the potential to hinder 
the consolidation process since it creates an additional source of political 
fragmentation in the budgetary process. In a decentralised system there is the potential 
for division between tiers of government (i.e. the centre versus the sub-centre) and 
between individual governments (i.e. central versus individual sub-central 
governments or between individual sub-central governments) 12. As argued by 
II It is also possible that by limiting the size of the government in the first instance, decentralisation 
itself leads to fewer required consolidations. 
12 Decentralisation may also yield administrative divisions, as consolidation across tiers of government 
requires active co-ordination. This may in tum reduce the transparency of the consolidation attempt -
see Tanzi (2001). 
288 
Tsebelis (1990), fiscal decentralisation increases the number of 'veto players,13 
involved in fiscal policy. Thus it is possible for example to obtain a 'war of attrition' 
between different tiers of government rather than between different parties within 
central government. 
In highly decentralised systems, the unilateral ability of the centre to stabilise 
the economy is more limited than under a fully centralised systeml4. Any national 
consolidation attempt will therefore require the active involvement of both tiers of 
government. To the extent that sub-central politicians are less likely to be concerned 
about the national fiscal position, and more about local fiscal policy outcomes and 
local politics and motivations, there is the potential for greater fragmentation in the 
policy making process. 
Two important sources of potential fragmentation between the centre and the 
sub-centre are differences in preferences and political motivation. 
A necessary consequence of delegating control of fiscal policy across tiers of 
government is that governments, with alternative preferences from one another, will 
control certain elements of national fiscal policy. We can identify three main potential 
sources of such division in the context of consolidation attempts. Firstly, central and 
sub-central politicians may not agree on the need for, or desirability of, consolidation. 
13 This veto power is especially relevant in countries that have a strong regional representation in the 
central legislature. For example, in Germany and Austria, the second chamber is composed entirely of 
representatives elected by the regional Lander. In others, such as the USA and Australia, regional 
constituents directly elect representatives to the second chamber. Such high levels of regional 
representation in central government strengthen the hand of the sub-central governments in any inter-
governmental policy dispute. Moreover, as pointed out by Rodden (2002), virtually all of the 
distinguishing characteristics of political federalism imply limits on the central government's ability to 
regulate the fiscal activities of sub-central tiers. 
14 See Chapter 5. 
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Secondly, even if both tiers recognise the need for consolidation, the actual size of 
any adjustment may be disputed. Thirdly, there may be disagreement over the 
appropriate expenditure and revenue composition of any such consolidation attempt. 
For instance, differences of opinion can arise over matters such as which is the 
relevant tier of government to bear the burden of the adjustment, or whether sub-
central expenditures should be cut by more than central expenditures. It is possible 
that sub-central governments may resist fiscal reforms instigated by the centre if they 
would prove unpopular to their constituents. For example, a key pillar of the centre's 
consolidation attempt might be to address an inflated national government wage bill. 
If a large part of the public sector pay bill is paid out by sub-central authorities, as is 
the case in many countries (see Chapter 1), then the sub-centre must agree on the 
wisdom of cutting their wage bill before undertaking similar cuts 
Differences in political motivation can arise due to the various responsibilities 
faced by each tier of government. In practice, the central government is likely to be 
held accountable by the electorate both for overall macroeconomic performance and 
for national fiscal policy!s. In contrast, sub-central politicians face different 
constraints and are likely to be primarily concerned with their own fiscal 
responsibilities. The national fiscal position is of less direct concern as, in general, 
one would expect that sub-central politicians are unlikely to suffer at the hands of the 
electorate as a result of a poor fiscal position at the general government level. 
Therefore, to the extent that sub-central politicians are 'office' motivated, they have a 
low incentive to instigate tough and sustained adjustment programs that improve the 
national fiscal position, particularly if in doing so they damage their own local 
15 In addition, international pressure with regard to a country's fiscal policy (from bodies such as 
Ecofin, the OEeD and the IMF etc.) tends to be focussed on the central tier. 
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position through a reduction in service provision and/or increased local taxation16. In 
fact, Triesman (2000) argues that in certain countries sub-central governments may 
deliberately resist any central government attempt at reform to gain electoral support 
of regional interest groups etc. The concern that conflicting political goals can lead to 
intergovernmental inconsistencies in policy has motivated a companion political 
science literature - see for example Dillinger and Webb (1999) and Garman et al. 
(2001). These authors argue that, when national party leaders have limited capacity to 
discipline sub-central tiers, it can be extremely difficult for the central government to 
implement a coherent and unified policy agenda. It follows that in such cases, political 
or budgetary reform is likely to occur less frequently, be less dramatic and/or be 
structured so as to avoid changing politically sensitive elements. 
Consequently, if a large proportion of expenditure is decentralised to sub-
central tiers (without grant finance), and fragmentation between tiers is a realistic 
concern, the centre may face binding constraints on their ability to alter national fiscal 
policy during consolidation. Consolidation attempts will be centred upon those 
elements of fiscal policy over which the centre has unilateral control. There is no 
guarantee that these are the most appropriate or desirable elements of national fiscal 
policy on which to impose cuts. For instance, if a fiscal crisis was generated by an 
increase in the government wage bill, a fiscal consolidation should address this issue 
directly. However, if the government wage bill is paid primarily by sub-central tiers, 
who may be unwilling to co-operate, the centre may be forced to compensate by 
16 Moreover, where considerable responsibilities are devolved an inherent 'free-rider' problem may 
exist with each individual sub-central unit facing the incentive to ignore the consolidation effort given 
the high positive spill-over effects of national consolidation and the small spill-over effects on the 
national fiscal position of their 'own' consolidation. As a result, from a national perspective, sub-
central politicians are likely to underestimate the benefits while at the same time overestimating the 
costs of their own contribution to any consolidation attempt. 
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cutting other elements of expenditure and/or raising revenue. Failure to address the 
source of fiscal difficulty is likely to limit the possibility of the consolidation attempt 
being successful l7 . In addition, where there are high levels of shared responsibility in 
service provision, adjustments made by one particular tier to the elements of service 
provision that they control, may generate distortions. 
Therefore, an additional source of fragmentation can emerge when one looks 
at fiscal policy across tiers of government. It is possible that such fragmentation will 
generate analogous results to that within central government, with consolidation 
attempts in highly decentralised countries shying away from cuts to key elements of 
expenditure. Instead, governments wary about generating politically damaging 
conflict between tiers may choose to focus instead on less 'sensitive' elements such as 
revenue increases and so forth. 
Further on a more practical level, even in a country with high levels of 
decentralisation a vertical imbalance is likely to remain - see Chapter 1. Thus, 
consolidation attempts instigated by central governments have the potential to be 
biased toward revenue increases, since these are the fiscal instruments over which 
they have the greatest control. Not only will they be able to reduce the grants 
(however, big or small) they allocate to the sub-central tier, they can also increase the 
revenues used to finance such transfers and choose to retain the excess. Furthermore, 
in countries where there is a large degree of sub-central fiscal autonomy, it is likely 
that the expenditures that remain under central control will typically be items which 
17 Tanzi (2001) considers such impediments to reform as a major problem with decentralisation. He 
argues that the Argentinean central government's reluctance in the 1990s to alter revenues that they 
shared with sub-central tiers led them to adjust those revenues they did unilaterally control, such as 
excise taxes. Tanzi argues that at this point in time, increasing excise duties did more harm than good. 
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are less likely to be cut during consolidation attempts, e.g. defence. Key elements 
such as the wage bill (as demonstrated in Chapter 1) tend to be assigned to sub-central 
tiers. In such a scenario, the fiscal tools available to the centre will be limited and 
again biased toward revenue adjustments. 
In summary, there are a number of potential avenues through which 
decentralisation can impact the consolidation process and ultimately its chances of 
success. In the remainder of this chapter we test whether such factors do in fact appear 
to be of empirical importance. 
6.3 Measures of Decentralisation 
In this section we outline the two main measures of decentralisation used in 
our empirical study. In the current literature, measures of decentralisation have either 
been based on the economic/fiscal autonomy or the political autonomy of sub-central 
tiers. In what follows we test the significance of both. It is likely that there will be a 
high correlation between measures of fiscal and political autonomy. Our first measure 
we call 'fiscal decentralisation', while our second we call 'sub-central political 
autonomy'. We discuss each measure in turn. 
6.3.1 Fiscal Decentralisation 
As discussed in Chapter 5, expenditure decentralisation on its own is an 
insufficient measure of fiscal decentralisation, as it is necessary to take into account 
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how these expenditures are financed. As demonstrated, sub-central expenditures 
financed by grants are in effect controlled by the central government via the grant 
system. In contrast, sub-central authorities have far greater de facto powers over 
expenditures that are not financed by grants. 
In constructing a measure of fiscal decentralisation we choose to differentiate 
sub-central expenditures according to how they are financed. To capture the degree of 
fiscal decentralisation in our sample we calculate the value of sub-central 
expenditures that are not financed by grants and express this value as a percentage of 
total general government expenditure. Note that we also take into account those tax 
sharing arrangements where the centre is able to alter the tax shares assigned to the 
sub-centre unilaterally18. 
We consider that this approach creates a relatively more accurate measure of 
actual fiscal decentralisation than simply using total sub-central expenditure (see for 
example, Oates (1985)) or sub-central revenue autonomy (see for example Stein 
(1999) and Rodden (2003)). Our approach enables us to measure the level of sub-
central expenditure which the centre cannot directly control. The measure is a time 
series calculated for each year. The following table contains the sample averages for 
this measure for each country. 
18 For a discussion of why such revenues are identical to grants see Chapter 5. To undertake this 
adjustment we use the information provided in OECD (1999) on the percentage of total sub-central 
taxation that stems from such tax sharing arrangements and adjust revenues accordingly. 
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Table 6.1: Percentage of General Government EXl!enditures Conducted at the 
Sub-Centre in Excess of those Financed by Grants 
Country % of General Government Country % of General Government 
Expenditures Expenditures 
Belgium 5.60 Austria 24.26 
Netherlands 7.65 Finland 27.17 
Norway 10.00 Australia 27.78 
Ireland 10.64 Denmark 29.39 
France 11.48 Sweden 32.26 
UK 13.79 USA 35.39 
Spain 14.69 Germany 36.42 
Canada 50.21 
6.3.2 Sub-Central Political Autonomy 
Our second measure is based on the political autonomy of sub-central units 
within a country. Using measures of the political power of the sub-centre in fiscal 
policy studies, as opposed to the level of fiscal decentralisation, has been common in 
the literature (see for example Wibbels (2000)). 
An obvious classification that can be made, is to follow Wibbels (2000) and 
split countries along federal and unitary lines. This approach however, fails to fully 
capture differences between countries since there can be broad differences in the level 
of sub-central autonomy within federal and or unitary countries. As a better 
alternative, we construct a political autonomy index where the distinction between 
federal and unitary structures is only one component. Our measure is outlined in the 
following table. 
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Table 6.2: Measuring Political Autonomy 
Fed vs. Unitary De-Central Upper House 
Value Description Value Description Value Description 
0 Unitary 0 No rights for 0 Appointed 
sub-national directly/hereditary 
govt. from central 
government or 
unicameral. 
1 Semi-Federal 1 Limited rights 0.5 Directly elected. 
2 Federal 2 Specific and 1 Regions appoint 
irrevocable upper house. 
rights 
Construction of the index is largely self-explanatory. Countries are assigned a 
value of 0, 1 or 2 depending upon whether they are unitary, semi-federal or federal. 
The semi-federal countries include Belgium 19 and Spain in the pre-l 990s period. 
The variable De-Central is taken from Budge et al. (2000). This variable is 
designed to capture the rights of sub-central governments. In certain countries, such as 
the USA, Canada and Germany, Federal institutions often restrict the authority of the 
central government with explicit constitutional protections for sub-central units, 
which are often enforced by independent courts. In many, in at least some policy 
areas, the central government is unable to change the policy status quo without the 
agreement of a majority, supermajority and sometimes even unanimity of the sub-
central units. If sub-central governments have specific rights vis-a.-vis the centre that 
are formal and significant, they are given a score of 2; if they have some independent 
rights they are assigned a value of 1; and if they have no explicit rights and their 
19 Since 1970, Belgium has embarked on a process toward becoming a federalist state. It was formally 
classified as federal in 1994 (see Budge et al. (2000)). 
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authority is dependent on the will of the central government a value of 0 is assigned. 
For a discussion of this variable see Budge et al. (2000). 
Finally, our third variable captures the sub-central representation at the centre 
via the second/upper chamber. If sub-central governments can elect or nominate 
members of this chamber, this implies that they can have a substantial degree of 
representation at the central level and hence a value of 1 is assigned. If members of 
this house are elected via regional/local elections then a value of 0.5 is assigned and if 
the centre either appoints members or the system is unicameral then a value of o. 
Table 6.3 shows the values of our political autonomy index for the countries in our 
sample. In contrast to our measure of fiscal decentralisation this measure is constant 
across our sample (except for Spain). 
297 
Table 6.3: Construction of Sub-Central Political Autonomy Index 
Federal vs. De-central Upper Sub-Central Political 
Unitary House Autonomy 
Australia 2 1 0.5 3.5 
Austria 2 2 1 5 
Belgium 1 1 0.5 2.5 
Canada 2 2 0 4 
Denmark 0 2 0 2 
Finland 0 2 0.5 2.5 
France 0 1 0.5 1.5 
Germany 2 2 1 5 
Ireland 0 1 0.5 1.5 
Netherlands 0 0 1 1 
Norway 0 2 0.5 2.5 
Spain20 Pre -90 Post-90 Pre -90 Post -90 
1 2 1 0.5 2.5 3.5 
Sweden 0 2 0 2 
UK 0 1 0 1 
USA 2 2 0.5 4.5 
6.4 Decentralisation and the Composition and Size of a Consolidation Attempt 
6.4.1 Introduction 
Having outlined our methods to measure decentralisation across countries, we 
are now able to begin our analysis of the impact of decentralisation on the 
consolidation process. 
20 Given the substantial constitutional reform that has taken place in Spain during our sample period we 
define observations up until 1990 as having being taken place in a semi-federal system, and fully 
federal in the post 1990 period. 
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As discussed above, it is widely thought that fragmentation can skew the 
composition of a consolidation away from politically sensitive elements of fiscal 
policy. Consolidation attempts where fragmentation is strong are likely to avoid cuts 
to social transfers, government wages and so on. Instead, consolidations will be biased 
toward the less politically sensitive elements of policy such as types of tax increases 
and the retention of state enterprises' profits. Therefore, it is clearly of interest to test 
at the very outset, whether decentralisation has significant influence on the 
composition of a consolidation attempt. 
Given data constraints we limit our focus to an empirical examination of total 
expenditure and revenue. We are able to differentiate between consolidation attempts 
which involve cuts to expenditure in excess of any revenue hikes21 . In addition to 
including 'other' potential economic and political determinants of composition we 
also include our measure of decentralisation so that we are able to test directly 
whether decentralisation appears to skew the composition of a consolidation attempt 
toward revenue or expenditure. 
There are a number of alternative econometric approaches that we can adopt to 
test whether countries are more or less likely to engage in expenditure or revenue 
adjustments during consolidations. We limit ourselves to just two alternative 
techniques. Firstly, we run seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) to explain the sizes 
of the expenditure and revenue adjustments. Secondly, we use limited dependent 
variable analysis (LDV) to discriminate between those consolidations which are 
21 We do not look at the individual components of expenditure etc, the reason being that the cyclical 
adjustments we have made to expenditures and revenue have been at the aggregate level and not as 
individual components. Therefore, any analysis of how acijusted expenditures and revenues change can 
only be limited to the aggregate levels. 
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predominantly expenditure based and those that are based on revenue increases. In 
addition to a standard binary dependent variable model we also make use of a more 
refined ordered model. We believe that the use of an ordered model is an advantage as 
a more accurate division of consolidation attempts with respect to their relative 
reliance upon revenue or expenditure is possible. It is likely that an improved insight 
of the factors which help determine the composition of a consolidation can be 
obtained. 
6.4.2 Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) Estimation22 
In our first method we estimate a SUR model on the percentage change in 
adjusted expenditures and revenues in the 61 consolidation episodes23 . That is, 
(6.1) 
where Yi is an n x 1 vector of observations on the ith variable (where i = % III 
expenditure and % in revenue); Xi an (n x ki) matrix of observations on explanatory 
variables; bi a (ki xl) vector of coefficients; and Ui an (n xl) vector of disturbances. 
Equation 6.1 can be re-written, 
22 SUR estimation was fIrst introduced in Zellner (1962). 
23 The values for adjusted expenditures and revenues are taken from the calculations in the construction 
of the Blanchard Fiscal Impulse - see Chapter 2. 
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where Yl is the percentage change in expenditure and Y2 is the percentage change in 
revenue. However as we will discuss below, the explanatory variables that we include 
in both regressions Xl and X2 are identical (i.e. Xl = X2 = Xm) and therefore, the SUR 
estimator of equation 6.2 collapses to the OLS estimators of individual regressions on 
Yl and Y2· So that b I = b2 = bm where, 
b = (X'X)-IX'y 
11/ 
(6.3) 
One limitation of the estimation technique applied above, is that by 
measuring the total size of the change in expenditure and revenue, this does not tell us 
whether the consolidation is more or less expenditure based relative to the adjustment 
in revenue. Further, our results will be influenced to a certain extent by the actual size 
of government in each country. A 2% adjustment in expenditure will, in relative 
terms, be more severe in a country with low levels of government expenditure than 
one with higher levels. One way to circumvent this problem is to include country 
dummies. However, not only does the inclusion of 15 dummies substantially reduce 
the available degrees of freedom (given only 61 observations) we find that in addition, 
their inclusion together with our measures of decentralisation, type of government and 
political ideology lead to problems of high multicollinearity. An alternative method 
which circumvents this problem is to test what factors make a consolidation more 
expenditure based relative to the adjustment in revenue and vice versa. In this way, 
the scale effects of each country's fiscal policy are eliminated. To implement this 
strategy we have chosen to use limited dependent variable (LDV) estimation 
techniques. 
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6.4.3 Limited Dependent Variable Estimation 
We adopt two different LDV models to conduct our analysis. Firstly, we 
classify our consolidation attempts according to the change in expenditure being 
greater or less than the adjustment to revenue. If for a particular consolidation attempt, 
the change in expenditure is greater than the change in revenue, we classify this 
consolidation as being 'expenditure based'. If on the other hand, the change in 
revenue is greater than the change in expenditure, we classify this as a 'revenue 
based' consolidation. 
To estimate the model we can either apply a reduced form Logit or Probit 
model to the 61 consolidation observations. Such that, 
(6.4) 
where, 
: Yi = 1 if adjusted expenditure> adjusted revenue and, 
: Yi = 0 if adjusted expenditure adjusted revenue. 
The probability of observing Yi = 1 is given by, 
Pr(y; =ljx;,,B)=l-F(-x;p) (6.5) 
and it follows that the probability of observing Yi = 0 can be written as, 
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where F is a continuous, strictly increasing function that takes a real value and returns 
a value ranging from zero to one. The choice of the function F determines the type of 
binary model- Logit or Probit24 . We use the same explanatory variables as in Section 
6.4.2. 
Such an approach is however, rather restrictive as it fails to fully capture the 
extent to which the adjustments to expenditure and revenue differ from one another. 
Therefore, in addition to estimating 6.4 we also estimate an ordered dependent 
variable model (ODV). The four different categories are outlined below. As before, 
we can apply either a Logit or Probit estimation technique to 6.7, 
(6.7) 
where, 
: Yi = 3 if large -ve in adjusted expenditure and revenues either fall or 'stay 
the same' (where 'stay the same' is defined as <10% increase relative to 
expenditure adjustment), 
: Yi = 2 if -ve in adjusted expenditure> +ve in adjusted revenue, 
24 Logit and Probit models are widely used in econometric applications, though less so in 
macroeconomics. The difference between the two models is based on the particular probability 
distribution function F adopted. While the former uses a logistic distribution function the latter is based 
on a cumulative normal one. The two distributions are similar except for the larger tails of the logistic 
distribution. On theoretical grounds, for this application, it is difficult to justify the choice of one 
instead of the other. In our analysis, the particular choice makes littler difference in terms of 
substantive results. 
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: Yi = 1 if +ve in adjusted revenue> -ve in adjusted expenditure and, 
: Yi = 0 if large +ve in adjusted revenue and adjusted expenditures either 
increase or 'stay the same' (where 'stay the same' is defined as <10% decrease 
relative to revenue adjustment). 
It is worthwhile to note that when estimating an ordered dependent variable 
model in effect one is creating a latent variable Yi* that depends on the explanatory 
variables using the rule, 
Yi = 0 if Yi* ::; r I 
= 1 if r I < Y; ::; r 2 
=2 if r2 <Y; ::;r3 
=3ifr3<Y; 
(6.8) 
where, the limit points, Yl, Y2 and Y3 are estimated at the same time as the ~ 
coefficients. It follows that the probabilities of observing a given value of yare given 
by-
Pr(Yi = OlxpP,r) = F(rl -x;p) 
Pr(Yi = 1I xpP,r) = F(r 2 - x;p) - F(r I - x;p) 
Pr(Yi = 2I xi,P,r) = F(r 3 -x;p) - F(r 2 - x;p) 
Pr(Yi = 3I xpP,r) = 1- F(r 3 - x;!3) 
(6.9) 
As before, it is necessary to choose a function form for F. Again, the two most 
common are based on either a Logit or a Normal distribution. 
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One concern in the way in which this model is constructed is that there is 
likely to be an uneven distribution of observations in each category. We find that 
categories 2 and 1 have the greatest number of observations. An unbalanced number 
of observations in particular categories can serve to reduce the efficiency of our 
estimates. To address this point, and in addition to estimating the above ordered 
model, we have chosen to additionally obtain estimates using a reclassification of the 
groups in the above model so that an equal number of observations in groups 2 and 3 
and in groups 1 and 025 . In what follows, we term this latter variant 2 and the former 
variant 1. 
6.4.4 Explanatory Variables 
Our explanatory variables are as follows. Firstly, to capture the impact of 
differences in decentralisation we include the two measures of decentralisation 
discussed in the previous section; Fiscal Decentralisation and Sub-Central Political 
Autonomy. 
Secondly, in line with previous studies in the field, we test the significance of 
the 'type of government' at the centre, so we include two dummy variables26. Firstly, 
we include a dummy variable which discriminates between single party majority 
governments as oppose to coalition and minority governments. The dummy variable 
takes a value of 1 if the central government at the time of consolidation is formed by a 
25 We do this by ordering our consolidation attempts in terms of expenditure adjustment as a percentage 
of the adjustment in revenue and dividing the sample into four. 
26 We use Budge et af. (2000) to obtain the necessary political information to construct these dummy 
variables. 
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single party and has a legislative majority. It is anticipated that the parameter on this 
dummy variable will be negative, implying that the adjustment to expenditures 
(revenues) is larger (smaller) in single party majority governments. Secondly, we 
include a dummy variable which captures the ideological colour of the central 
government. The dummy variable in this instance takes the value of 1 if the party in 
power at the time of consolidation is classified as being left wing27. Previous studies 
have found conflicting evidence with regard to the sign and significance of this 
variable. 
Thirdly, we include a number of 'economic' control variables in our 
estimation. Firstly, in line with Von Hagen et al. (2001), Ardagna (2004) and Purfield 
(2003), in order to account for the macroeconomic environment at the time of 
consolidation, we include both the value of the output gap in period T -1 and the 
change in monetary stance as measured by the change in the short-term real interest 
rate between T -1 and T28. It is possible that certain consolidation 'types' are more 
likely to occur under alternative macroeconomic conditions than others. For instance, 
it may be the case that tough expenditure reforms occur when output is high and/or 
monetary policy is loose etc. There is little empirical consensus on whether such 
factors ultimately influence the composition of a consolidation attempt29 . We use 
lagged values of these variables to avoid problems of endogeneity - see Von Hagen et 
al. (2001). 
27 For each the central government is classified as left wing if the share of seats in government and 
supporting parties in Parliament controlled by parties which can are recognised to be left of centre on 
the political spectrum is greater than 66.6%. 
28 We also included the change in the real effective exchange rate but this was never significant in any 
specification so has been dropped from the results presented here. 
29 Both our output gap and short run real interest rate measures are taken from the OECD Statistical 
Compendium 2002 edition. 
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In addition, we account for the current fiscal policy climate at the time of 
consolidation, by considering both the level of debt in the year preceding the 
consolidation and the cumulative change in the fiscal surplus in the immediate run up 
to consolidation3o. A number of authors, including Von Hagen et al. (2001) and 
Perotti (1999), have opined that consolidation attempts may be influenced by both the 
current fiscal policy position and previous years experiences. 
In summary, our control variables are similar to that used in the existing 
literature. While the exact variables used may differ slightly (for example, lagged 
output gap as oppose to the lagged unemployment rate), we have attempted to follow 
the current literature as closely as possible. The primary additional variables in our 
analysis are the measures of decentralisation. This is an important development and 
enables us to test whether the level of decentralisation has an impact on consolidation 
attempts over and above alternative factors previously discussed in the literature. 
6.4.5 Results 
The results of our SURIOLS estimation are presented alongside our results 
from the LDV analysis. Table 6.4 contains the results with our measure of fiscal 
decentralisation while Table 6.5, the measure of sub-central political autonomy3l. For 
30 The initial debt measure is taken from the OECD Statistical Compendium 2002 edition while the 
measure of the cumulative change in the general government surplus is obtained from the IMF GFS 
database and our own calculations. 
31 In all our LDV models, the LR test statistic which tests the null hypothesis that all the slope 
coefficients are zero is rejected. In addition, we have tested for the presence ofheteroscedastic residuals 
using the LM test advocated by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). We find no evidence of 
heteroscedastic residuals. 
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our LDV analysis, the results presented in the following two tables are based on the 
use of a Logit model. 
Table 6.4 Coml!osition of Adjustment: SUR and LDV Estimates (Fiscal 
Decentralisation} 
Dependent Dependent Type of Type of Adjustment: 
Variable: Variable: Adjustment: Ordered Modd2 
% in % In Binary Model Variant 1 Variant 2 
Expenditure Revenue 
C -1.84** 1.74* 0.01 N.A. N.A. 
(0.78) (1.03) (0.82) 
rT-l 0.36*** -0.06 -0.1 0 -0.15 -0.13 
(0.13) (0.17) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) 
Output GapT_l 0.35*** 0.63*** -0.31 *** -0.26*** -0.25*** 
(0.13) (0.17) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) 
DebtT_1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) 
Cumulative SurplusT_2toT 0.05 -0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
SinglelMaj GovtT -1.55** -2.13*** 1.64** 1.28*** 1.43*** 
(0.63) (0.83) (0.68) (0.45) (0.46) 
Central Govt ColourT 0.14 0.41 -1.01 ** -0.46 -0.31 
(0.51) (0.68) (0.44) (0.35) (0.34) 
Fiscal Decentralisation 0.03* 0.03 0.01 -0.02* -0.02* 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01 ) 
Limit Points 
LIMIT lC(8) -1.70*** -1.04** 
(0.60) (0.55) 
LIMIT 2 C(9) -0.05 -0.18 
(0.54) (0.54) 
LIMIT 3 C(10) 1.12** 0.84* 
(0.55) (0.55) 
R2 0.45 0.31 
Adj. R2 0.38 0.22 
Log-Likelihood -24.76 -58.24 -64.21 
Average Log- -0.43 -1.02 -1.13 
Likelihood 
S.E.ofregression 1.82 2.41 0.41 
Sum of Squared 163.Ql 284.35 8.38 
Residuals 
D-W Statistic 1.60 2.65 
Restricted Log- -38.44 -73.81 -77.93 
Likelihood 
LR Statistic 26.95 31.15 27.43 
PsuedoR2 0.21 0.18 
32 Note that for an ordered model a constant is not reported. Instead we report the value of the Limit 
Points. It is possible to calculate marginal effects for each of the coefficients however, for our purposes 
it is sufficient to recognise the sign and significance of each coefficient. 
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Table 6.S Coml!osition of Adjustment: SUR and LDV Estimates (Sub-Central 
Political Autonomy) 
Dependent Dependent Type of Type of Adjustment: 
Variable: Variable: Adjustment: Ordered Model 
% in % III Binary Model Variant 1 Variant 2 
Expenditure Revenue 
C -2.15** 1.72* 0.09 N.A. N.A. 
(0.S9) (1.09) (0.90) 
rT_! 0.39*** -0.04 -0.10 -0.17* -0.15 
(0.13) (0.17) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) 
Output GapT_! 0.29** 0.61 *** -0.31*** -0.27*** -0.26*** 
(0.13) (0.16) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) 
DebtT_! -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cumulative SurplusT_2toT 0.05 -0.06 0.05 0.01 0.01 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Single/Maj GovtT -l.l6* -1.7S** 1.63** 1.06** 1.19*** 
(0.63) (O.SO) (0.69) (0.43) (0.43) 
Central Govt ColoUfT 0.42 0.53 -1.01** -0.47 -0.32 
(0.20) (0.26) (0.44) (0.35) (0.34) 
S-C Political Autonomy 0.37* 0.27 -0.02 -0.22* -0.25* 
(0.52) (0.66) (0.20) (0.13) (0.13) 
Limit Points 
LIMIT 1C(S) -1.S3*** -l.l4* 
(0.65) (0.61) 
LIMIT 2 C(9) -0.21 -0.29 
(0.60) (0.60) 
LIMIT 3 C(lO) 0.96* 0.73 
(0.61) (0.60) 
R2 0.41 0.30 
Adj. R2 0.33 0.20 
Log-Likelihood -24.76 -5S.37 -64.49 
Average Log- -0.43 -1.02 l.l3 
Likelihood 
S.E.ofregression 1.S9 2.39 0.41 
Sum of Squared lS2.03 291.34 
Residuals 
D-W Statistic 1.46 2.51 
Restricted Log- -3S.44 -73.S1 -77.93 
Likelihood 
LR Statistic 26.94 30.S9 26.S7 
Psuedo R2 0.21 0.17 
The results in both Tables 6.4 and 6.5 are relatively consistent with 
each other. That is, variables which tend to generate large cuts in expenditure tend as 
one would expect to be associated with consolidation attempts that are relatively more 
expenditure than revenue based. Note that the results from our ordered model variants 
309 
are also consistent with one another suggesting that our results are not overly 
influenced by the construction of categorical groups. Any improvement in efficiency 
appears to be minimal. 
We observe that the value of the output gap and the change in the short run 
real interest rate, are the only two significant 'economic' control variables. The 
positive coefficient on the output gap for both the change in expenditure and revenue 
in our SUR, suggests that a healthier macroeconomic position tends to lead to 
consolidation attempts that involve larger increases in national revenue and smaller 
cuts to expenditure. This inference is also supported by our LDV variable estimation 
where the significantly negative coefficient demonstrates that larger (positive) output 
gaps in the period preceding consolidation lead to a higher probability of a 
consolidation attempt being skewed toward increases in revenue as opposed to cuts in 
expenditure33 . The positive coefficient on the change in the interest rate for the 
expenditure equation, implies that a tightening of the monetary stance tends to reduce 
the size of the expenditure adjustment. This also emphasises that expenditure 
adjustments are more likely to occur when the Central Bank is following an 
expansionary policy. However, the monetary stance coefficient is insignificant in our 
limited dependent variable analysis. Thus it would appear that the output gap is the 
single most important economic determinant of the relative composition of a 
consolidation attempt. 
The fiscal position as measured by the debt and the cumulative change in the 
surplus, appears to have little impact on the size of the adjustment either to adjusted 
33 A similar result is found in Mulas-Granados (2002) though using a measure of unemployment 
instead of the output gap. 
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expenditure or revenue. This is consistent with Mulas-Granados (2002) who while 
adopting a slightly different estimation approach and measurement of the initial fiscal 
position concludes that the fiscal balance in the run up to consolidation is an 
insignificant determinant of whether a consolidation attempt is likely to be more 
expenditure or revenue based. 
From Tables 6.4 and 6.5 there is clear evidence that the type of government 
matters. Our results show that single party majority central governments tend to 
undertake larger cuts in adjusted expenditure and smaller increases in adjusted 
revenue during consolidation attempts, than their coalition or minority government 
counterparts. The results from our LDV analysis support this. The significantly 
positive coefficients in both the binary and ordered models implies that single party 
majority governments are more likely to base their consolidation attempts on 
adjustments to expenditure rather than revenue. This result is consistent with the 
previous research in this field e.g. Alesina et al. (1998), however we have been able to 
demonstrate that this effect is significant even accounting for economic controls. 
Interestingly, we find no significant evidence that the SIze of either the 
expenditure or revenue adjustments during consolidations is determined by the 
political ideology of the central government34. The signs of the coefficients in both 
our approaches would suggest that left-wing governments are less likely to make 
substantial cuts to expenditure than their centre or right-wing counterparts. In most 
instances however, they are insignificant. Only in the binary model case is the 
34 The dummy variable for ideological colour while positive is statistically insignificant. 
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coefficient significant. This result is consistent with that reported in Mulas-Granados 
(2002) who uses a similar binary model. 
Our main focus however, is on our measures of decentralisation. Significance 
in either direction would imply that the size of the adjustments to either expenditure 
or revenue (and hence the composition of the consolidation attempt) are influenced by 
the extent of decentralisation within countries, the evidence on this is of borderline 
significance. Specifically, our measures of decentralisation are significantly positive 
at the 8 and 7 percent levels of significance for the size of the adjustment to 
expenditure35 . They are insignificant for our revenue equation. Thus the evidence 
tentatively suggests that the size of the overall adjustment to expenditure was smaller 
in countries with greater levels of decentralisation than in the more centralised 
countries. The results from our ordered dependent variable model also lend support to 
this inference. The significantly negative coefficients (all be it at the 10% level) imply 
that, in countries with higher degrees of decentralisation, the composition of the 
adjustment was more likely to be skewed toward revenue increases as oppose to 
expenditure cuts. It is possible to interpret these exploratory results as providing 
evidence that decentralisation may (by presumably leading to increased fragmentation 
in the setting of budgets) curtail the extent of any adjustment to expenditure during 
consolidation attempts. This result is consistent with our discussion in Section 6.2. 
In summary, we have offered a first insight into whether the level of 
decentralisation impacts on the composition of a consolidation attempt. As we have 
argued above, by increasing fragmentation in the budgetary process and given the 
35 Upon elimination of the most insignificant control variables, both measures of sub-central autonomy 
are significant at the 5% level. 
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substantial vertical imbalances that exist III most countries, it IS possible that 
consolidation attempts in countries with highly autonomous sub-central governments 
are more likely to favour adjustments to national revenue as oppose to expenditure. 
Our evidence, within limitations, does suggest that this may be the case. 
6.4.6 Fiscal Impulse 
In addition to examining the impact of political factors on the composition of 
consolidation attempts, we can also test whether or not these factors impact on the 
size of the consolidation itself. In this section we present some results based on a 
simple OLS regression of the size of the general government fiscal impulse on our 
explanatory variables discussed above. Our results are contained in Table 6.6. 
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Table 6.6: Fiscal Impulse OLS Regressions 
C 
Output GapT_1 
DebtT_1 
Cumulative SurplusT-2toT 
Single/Maj GovtT 
Central Govt ColourT 
Fiscal Decentralisation 
S-C Political Autonomy 
R2 
Adj. R2 
S.E.ofregression 
Sum of Squared Residuals 
D-W Statistic 
F-stat p-value 
Dependent Variable: Size of General Government Fiscal 
Impulse 
Fiscal Decentralisation 
2.53*** 
(0.48) 
-0.24*** 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.66* 
(0.38) 
-0.11 
(0.31) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.30 
0.20 
1.03 
51.66 
1.64 
0.01 
Political Autonomy 
2.96*** 
(0.50) 
-0.25*** 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.70* 
(0.36) 
-0.15 
(0.30) 
-0.17 
(0.12) 
0.33 
0.23 
1.01 
49.63 
1.62 
0.01 
In contrast to our results on composition, the size of the cumulative surplus 
appears to be an important factor in determining whether a consolidation attempt is 
large or small. Consolidation attempts that have followed periods of improvement in 
the primary balance tend to be smaller than consolidations taking place in the 
aftermath of a weaker fiscal position. This is unsurprising, as any return to 'trend' 
fiscal policy will require a fiscal expansion if the position had been deteriorating in 
the immediate past. Note however that, in this instance, the political variables are for 
the most part insignificant. Only the type of government variable is significant and 
even then only at the 10% level. While political variables appear to be important in 
determining the composition of consolidation attempts, they appear to have little 
influence on the actual size of the adjustment. 
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6.5 Decentralisation and Success 
In Section 6.4 we have discussed the impact of decentralisation on the 
composition and size of consolidation attempts. As a final empirical test, it is sensible 
to examine directly whether or not decentralisation impacts on success. As 
demonstrated, there is some evidence to suggest that greater levels of decentralisation 
tend to reduce the size of the expenditure adjustment, with a greater reliance on 
revenues. We now test whether this observation is sufficient to generate less 
successful attempts. 
To test the impact of decentralisation on the probability of success we again 
apply limited dependent variable analysis (LDV)36. Our first model we estimate is a 
binary LogitlProbit model based upon the definitions of success and failure outlined 
in Chapter 2 Definition 2: 
(6.4) 
where, 
: Yi = 1 if consolidation is deemed successful and, 
: Yi = 0 if consolidation is deemed unsuccessful. 
Our use of a binary dependent variable model which discriminates between 
successful and unsuccessful consolidations follows Purfield (2003). However, our 
36 Binary limited dependent variable models have been used previously in the context of fiscal 
consolidation attempts - see for example, Von Hagen et al. (2001), Purfield (2003), Annet (2002), EC 
(2003) and Alesina and Ardagna (1998). 
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analysis differs in that we have chosen to focus upon industrialised as oppose to 
transitional countries and in addition we include political variables, such as the type of 
government and the degree of decentralisation in addition to economic controls. 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) adopt a similar binary estimation approach however, they 
fail to include a full list of control variables and choose instead to limit their analysis 
of the factors which contribute to successful as oppose to unsuccessful consolidation 
attempts to the size and composition of such an adjustment. 
Von Hagen et al. (2001) and to a lesser extent Ardagna (2004) also make use 
of binary dependent variables in their analysis of consolidation attempts however, 
they make use of the entire sample and not just the periods of consolidation. The 
difficulty with such an approach is that with the small number of consolidation 
attempts relative to the entire sample, the limited dependent variable estimation can 
lack efficiency. Furthermore, our explicit focus in on the determining the factors 
between successful and unsuccessful consolidations and therefore, we feel it is 
appropriate to limit our discussion to these two groups of observations. 
In a further extension to the literature, we estimate an ordered dependent 
variable model (ODV) but on this occasion using the success index outlined in 
Definition 3 in Chapter 2: 
(6.5) 
where, 
: Yi = 3 if SI = 3, 
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i.e. if the debt to GDP ratio falls by at least 5 percentage points in the 
three years following consolidation. 
: Yi = 2 if SI = 2, 
i.e. if the debt to GDP ratio stabilises (within half a percentage point 
tolerance of the initial level rate) or if it decreases by less than 5 
percentage points over the three years following consolidation. 
: Yi = 1 if SI = 1 
i.e. if the growth rate of debt to GDP ratio over the three years 
following consolidation is less than that observed in the three years 
prior to consolidation (here we use a tolerance of 10% of the initial 
growth rate). 
: Yi = 0 if SI = o. 
i.e. ifnone of the above apply. 
Once more we believe that the use of an ordered model in this context is 
justified as it better captures differences in the relative successes of our observed 
consolidation attempts. 
As before, the same explanatory variables are used and hence our 'controls' 
are very similar to that of Von Hagen et al. (2002) and Purfield (2003). Note however, 
unlike Von Hagen et al. (2001) and Purfield (2003) we do not include as explanatory 
variables either the size of the adjustment or the composition. Our hypothesis, and that 
of the political economy literature, is that political factors skew the composition 
and/or limit the size of consolidation attempts so that they are less likely to be 
successful. Consequently, it is inappropriate to include both political variables and the 
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size and composition of the consolidation in the same regression as both will in effect 
test the same hypothesis. We assume therefore, that there is a clear casual relationship 
between the political economy factors and the type of consolidation undertaken and 
hence on success. Accordingly, we do not include both the size and the composition 
of consolidations in the X matrix37• As before our results do not alter substantively 
according to whether a Logit or Probit model is adopted. The results presented in 
Table 6.7 have been obtained using a Logit model. 
37 We have experimented with including the composition and size of consolidation in the same 
regression as the political economy measures. As expected, in most instances, the political economy 
variables are insignificant and results are available on request. Ardagna (2004) includes both 
composition and political economy measures including ideology and type of government in a similar 
though not identical binary model of success. This study also finds that for the most part, the relevant 
political economy measures are insignificant. 
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Table 6.7: Decentralisation and Success 
Binary Dependent Variable: Ordered Dependent Variable: 
1 = Success, 0 = Failure Success Index 
Fiscal Political Fiscal Political 
Decentralisation Autonomy Decentralisation Autonomy 
C -1.58** -1.15 
(0.71) (0.77) 
rT-l -0.06 -0.07 -0.12 -0.15 
(0.11 ) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14) 
Output GapT_l -0.25** -0.25** -0.45*** -0.47*** 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) 
DebtT_l 0.01 0.01 0.03** 0.02** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cumulative 0.09** 0.09** 0.15 0.15*** 
SurplusT-2toT 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Single/Maj GovtT 1.08** 1.06** 1.73** 1.70** 
(0.53) (0.53) (0.78) (0.77) 
Central Govt 0.70 0.66 1.58** 1.59** 
ColourT 
(0.45) (0.45) (0.66) (0.67) 
Fiscal 0.00 N.A. -0.01 N.A. 
Decentralisation 
(0.01) (0.02) 
S-C Political N.A. -0.18 N.A. -0.46** 
Autonomy 
(0.17) (0.24) 
Limit Points 
LIMIT lC(8) 0.93 -0.10 
(1.05) (1.09) 
LIMIT 2 C(9) 2.83*** 1.94* 
(1.10) (1.1 0) 
LIMIT 3 C(lO) 3.82*** 2.99*** 
(1.13) (1.13) 
Log-Likelihood -29.28 -28.72 -62.18 -60.30 
Average Log- -0.51 -0.50 -1.09 -1.06 
Likelihood 
S.E.ofregression 0.44 0.44 
Sum of Squared 9.68 9.48 
Residuals 
Restricted Log- -76.11 -76.11 
Likelihood 
LR Statistic 16.45 17.58 27.86 31.60 
Psuedo R2 0.18 0.21 
Our results highlight the factors which contribute to the success or failure of 
consolidation attempts. Firstly and somewhat surprisingly, we find strong evidence to 
suggest that consolidation attempts that take place during macroeconomic downturns 
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(i.e. negative output gap), are more likely to be successful than those that take place 
during macroeconomic upturns. Our measure of the output gap in period T -1 is 
statistically significantly negative in both our Binary and Ordered Success models and 
across both measures of decentralisation (i.e. larger (more positive) output gaps 
reduce the probability of a consolidation being successful). This may reflect the 
substantial impact on expectations of consolidation attempts being conducted in 
periods of lower output. Added to this, the results from the previous section 
demonstrated that expenditure adjustments are more likely to occur in periods of low 
output gaps. Similar results tend to be found elsewhere. For example, EC (2003) find 
that expansionary fiscal consolidations tend to follow periods of poor macroeconomic 
performance and our results may reflect this. 
In contrast, we find no evidence to suggest that the stance of monetary policy 
impacts on the probability of success. This result contrasts with that of Alesina and 
Ardagna (1998) and Ardagna (2004) which find limited evidence that expansionary 
monetary policy can assist the chances of success. This is however, disputed 
elsewhere (see for example Purfield (2002). 
In line with Obstfeld (1998), Ardagna (2004) and Perotti (1999) we find that 
initial fiscal conditions appear important, all be it in only some of our estimations. 
The results from our ordered model show that consolidation attempts that take place 
when the debt to GDP ratio is high have a high probability of being successful - see 
Table 6.738. However, our results also show that successful consolidations typically 
follow periods of improvement in the fiscal balance as highlighted by the significantly 
38 This result only holds for the ordered models, as in the binary models the Debtt.! variable, while 
positive is insignificant. 
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positive coefficient on the cumulative fiscal impulse variable. This suggests that 
successful consolidations appear to be part of more prolonged periods of fiscal 
improvement. As observed in our analysis in Chapter 3, in many instances successful 
consolidations occur in close proximity to other consolidation attempts. These two 
results are also found in Ardagna (2004). 
In line with the established literature we find strong evidence to support the 
claim that single party majority governments have a higher probability of 
implementing a successful consolidation than their coalition or minority counterparts 
- see Alesina and Perotti (1995), Alesina et al. (1998). However, in an extension to 
their analysis we are able to show that this result holds even when one accounts for 
economic controls. This result is entirely consistent with our results in Section 6.4, 
which demonstrated that such governments typically made substantial cuts to 
expenditure and altered national revenue to a lesser extent. 
Interestingly, we find strong evidence that left wmg governments have a 
significantly higher probability of being successful than those of the right or centre. 
This is consistent with Alesina et al. (1998). But when taken with our earlier analysis, 
is difficult to explain. As we demonstrated in Section 6.4, our analysis of the 
composition and size of consolidation attempts showed no significant difference 
between left-wing and centre/right governments. In fact in the case of our Binary 
model, the evidence is that left-wing governments are more likely to increase 
revenues. As we have shown throughout this thesis, revenue based adjustments tend 
to be less successful than those which are expenditure based. Therefore, there appears 
to be an apparent inconsistency between our two results (and between the results of 
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Alesina et al. (1998) and Mulas Grandos (2002». One explanation for this might be 
lack of degrees of freedom but it is also possible that it may reflect the different 
impact on private sector expectations of a consolidation implemented by a left wing 
versus a right wing government. It is possible that any consolidation attempt 
undertaken by a left-wing government (even if the majority of the adjustment is on 
revenues but where expenditures are still cut) has a significant impact on the private 
sector who might expect them to be more fiscally profligate. Thus, revenue 
adjustments without a substantial increase in expenditure may still have a significant 
positive impact when instigated by a left-wing government. Note however, that this 
result also appears to be heavily influenced by the construction of the dummy 
variables for 'type of government'. If we re-construct our measure of type of 
government to discriminate between governments with a majority and those with a 
minority in the legislature, the ideology dummy is insignificant. Thus we should not 
be overly concerned about the apparent inconsistency 39. 
Finally and most importantly, we find little evidence to suggest that 
decentralisation impacts directly on the potential of a consolidation being successful. 
While our measure of sub-central political autonomy is significant in our ordered 
model, our measure of fiscal decentralisation is insignificant in both the binary and 
ordered models. Therefore, our evidence suggests that decentralisation, while 
influencing the composition of adjustment at the margin, is not sufficient to constrain 
a country's ability to consolidate successfully. We conclude that countries with 
39 There is also a question regarding the accuracy of our measure of ideological colour. For example, 
most political commentators would draw a clear distinction between the current labour government 
(classified as left-wing) and other left-wing governments of the past. For an improved measure of 
ideology and changes over time which unfortunately does not include all countries in our sample see 
Darby et al. (2004). 
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relatively high levels of decentralisation appear just as able as other countries to 
implement a successful consolidation. 
This final result is important as it offers a first test of the hypothesis that 
decentralisation may lead to greater macroeconomic difficulties. Our results for the 
most part, would suggest that countries with the highest levels of decentralisation are 
not necessarily less likely to implement a successful consolidation attempt. We should 
however, be aware of the tentative nature of our results and our analysis is a first pass 
at this issue. Further research is clearly warranted. 
6.6 Options for Improved Measures of Decentralisation 
While our measures of decentralisation are we believe an improvement on 
previous studies even then, they do not provide a 100% accurate measure of the level 
of decentralisation and the scope for political fragmentation between tiers of 
government within particular countries. We believe therefore, that continued research 
in this field is warranted and perhaps with future improvements in data availability the 
concepts and issues discussed in this chapter can be reassessed. 
We believe that the two measures we have constructed, 'Fiscal 
Decentralisation' and 'Sub-Central Political Autonomy' provide good approximations 
of the levels of sub-central fiscal and political responsibility across our sample 
countries. However, these two concepts, fiscal and political decentralisation, are not 
mutually exclusive. For instance, high levels of fiscal control may matter little if the 
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centre can challenge the authority of the sub-centre. Similarly, high levels of political 
autonomy are of little use if few resources are transferred to sub-central tiers. We have 
included an interactive measure of fiscal and political decentralisation by multiplying 
the two values assigned to 'Fiscal Decentralisation' and 'Sub-Central Political 
Autonomy' by one another. The resultant interaction variable was statistically 
insignificant. However, such a simple arbitrary approach may not fully capture any 
interactions and a more sophisticated approach may yield a different conclusion. 
Our above measure of fiscal decentralisation does not account for differences 
III borrowing autonomy. If a sub-central tier can borrow, this can significantly 
increase their level of de facto control over their own expenditure levels. For example, 
in response to cuts in inter-governmental transfers and if the sub-centre is able to 
borrow, it can continue to offer the public services currently provided. The difficulty 
with inserting a measure of borrowing autonomy in the analysis is that information is 
relatively limited. We have however, used the Rodden (2003) borrowing autonomy 
index in the analysis conducted above and the variable is insignificant. Nevertheless, 
we acknowledge that a fully accurate measure of fiscal decentralisation should 
account for differences in borrowing autonomy and that the importance of borrowing 
freedom is likely to be heavily dependent on interactions with other decentralisation 
variables such as revenue autonomy, expenditure decentralisation, and political 
autonomy. 
While we have improved on previous studies by focussing on the size of sub-
central expenditures in excess of grant finance and hence captured the degree of 
central control via the financing of sub-central expenditure, we have not accounted for 
324 
the extent of central government directives over these expenditures. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, if the centre can alter guidelines, targets and so forth for sub-central 
expenditure provision, they can retain a substantial degree of de facto control over 
such expenditures even if the sub-centre raises the revenue to finance these 
expenditures - see Pola (1999) and Ebel and Yilmaz (2002). Unfortunately, 
information on the use of directives across countries is relatively limited. To date, the 
only formal study of their use has been in OECD (2001) and is limited to only six 
transitional countries. 
However in mitigation, in the context of a consolidation attempt the relevance 
of central control via directives may be relatively limited. Directives are often used to 
enforce minimum standards and hence increases in sub-central expenditure above 
levels which the centre deems to be too low, typically in health and education. In 
contrast, during a consolidation attempt the centre is likely to want cuts in 
expenditure. The effectiveness of directives in such a scenario is likely to be more 
limited. Nevertheless, an accurate account of the use of directives can assist in 
obtaining a complete and comprehensive measure of the degree of effective 
decentralisation within a country. While information across the entire sample range is 
likely to be unavailable, measures for more recent years should be able to be obtained 
with careful examination of individual country sources. One option is to adopt a 
similar survey approach to the OECD (2001) study but to extend the scope to a wider 
group of countries. 
While we have been able to account for the existence of tax sharing 
arrangements in our sample, and thereby, Improve significantly on many previous 
325 
studies of fiscal decentralisation, our measure is not complete. Firstly, our source fails 
to provide the necessary information on two of our countries Australia and France. 
Secondly, the data is cross sectional and therefore, there is the potential for imposing 
financing regimes across our entire sample which are only correct for one particular 
year. In addition, it is possible that the de-classification of the tax revenues received 
by sub-central units into effectively four different groups is not detailed enough. A 
related point is that in order to obtain a single unit measurement of sub-central tax 
autonomy it is possible that erroneous horizontal aggregation is applied. This is 
particularly the case for countries which have chosen an asymmetric path to 
decentralisation. Thirdly, in many countries even when the sub-centre appears free to 
set the tax rate and the tax base, substantial central government interference can still 
exist. For example, according to OEeD (1999) UK local governments are able to set 
their council tax rates autonomously. While this is the case in theory, in practice the 
central government retains the right to 'cap' the tax rates of local governments if they 
deem such rates to be excessive. Therefore, the de facto control of local governments 
in the UK to freely set their own tax rates is more limited than the OEeD (1999) study 
suggests. The data provided in the OEeD (1999) study does however, provide a 
useful approximation of the degree of sub-central taxation autonomy across our 
sample. In addition, from individual case studies of decentralisation arrangements 
within particular countries, we are reasonably confident that for most countries the 
degree of taxation autonomy has remained relatively constant over the years. It is 
encouraging to observe that recent studies such as that by Stegarescu (2004) are 
seeking to build on and improve the current information on sub-central taxation 
autonomy. 
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Finally, while not an actual measurement of decentralisation but an important 
factor in determining the scope for political fragmentation between tiers of 
government, is the existence of institutional structures which aim to reconcile any 
policy differences between central and sub-central tiers of government. A number of 
countries have attempted to circumvent the associated conflicting preferences and/or 
political motivations, by introducing a variety of co-ordination arrangements designed 
to facilitate a common fiscal policy strategy across tiers. In such a framework, policy 
makers can discuss the wisdom and implications of alternative fiscal strategies before 
reaching an 'agreed' position on the most appropriate form of action. Such 
institutional bodies tend to be most evident in federal countries such as the Premiers' 
Conference and the Loan Council in Australia and the Financial Planning Council in 
Germany. However in practice, the effective power of these institutional 
arrangements, especially during periods of significant policy conflicts can be 
questionable, see IMF (1997). The main role of these institutions is to prevent any 
fragmentation between tiers during times of fiscal stress or other instances of required 
adjustment. It is possible that the existence of such institutions actually encourages 
successful consolidation attempts even in a system of high levels of fiscal 
decentralisation. It may also be the case however, that such institutions are in reality 
an irrelevance. Obtaining the necessary information is likely to be challenging and 
requires careful research. 
I hope to address some of these issues in future post-doctoral studies. Despite 
these issues of measurement, the research undertaken in this chapter we believe 
retains a great deal of significance and relevance. We are confident that our measures 
of sub-central decentralisation in improving upon those adopted in previous studies, 
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provide a useful approximation of the relative fiscal and political strengths of sub-
central units across our sample countries. While improvements in measurement are 
possible we are confident that our classification of countries according to their degree 
of decentralisation will not alter to any great extent. 
6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have outlined a number of ways in which decentralisation 
can have an impact on the consolidation process. Political economy theory suggests 
that by increasing the number of players in the budgetary process, decentralisation 
may reduce the likelihood of a successful consolidation being implemented. 
We have tested this hypothesis both directly and indirectly. In the first 
instance, we found marginal evidence to suggest that decentralisation impacts on the 
composition of a consolidation attempt. Consolidation attempts that took place in 
countries with higher levels of fiscal decentralisation or sub-central autonomy tended 
to rely heavily upon revenue increases as opposed to expenditure cuts. Our measures 
of decentralisation were however, significant only at the 10% leveL This result was 
consistent across both our SUR and LDV analysis. We found no evidence that 
decentralisation has an impact on the size of a consolidation attempt. 
From this, we then proceeded to test directly whether decentralisation was a 
significant determinant of our identified successful consolidation attempts. While the 
coefficients on our two measures of decentralisation were negative, in the majority of 
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cases they are insignificant. We can therefore, tentatively conclude that there is little 
significant evidence to support the hypothesis that decentralisation harms the 
consolidation process. 
As discussed, our measures of sub-central decentralisation provide a useful 
and improved comparative benchmark of the degree of decentralisation within 
countries. However, we recognise that as an approximation our measures do not 
capture all aspects of decentralisation or the scope for fragmentation between tiers. In 
the penultimate section of this chapter we have outlined a number of potential avenues 
for improvement and the difficulties involved in obtaining the required additional 
information. 
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Conclusions 
A number of important issues have been analysed in this thesis. Primarily our 
focus has been on the role of sub-central governments during national consolidation 
attempts. Our research has also focussed on the behaviour of sub-central governments 
in response to cuts in their grant allocations together with a discussion of differences 
in the level of central control over sub-central governments under alternative 
financing regimes. A key conclusion emerging from this research is that the distinct 
contribution of sub-central tiers in national fiscal management cannot be readily 
dismissed. While we acknowledge that in many cases it is convenient to view national 
fiscal policy as being controlled by a single entity, we argue that such an assumption 
is not always appropriate. 
The core of the original contribution of this thesis is contained in Chapters 1, 
3,4,5 and 6. Key findings and areas for future research are summarised below. 
Fiscal Decentralisation: A Discussion of the Literature and Cross-Country 
Experiences 
In Chapter 1 we compared and contrasted the levels and forms of fiscal 
decentralisation in fifteen OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
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Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, UK and the USA). 
We observed that across our sample, sub-central governments play a 
significant role in the conduct of national fiscal policy. In all these countries, 
substantial amounts of expenditure and revenue are assigned to State, Regional and 
Local tiers of government. This is unsurprising given that the virtues of 
decentralisation, such as improvements in allocative efficiency, voter participation 
and restrictions on profligate governments have been well documented. We do 
however observe, that substantial heterogeneity exists between countries both in terms 
of their actual level of decentralisation (as measured by the percentage of national 
expenditures and revenues assigned to sub-central tiers), and in the elements of fiscal 
policy assigned to sub-central tiers. For instance, we observed that across our sample 
and using the latest available data, expenditure decentralisation ranges from just under 
25% to just over 50% of total government expenditure. However, in an interesting 
result we found that the apparent differences between federal and unitary countries are 
more apparent than real. For example, many unitary countries, including the 
Scandinavian nations, have devolved large amounts of fiscal responsibility to sub-
central tiers. 
A key observation was the existence of a substantial vertical imbalance 
throughout our sample with sub-central expenditures greatly exceeding sub-central 
revenues. As we observed in later chapters, this gap and the grants used to fill it, play 
a key role in intergovernmental relations. 
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An issue discussed at length in Chapter 1 and in Chapter 6 was the attainment 
of accurate measures of fiscal decentralisation. In this thesis, our primary data source 
was the IMF's Government Financial Statistics. This is an excellent source of data on 
sub-central fiscal policy and provides a wide range of internationally comparable data 
not only on expenditure, revenue and deficit 'aggregates', but on disaggregate 
elements of expenditure and revenue such as breakdowns by economic function and 
type. In using this dataset, combined with supplementary sources including measures 
of tax and borrowing autonomy, we are confident that our analysis of sub-central 
governments and their degree of 'autonomy' is relatively accurate. 
We recogmse however, that full knowledge of issues such as taxation 
autonomy, expenditure guidelines and intergovernmental policy forums is not yet 
possible. A key goal for future research is to continue to make improvements in 
measurement and information on these issues. 
Fiscal Consolidation and Fiscal Decentralisation: A Tale of Two Tiers 
Having outlined our methodology to identify consolidation attempts and to 
measure their success in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 we began our empirical analysis by 
undertaking a descriptive analysis of consolidation attempts both at the national level 
and at the sub-central level. In doing so, we followed the approach of a number of key 
researchers in the field such as Alesina, Perotti and a variety of co-authors, by 
measuring the average adjustments in key fiscal policy variables during consolidation 
episodes. The advantage of adopting this descriptive approach is the ability to obtain 
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a clear picture of key trends in the data during consolidations, together with 
differences in these trends during successful and unsuccessful attempts. Our novel 
contribution has been to apply this approach to both central and sub-central 
government data so that during a national consolidation attempt the individual 
contributions of each tier and the interactions between the two could be analysed. In 
previous studies the focus has been limited to general government data, with the 
implicit assumption that the central government is entirely responsible for all changes 
in general government fiscal policy. In addition, by extending this analysis to focus 
upon episodes when sub-central governments consolidate, we have undertaken the 
first cross-national study of the adjustment behaviour of sub-central tires. 
In Chapter 3 we demonstrated that most successful national 
consolidation attempts have involved concerted adjustments by both central and sub-
central tiers. This is a key result. We observed that sub-central tiers of government are 
actively involved in national consolidations and assist the central government during 
such periods. We verified that successful general government consolidations tend to 
be based upon expenditure cuts as opposed to increases in revenue and in a new 
observation we demonstrated that the sub-central tier is crucial in achieving such cuts. 
This is especially critical with regard to the government wage bill. Throughout the 
consolidation literature to date, cuts to the government wage bill have been widely 
supported for their ability to have both long-lasting effects on the public purse and to 
potentially generate expansionary non-Keynesian output effects. In an interesting 
result we have been able to show that a large proportion of these cuts have stemmed 
from the sub-central tier and therefore and we have advocated that future attempts at 
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consolidation should be aware of the importance of making cuts to the sub-central 
wage bill. 
In addition, a key observation was made on the role of intergovernmental 
grants during national consolidation attempts. We observed that cuts in central to sub-
central grants were made during successful consolidation attempts but that during 
unsuccessful attempts these grants altered little. We believe this to be an important 
result which previous studies, by ignoring the separation of central and sub-central 
fiscal policy, have not been able to identify. We suggested that these cuts have acted 
as a visible signal of the central government's intention to consolidate and have 
'forced the hand' of the sub-centre. Given their typically limited alternative sources of 
revenues, even marginal changes in grants can have a major impact on expenditure. 
This result provided the motivation for our further research into grants and the 
response of sub-central governments in subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
In the final section of Chapter 3 we examined how sub-central tiers adjusted 
during 'lone' consolidation attempts. Interestingly, in an analogous result to our 
general government study we found that those sub-central consolidations which 
focused upon expenditure cuts, tended to generate longer-term improvements in sub-
central balances than those based upon revenue increases. An apparent downside of 
this, is the observation that a large proportion of the adjustment to sub-central 
expenditures is often borne by capital rather than current expenditure. We concluded 
that this phenomenon may have long-term implications for local service provision. 
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While this descriptive analysis revealed a number of interesting results, a 
limitation of this approach was the restricted focus on the actual period of 
consolidation. Little is known of the behaviour of fiscal policy in the immediately 
surrounding periods. Interesting unexplored questions included whether our identified 
consolidations were sustained and/or whether they occurred in the aftermath of a 
deterioration in the fiscal position etc. The challenge was to find a methodology 
which would allow us to continue with a clear descriptive approach but one that 
would enable us to examine changes in fiscal policy before, during and after a 
consolidation attempt. Previous studies of fiscal consolidations have tended to ignore 
the periods surrounding consolidation or have offered only brief and somewhat ad hoc 
comment. We believe that without an accurate and systematic analysis of the periods 
immediately prior to and following consolidation attempts, a complete picture of the 
common features of successful and unsuccessful attempts cannot be obtained. 
Fiscal Federalism, Fiscal Consolidations and Cuts in Central Government Grants: 
Evidence from an Event Study 
In Chapter 4 we addressed this issue by outlining a new methodological 
approach that would allow examination of fiscal policy behaviour across a number of 
periods and not just during the year of consolidation. We constructed an event study 
in which we compared and contrasted changes in fiscal behaviour across an 'event 
window' with that in 'normal' or reference years. While the methodology we adopted 
has been previously applied in the Finance literature, we believe that its use in the 
context of fiscal consolidation is novel. 
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In addition to re-exammmg the behaviour of central and sub-central 
governments during national consolidation attempts, we also extended our focus to 
examine the behaviour of sub-central governments in response to cuts in their grant 
allocations. The adjustments made by sub-central governments during such episodes 
has attracted widespread attention in the literature but the existing analysis has been 
limited to single country case studies, primarily on US data. The difficulty with such 
studies is that their application to countries with a lesser degree of decentralisation is 
limited. Applying our event study analysis to cuts in intergovernmental grants enabled 
us to conduct as far as we aware, the first cross-country empirical examination of the 
response of sub-central governments to cuts in their grant allocations. We were also 
able to group countries according to their differing degree of decentralisation and 
hence present and discuss results that are of greater relevance to a broad spectrum of 
countries. 
The results from this chapter re-affirmed our belief of the importance of sub-
central governments during national fiscal adjustments. For example, the evidence 
presented here demonstrated the large and sustained adjustments to expenditure and 
revenues that sub-central governments undertook during successful national 
consolidation attempts. In an extension to our analysis in Chapter 3 (and in the 
literature in general), an actual time profile of the adjustments before, during and after 
the period of consolidation was obtained. The importance of grants was further 
emphasised with the observation that successful consolidations typically involved 
large and sustained cuts in intergovernmental grants. 
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A number of key results emerged from our examination of cuts in grant 
allocations. We observed that in response to grant cuts, sub-central governments 
typically responded by cutting their expenditures. In addition, the largest cuts in sub-
central expenditure in response to grant cuts seemed to have occurred in countries 
with the greatest expenditure decentralisation. This implies that, even within countries 
which have a high degree of decentralisation, grant allocations provide an important 
mechanism through which central governments can retain considerable effective 
control over sub-central expenditures. Interestingly, in contrast to studies on US data, 
we have found that cuts in grants are not generally offset by increases in sub-central 
taxation revenues. While there was some evidence of a temporary increase, this effect 
was not sustained. Finally, consistent with our discussions in Chapter 3, we observed 
that capital spending has been an important adjustment mechanism for sub-central 
governments - a result that holds during national consolidation attempts and 
following cuts in grants. 
Assessing the Degree of Central Government Effective Control: Grants versus Tax 
sharing 
In Chapter 5 we changed tack slightly and discussed the important issue of 
central control over sub-central government finance. It has become increasingly 
popular in the literature to view sub-central revenues received from grants and tax-
sharing arrangements as equivalent, given the limited control that sub-central tiers 
have over the actual amount of revenue they ultimately receive. If the centre controls 
the tax base and rate over the shared taxation, the amount of revenue the sub-centre 
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receives is in fact controlled by the centre, even though in accounting terms, such 
revenues are classified as sub-central 'own-source'. 
In this chapter however, we demonstrated that under the most common form 
of tax sharing regime where the tax shares assigned to each tier are either i) fixed by 
the constitution or ii) fixed by some mutually agreed formula that requires the consent 
of both tiers before it can be altered, or iii) where the sub-centre is permitted to set a 
tax within a certain band, the degree of effective central control over sub-central fiscal 
policy is substantially lower than under a system of grant finance. The reason for this 
is relatively simple but it has in our view, been widely overlooked. Under grant 
finance the central government can drive a wedge between the resources they intend 
to raise for sub-central expenditures and what they actually transfer to the sub-centre 
in any given fiscal year. In contrast, under the tax sharing regimes that are common in 
most countries, such as Austria, Germany and many Scandinavian countries, this is 
not possible. In such a scenario while it is possible for the central government to alter 
the actual level of sub-central expenditure, they are required to adjust sub-central 
revenue allocations in a manner that erodes any potential improvement in the fiscal 
deficit/surplus. In short, we demonstrated that under the most common form of tax 
sharing, the centre is unable to 'force a consolidation' on the sub-central tier unlike 
under a system of grant finance. 
This conclusion has important policy implications for countries such as the 
UK and its devolved territories, which are actively contemplating switching from 
grant finance to tax sharing regimes (or vice versa). In the future, it would be 
interesting to focus on the behaviour of sub-central governments to changes in the 
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revenues received from their tax sharing allocations and to compare and contrast this 
with their responsiveness to changes in grants. 
The Impact of Decentralisation on National Consolidation Attempts 
In the 6th and final chapter of the thesis we tested directly whether the extent 
of decentralisation within a country has impacted on the nature of a consolidation 
attempt and ultimately whether it has enhanced or hindered a country's ability to 
consolidate successfully. 
A substantial political economy literature has developed focussing on fiscal 
consolidation attempts and has concluded that political factors such as fragmentation 
and ideology can be important determinants of when and how a consolidation actually 
takes place and whether or not it is ultimately successful. A key hypothesis is that 
fragmentation during the setting of the budget can lead to a consolidation attempt that 
is skewed toward the less 'sensitive' elements of fiscal policy such as revenue and 
capital expenditure. Consequently, by failing to address the key areas of social 
transfers, the government wage bill and government expenditure more generally, this 
reduces the probability of success. 
This literature has however, ignored the practical implications of fiscal policy 
being conducted by a number of distinct tiers of government. The only sources of 
fragmentation which previous studies have tested, lie within the central tier. While it 
is possible that decentralisation may assist the consolidation process, one would 
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expect that fragmenting fiscal policy conduct over a number of government units, 
which mayor may not share the same economic preferences and political motivations, 
will result in successful consolidation becoming more difficult in highly de centralised 
countries. The aim of Chapter 6 was to test this hypothesis. 
At the outset, it was necessary to obtain an accurate measure of sub-central 
decentralisation. To do this, we constructed two measures; one based on the level of 
fiscal decentralisation and the other on the level of sub-central autonomy. Previous 
empirical studies of the impact of decentralisation on economic outcomes have tended 
to use either measures of fiscal or political decentralisation, therefore we constructed 
measures of both. We believe our measure of fiscal decentralisation is an 
improvement on previous measures in that we accounted for the way in which sub-
central expenditures are financed, while recognising the important difference between 
grants and tax sharing highlighted in Chapter 5. Likewise, we believe our measure of 
sub-central political autonomy is an improvement on the standard Federal vs. Unitary 
distinction as account has been taken of other 'political/federal' factors such as the 
explicit rights of sub-central tiers and the degree of regional representation at the 
central level. 
To undertake our empirical examination we adopted a number of alternative 
procedures. For the most part, our main estimation techniques were to employ various 
Limited Dependent Variable models. While the use of binary limited dependent 
variable models have been used previously in the context of fiscal consolidations, our 
use of an ordered model was, to the best of our knowledge, unique. We believe that 
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the ordered model is preferred as this allows more appropriate distinctions to be made 
between the various consolidation attempts. 
Our empirical results are mixed. We found some evidence to suggest that 
those countries with greater levels of decentralisation have biased their consolidation 
attempts toward increases in revenue and away from cuts in expenditure. However, 
they tend not to be significantly less likely to implement a successful consolidation 
than countries with lower levels of decentralisation. These results are a first pass at 
this issue and in the future, with fuller information on the levels and forms of 
decentralisation and the existence of inter-governmental policy institutions, a re-
examination of such issues can be undertaken. 
General Areas for Future Research 
The issues of political fragmentation between tiers and of how conflicts 
develop and are resolved, are important areas for future research. For example, it 
would be interesting to examine whether fragmentation is more likely to exist and be 
of concern when governments of differing ideological colour are in power at different 
tiers. It is possible that co-partisanship may allow the centre to force fiscal discipline 
on certain sub-central units in order to protect the national value of the party label, but 
that other governments may be far less willing to respond. Given data considerations, 
such analysis would probably have to be restricted to individual country studies. 
Nevertheless, important political economy questions and their resolution could be 
analysed. 
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On a cross-national basis there is clear scope for improvements in information 
on sub-central fiscal policy. This is one of the clear goals for future analysis of fiscal 
decentralisation. As discussed above, while the measures we have available provide 
good approximations of fiscal and political autonomy, there are important gaps which 
need to be addressed. Obtaining the necessary information is likely to require careful 
research but attainment of improved measures such as the extent of sub-central 
taxation autonomy, the extent of centrally imposed guidelines, sub-central budgetary 
institutions and so forth is fertile ground for future studies. It would, for example, be 
interesting to examine the extent to which targets and guidelines impact on the 
behaviour of sub-central governments and whether this leads to uniformity in service 
provision. This is an area of research I wish to advance in post-doctoral studies. 
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